Common Living公司于2015年在布魯克林成立,是一種新型住宅物業(yè)管理模式的先驅(qū):它不是出租整個(gè)單元,而是將房間出租給個(gè)人。水電費(fèi)、WiFi網(wǎng)費(fèi)和清潔費(fèi)與租金捆綁在一起,而且公寓內(nèi)家具齊全。
從那時(shí)起,共享居住在美國(guó)和全球各地迅速流行起來,但Common Living作為這種模式的先驅(qū)者,其發(fā)展歷程卻在上月底戛然而止,因?yàn)樵摴拘忌暾?qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)并清算其資產(chǎn)。該公司在美國(guó)12個(gè)城市經(jīng)營(yíng)5,200套公寓,現(xiàn)在它也成為越來越多倒閉的共享居住運(yùn)營(yíng)商的一員。這些運(yùn)營(yíng)商的破產(chǎn),讓人們對(duì)這種模式未來的可行性產(chǎn)生了質(zhì)疑。
2023 年,Common Living與總部位于柏林的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手Habyt合并,成立的聯(lián)合實(shí)體在十幾個(gè)國(guó)家運(yùn)營(yíng)著3萬多套住宅。Habyt首席執(zhí)行官盧卡·博沃尼表示,關(guān)閉Common雖然令人遺憾,但清算Common的資產(chǎn)將使Habyt實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利。
博沃尼對(duì)商業(yè)地產(chǎn)資訊網(wǎng)站Bisnow表示:“這個(gè)決定雖然不是我們所希望的,但它將使Habyt集團(tuán)的其余業(yè)務(wù)更具財(cái)務(wù)靈活性,更有能力加速增長(zhǎng)和創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。”
Common的數(shù)千套住宅將由Outpost Club接管。Outpost Club是采用這一模式中的另一個(gè)巨頭,經(jīng)營(yíng)著紐約市40棟大樓的約1,500套住宅。該公司CEO謝爾蓋·斯塔羅斯汀對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示,在Common申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)之前,Outpost Club已經(jīng)接管了7處物業(yè)的管理權(quán),Outpost的目標(biāo)是Common 50%的庫存。
在疫情期間,許多共享居住公司紛紛倒閉,而Common卻在積極擴(kuò)大其資產(chǎn)組合并進(jìn)行融資。2020年至2022年期間,它收購(gòu)了約5,000套住宅,到2023年,它已獲得了超過1.1億美元風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。但在接受《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》采訪時(shí),該公司創(chuàng)始人布拉德·哈格里夫斯拒絕就Common是否盈利發(fā)表評(píng)論。
Outpost Club的斯塔羅斯汀表示,他認(rèn)為,Common的財(cái)務(wù)困境正是源于推動(dòng)該公司增長(zhǎng)的大量資金,因?yàn)橥顿Y推動(dòng)該公司在納什維爾、渥太華和芝加哥等市場(chǎng)快速擴(kuò)張。
斯塔羅斯汀對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示:“Common需要在很多地方保持快速發(fā)展。”他解釋稱,在一個(gè)新的市場(chǎng)中獲得一處房產(chǎn),就需要建立全新的員工隊(duì)伍和營(yíng)銷業(yè)務(wù)。 “如果將這個(gè)數(shù)字乘以20……這個(gè)過程需要投入巨額成本。我認(rèn)為,擴(kuò)大這種業(yè)務(wù)的規(guī)模,需要更多的時(shí)間。”
Habyt的CEO博沃尼告訴彭博社,Common的破產(chǎn)與該公司的合同和業(yè)務(wù)有關(guān),也與利率壓力增大有關(guān)。
這并不是Outpost第一次介入管理前競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的合同。2019年,Bedly公司倒閉時(shí),Outpost接管了該公司在曼哈頓和新澤西的部分轉(zhuǎn)租協(xié)議;2021年,當(dāng)?shù)聡?guó)公司Quarters宣布破產(chǎn)時(shí),Outpost也采取了同樣的做法。
與Common公司一樣,盡管Quarters公司在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)融資方面大獲成功,但最終依舊倒閉。2019年,Medici Living Group為其德國(guó)子公司融資3億美元,用于擴(kuò)張美國(guó)業(yè)務(wù)。
斯塔羅斯汀表示:“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)不佳,因?yàn)槲覀兛吹皆?0個(gè)或15個(gè)不同市場(chǎng),需求增長(zhǎng)迅速。因此,我認(rèn)為這些公司之所以失敗,是因?yàn)樗鼈儽灰笤谠S多不同的市場(chǎng)上過快發(fā)展,而這在房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)是很難做到的。”
克拉拉·阿羅伊夫是共享居住物業(yè)買賣和投資平臺(tái)Co-Living Cashflow公司的CEO。雖然她說本月早些時(shí)候有關(guān)Common申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)的消息讓她感到不安,但她也表示,考慮到該公司為擴(kuò)張所投入的資金,這并不奇怪。
