眾所周知,特朗普本周正在琢磨著封禁字節(jié)跳動(dòng)旗下受到歡迎的短視頻應(yīng)用程序TikTok。就在特朗普揚(yáng)言要下架TikTok的前一天,美國國務(wù)卿蓬佩奧也發(fā)表了類似的言論。
然而,就算特朗普政府轟轟烈烈地大談“封禁”,也沒有人知道他們到底要如何才能把這件事施行下去。在美國,任何強(qiáng)行禁止用戶使用App的行為都是違反憲法的,此舉必將受到數(shù)百萬人的抵制,尤其是美國的年輕人。對(duì)他們而言,TikTok已然成為了一種獨(dú)特的文化表達(dá)方式。
宣傳數(shù)字版權(quán)的法律組織電子前線基金會(huì)(宣傳數(shù)字版權(quán)的法律組織)的律師表示,與其把特朗普“封禁TikTok”之語當(dāng)作一項(xiàng)可行的政策,還不如說是一種氣勢洶洶的恐嚇。
該基金會(huì)的法律顧問庫爾特?奧普薩爾認(rèn)為,白宮目前的措施主要是以下幾種:其一,禁止聯(lián)邦政府的工作人員使用TikTok;其二,禁止任何形式的聯(lián)邦政府資金流向TikTok;其三,利用《出口管制條例》實(shí)行“合作許可證”政策,阻礙本土企業(yè)與TikTok的合作行為。相對(duì)而言,第三種方案要更為激進(jìn),主要針對(duì)的是蘋果及谷歌兩家公司,因?yàn)檫@兩者的應(yīng)用商店是大部分用戶下載TikTok最主要的途徑。
一年前,美國曾經(jīng)用過類似的方法來制裁中國的華為和中興,但當(dāng)制裁對(duì)象變?yōu)橐粋€(gè)App的時(shí)候,這一切還能再生效么?一方面,美國《出口管制條例》禁止的是芯片或者技術(shù)的出口,但蘋果和谷歌的應(yīng)用商店僅僅是一種服務(wù),并不能稱作為技術(shù)。另一方面,TikTok的運(yùn)營主體本來就位于美國當(dāng)?shù)兀耆梢詫?duì)這種出口規(guī)定提出申訴。
至此,“是否能夠封禁TikTok”這個(gè)問題已經(jīng)變得相當(dāng)復(fù)雜,更何況TikTok在本質(zhì)上是一種軟件代碼,而軟件代碼的發(fā)布和使用又是受到美國憲法《第一修正案》的保護(hù)的。
在分析這個(gè)問題時(shí),電子前線基金會(huì)的高級(jí)律師米奇?斯托爾茨提到了一個(gè)最近發(fā)生的案例,在這個(gè)案例中,聯(lián)邦政府試圖借助與“武器出口”相關(guān)的條規(guī),以審查為由,強(qiáng)迫一位密碼學(xué)研究者上交他的代碼。該案最終被美國第九巡回法院判決為無效,這進(jìn)一步說明了TikTok也會(huì)受到美國法律的保護(hù),想要封禁它,并非是一件易事。
不過,以上這些因素并不意味著特朗普政府會(huì)對(duì)TikTok束手無策。目前,美國兩黨參議員都在呼吁深入調(diào)查TikTok,包括印度在內(nèi)的其他國家已經(jīng)采取了明確的措施下架TikTok。只能說在短期,TikTok還不會(huì)太快地淡出美國人的視線。
“我們可以盡情地預(yù)測美國政府可能會(huì)采取的舉措,但對(duì)政府本身而言,如何讓這個(gè)制裁合法化,如果使大眾接受并理解這個(gè)行為,才是問題的關(guān)鍵所在。”奧普薩