阿羅伊夫表示:“如果你進(jìn)行過風(fēng)險(xiǎn)融資,你會(huì)面臨快速增長(zhǎng)和交付業(yè)績(jī)的壓力。很多時(shí)候,你會(huì)被迫增加房間數(shù)量、擴(kuò)大需求或市場(chǎng),你要在無法實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利或承受極高營(yíng)業(yè)成本的情況下保持增長(zhǎng)。”阿羅伊夫曾在波士頓創(chuàng)建并經(jīng)營(yíng)一家共享居住公司,該公司在疫情期間倒閉。
斯塔羅斯汀對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示,與其他已經(jīng)倒閉的著名競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手不同,Outpost選擇將其業(yè)務(wù)和擴(kuò)張計(jì)劃集中在紐約,因?yàn)楣疽呀?jīng)在當(dāng)?shù)亟⒘藛T工和營(yíng)銷網(wǎng)絡(luò)。
疫情是對(duì)共享居住模式的嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn),由于許多潛在租戶不愿與陌生人近距離共同居住,導(dǎo)致一些最大的運(yùn)營(yíng)商紛紛倒閉。當(dāng)Quarters倒閉時(shí),它經(jīng)營(yíng)著大約3,000套住宅,并且正在開發(fā)另外1,500套住宅。2021年,共享辦公公司W(wǎng)eWork的共享居住子公司W(wǎng)eLive,以及英國(guó)公司The Collective相繼倒閉。 The Collective在申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)時(shí)擁有約10萬套住宅。
除了疫情、擴(kuò)張帶來的問題和高利率之外,共享居住公司還必須解決其相對(duì)較新的房屋供應(yīng)方式所特有的問題。許多公司在宣傳時(shí),并不把自己當(dāng)作傳統(tǒng)的房東,而是租戶和可用房間之間的橋梁。潛在租戶不必為尋找室友共同租下一套住宅或者簽訂一年租約而煩惱。房間單獨(dú)出租,人們通常只住幾個(gè)月。但這種不固定、不干涉的方式也導(dǎo)致了一些問題。
2022年,據(jù)《野獸日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道,Common Living物業(yè)的一些租戶曾向該公司投訴安全問題、維護(hù)不善以及存在潛在危險(xiǎn)的住戶。一位租戶在公寓群聊中發(fā)帖說,他要放火燒樓——但文章中引用的住戶報(bào)告說,Common的響應(yīng)團(tuán)隊(duì)未能以適當(dāng)或及時(shí)的方式溝通或處理情況。
然而,盡管Common和其他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者相繼倒閉,Co-Living Cashflow的阿羅伊夫和Outpost Club的斯塔羅斯汀表示,他們相信這種商業(yè)模式將繼續(xù)存在。雖然這種模式的發(fā)展一波三折,但共享居住這種理念的核心,即靈活便利的房屋供應(yīng),在年輕租房者中有著足夠多的需求。
阿羅伊夫表示:“年輕人付不起房租,而紐約、波士頓和洛杉磯等地房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的最基本狀況,這些數(shù)字在短期內(nèi)不會(huì)發(fā)生重大變化。但共享居住模式要保持強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng),需要解決一個(gè)問題,那就是這種商業(yè)模式的哪個(gè)部分未能發(fā)揮作用。”
斯塔羅斯汀表示:“這個(gè)行業(yè)已經(jīng)存在。我認(rèn)為它不會(huì)消失。問題只是誰會(huì)在這個(gè)市場(chǎng)上發(fā)展壯大,但市場(chǎng)本身就在那里。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
翻譯:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
Common Living公司于2015年在布魯克林成立,是一種新型住宅物業(yè)管理模式的先驅(qū):它不是出租整個(gè)單元,而是將房間出租給個(gè)人。水電費(fèi)、WiFi網(wǎng)費(fèi)和清潔費(fèi)與租金捆綁在一起,而且公寓內(nèi)家具齊全。
從那時(shí)起,共享居住在美國(guó)和全球各地迅速流行起來,但Common Living作為這種模式的先驅(qū)者,其發(fā)展歷程卻在上月底戛然而止,因?yàn)樵摴拘忌暾?qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)并清算其資產(chǎn)。該公司在美國(guó)12個(gè)城市經(jīng)營(yíng)5,200套公寓,現(xiàn)在它也成為越來越多倒閉的共享居住運(yùn)營(yíng)商的一員。這些運(yùn)營(yíng)商的破產(chǎn),讓人們對(duì)這種模式未來的可行性產(chǎn)生了質(zhì)疑。
2023 年,Common Living與總部位于柏林的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手Habyt合并,成立的聯(lián)合實(shí)體在十幾個(gè)國(guó)家運(yùn)營(yíng)著3萬多套住宅。Habyt首席執(zhí)行官盧卡·博沃尼表示,關(guān)閉Common雖然令人遺憾,但清算Common的資產(chǎn)將使Habyt實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利。
博沃尼對(duì)商業(yè)地產(chǎn)資訊網(wǎng)站Bisnow表示:“這個(gè)決定雖然不是我們所希望的,但它將使Habyt集團(tuán)的其余業(yè)務(wù)更具財(cái)務(wù)靈活性,更有能力加速增長(zhǎng)和創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。”
Common的數(shù)千套住宅將由Outpost Club接管。Outpost Club是采用這一模式中的另一個(gè)巨頭,經(jīng)營(yíng)著紐約市40棟大樓的約1,500套住宅。該公司CEO謝爾蓋·斯塔羅斯汀對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示,在Common申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)之前,Outpost Club已經(jīng)接管了7處物業(yè)的管理權(quán),Outpost的目標(biāo)是Common 50%的庫存。
在疫情期間,許多共享居住公司紛紛倒閉,而Common卻在積極擴(kuò)大其資產(chǎn)組合并進(jìn)行融資。2020年至2022年期間,它收購(gòu)了約5,000套住宅,到2023年,它已獲得了超過1.1億美元風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。但在接受《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》采訪時(shí),該公司創(chuàng)始人布拉德·哈格里夫斯拒絕就Common是否盈利發(fā)表評(píng)論。
Outpost Club的斯塔羅斯汀表示,他認(rèn)為,Common的財(cái)務(wù)困境正是源于推動(dòng)該公司增長(zhǎng)的大量資金,因?yàn)橥顿Y推動(dòng)該公司在納什維爾、渥太華和芝加哥等市場(chǎng)快速擴(kuò)張。
斯塔羅斯汀對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示:“Common需要在很多地方保持快速發(fā)展。”他解釋稱,在一個(gè)新的市場(chǎng)中獲得一處房產(chǎn),就需要建立全新的員工隊(duì)伍和營(yíng)銷業(yè)務(wù)。 “如果將這個(gè)數(shù)字乘以20……這個(gè)過程需要投入巨額成本。我認(rèn)為,擴(kuò)大這種業(yè)務(wù)的規(guī)模,需要更多的時(shí)間。”
Habyt的CEO博沃尼告訴彭博社,Common的破產(chǎn)與該公司的合同和業(yè)務(wù)有關(guān),也與利率壓力增大有關(guān)。
這并不是Outpost第一次介入管理前競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的合同。2019年,Bedly公司倒閉時(shí),Outpost接管了該公司在曼哈頓和新澤西的部分轉(zhuǎn)租協(xié)議;2021年,當(dāng)?shù)聡?guó)公司Quarters宣布破產(chǎn)時(shí),Outpost也采取了同樣的做法。
與Common公司一樣,盡管Quarters公司在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)融資方面大獲成功,但最終依舊倒閉。2019年,Medici Living Group為其德國(guó)子公司融資3億美元,用于擴(kuò)張美國(guó)業(yè)務(wù)。
斯塔羅斯汀表示:“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)不佳,因?yàn)槲覀兛吹皆?0個(gè)或15個(gè)不同市場(chǎng),需求增長(zhǎng)迅速。因此,我認(rèn)為這些公司之所以失敗,是因?yàn)樗鼈儽灰笤谠S多不同的市場(chǎng)上過快發(fā)展,而這在房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)是很難做到的。”
克拉拉·阿羅伊夫是共享居住物業(yè)買賣和投資平臺(tái)Co-Living Cashflow公司的CEO。雖然她說本月早些時(shí)候有關(guān)Common申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)的消息讓她感到不安,但她也表示,考慮到該公司為擴(kuò)張所投入的資金,這并不奇怪。
阿羅伊夫表示:“如果你進(jìn)行過風(fēng)險(xiǎn)融資,你會(huì)面臨快速增長(zhǎng)和交付業(yè)績(jī)的壓力。很多時(shí)候,你會(huì)被迫增加房間數(shù)量、擴(kuò)大需求或市場(chǎng),你要在無法實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利或承受極高營(yíng)業(yè)成本的情況下保持增長(zhǎng)。”阿羅伊夫曾在波士頓創(chuàng)建并經(jīng)營(yíng)一家共享居住公司,該公司在疫情期間倒閉。
斯塔羅斯汀對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示,與其他已經(jīng)倒閉的著名競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手不同,Outpost選擇將其業(yè)務(wù)和擴(kuò)張計(jì)劃集中在紐約,因?yàn)楣疽呀?jīng)在當(dāng)?shù)亟⒘藛T工和營(yíng)銷網(wǎng)絡(luò)。
疫情是對(duì)共享居住模式的嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn),由于許多潛在租戶不愿與陌生人近距離共同居住,導(dǎo)致一些最大的運(yùn)營(yíng)商紛紛倒閉。當(dāng)Quarters倒閉時(shí),它經(jīng)營(yíng)著大約3,000套住宅,并且正在開發(fā)另外1,500套住宅。2021年,共享辦公公司W(wǎng)eWork的共享居住子公司W(wǎng)eLive,以及英國(guó)公司The Collective相繼倒閉。 The Collective在申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)時(shí)擁有約10萬套住宅。
除了疫情、擴(kuò)張帶來的問題和高利率之外,共享居住公司還必須解決其相對(duì)較新的房屋供應(yīng)方式所特有的問題。許多公司在宣傳時(shí),并不把自己當(dāng)作傳統(tǒng)的房東,而是租戶和可用房間之間的橋梁。潛在租戶不必為尋找室友共同租下一套住宅或者簽訂一年租約而煩惱。房間單獨(dú)出租,人們通常只住幾個(gè)月。但這種不固定、不干涉的方式也導(dǎo)致了一些問題。
2022年,據(jù)《野獸日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道,Common Living物業(yè)的一些租戶曾向該公司投訴安全問題、維護(hù)不善以及存在潛在危險(xiǎn)的住戶。一位租戶在公寓群聊中發(fā)帖說,他要放火燒樓——但文章中引用的住戶報(bào)告說,Common的響應(yīng)團(tuán)隊(duì)未能以適當(dāng)或及時(shí)的方式溝通或處理情況。
然而,盡管Common和其他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者相繼倒閉,Co-Living Cashflow的阿羅伊夫和Outpost Club的斯塔羅斯汀表示,他們相信這種商業(yè)模式將繼續(xù)存在。雖然這種模式的發(fā)展一波三折,但共享居住這種理念的核心,即靈活便利的房屋供應(yīng),在年輕租房者中有著足夠多的需求。
阿羅伊夫表示:“年輕人付不起房租,而紐約、波士頓和洛杉磯等地房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的最基本狀況,這些數(shù)字在短期內(nèi)不會(huì)發(fā)生重大變化。但共享居住模式要保持強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng),需要解決一個(gè)問題,那就是這種商業(yè)模式的哪個(gè)部分未能發(fā)揮作用。”
斯塔羅斯汀表示:“這個(gè)行業(yè)已經(jīng)存在。我認(rèn)為它不會(huì)消失。問題只是誰會(huì)在這個(gè)市場(chǎng)上發(fā)展壯大,但市場(chǎng)本身就在那里。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
翻譯:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
Common Living, which was founded in Brooklyn in 2015, was a pioneer of a new venture in residential property management: Rather than leasing out entire units, rooms would be rented out to individuals. Utilities, WiFi, and cleaning costs would be bundled together with rent—and apartments would be fully furnished.
Since then, co-living has ballooned across the U.S. and around the globe, but Common Living’s journey as a trailblazer of the model ended unceremoniously late last month when the company announced it was filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and liquidating its assets. The firm, which operated a U.S. portfolio of 5,200 units in 12 cities, now joins a growing list of co-living operators who have flamed out, leaving questions about the future viability of the model.
In 2023, Common Living merged with a Berlin-based competitor, Habyt, creating a joined entity that operated more than 30,000 units in more than a dozen countries. Luca Bovone, Habyt’s CEO, said that while closing Common was unfortunate, its liquidation would make Habyt a profitable company.
“This decision, although not what we had hoped for, will make the remainder of the Habyt group more financially agile, with greater capacity to accelerate growth and generate value,” Bovone told Bisnow, a site dedicated to commercial real estate news.
Thousands of Common’s units are going to be taken over by Outpost Club, another giant in the model that already operates around 1,500 units in 40 buildings in New York City. Sergii Starostin, the firm’s CEO, told Fortune the company had taken over management of seven properties before the bankruptcy was filed, and that Outpost was targeting 50% of Common’s inventory.
While many co-living companies went out of business during the pandemic, Common was aggressively expanding its portfolio and raising funding. It acquired around 5,000 units between 2020 and 2022, and by 2023 it had raised more than $110 million in venture capital. However, in an interview with the New York Times, company founder Brad Hargreaves declined to comment on whether Common was profitable or not.
Outpost Club’s Starostin said he believed the massive funding that fueled Common may have actually contributed to its financial troubles, as investments drove the company to expand at a rapid pace in markets like Nashville, Ottawa, and Chicago.
“Common needed to grow in many places very fast,” Starostin told Fortune, explaining that picking up a single property in a new market requires building completely new staff and marketing operations. “And when you multiply that by 20…that becomes a pretty expensive journey. My opinion is that to scale this kind of business, it just takes more time.”
Habyt CEO Bovone told Bloomberg that Common’s bankruptcy was related to the company’s contracts and business, as well as the increased pressure of interest rates.
This isn’t the first time Outpost has stepped in to manage a former competitor’s contracts. It took over some of Bedly’s sublease agreements in Manhattan and New Jersey when the company shut down in 2019, and it did the same when the German company Quarters declared bankruptcy in 2021.
Like Common, Quarters failed despite its success in raising venture capital. The Medici Living Group raised $300 million for its German subsidiary to expand in the U.S. in 2019.
“Venture Capital is not working very well with real estate, because we see demands to grow in like 10 or 15 different markets pretty rapidly,” Starostin said. “So I think that those companies failed because they were demanded to grow too fast in many different markets, and that is very difficult to do in real estate.”
Clara Arroyave is the CEO of Co-Living Cashflow, a platform to buy, sell, and invest in co-living properties. While she said she was upset by the news about Common earlier this month, she also said it wasn’t surprising considering the amount of investment staked in the company’s expansion.
“When you raise venture capital, you’re pressured to grow and to deliver very quickly,” said Arroyave, who founded and ran a co-living company in Boston before it went out of business during the pandemic. “And many times you’re pushed to expand your amount of rooms or demand or market, and you keep growing without profitability or having a very high overhead cost.”
Unlike other prominent competitors that have flamed out, Starostin told Fortune that Outpost has chosen to concentrate its operations—and plans for expansion—in New York, where the company already has established staff and marketing networks.
The pandemic was a serious test for the model, and some of its biggest operators shuttered as many prospective tenants veered away from close-quartered living arrangements with strangers. When Quarters went down, it operated around 3,000 units and was developing 1,500 more. 2021 also saw the demise of WeLive, the co-living offshoot of WeWork, and The Collective, a U.K.-based firm that had almost 100,000 units in its portfolio when it declared bankruptcy.
Beyond the pandemic, problems with expansion, and high interest rates, co-living companies have to grapple with problems more specific to their still relatively new approach to housing. Many companies advertise themselves less as traditional landlords, and more as platforms to connect people with available rooms. Prospective renters don’t have to worry about finding roommates to go in on a full unit, or a yearlong lease. Rooms are rented individually, and people often stay just a few months. But the somewhat fluid, hands-off approach has led to problems in some instances.
In 2022, the Daily Beast reported that some tenants of Common Living properties had complained to the company about security issues, poor maintenance, and occupants living on site who were potentially dangerous. One tenant posted in an apartment group chat that he was going to set fire to the building—but the residents quoted in the article reported that Common’s response team failed to communicate or handle situations in an appropriate or timely manner.
And yet despite the shutdown of Common and other competitors, Co-Living Cashflow’s Arroyave and Outpost Club’s Starostin said they believe the business model is here to stay. While it has progressed in fits and starts, the flexibility and easy access to housing at the core of the co-living idea is something that there is more than enough demand for among young renters.
“Young people cannot afford rent, and the fundamentals of housing—in New York, in Boston, in L.A.—the numbers are not going to change dramatically anytime soon,” Arroyave said. “But for co-living to stay strong, the question is, what is the part of the business model that is not working?”
“The move is already there,” Starostin said. “I don’t think it will go anywhere. It’s just a question of who will grow in this market, but the market itself is there.”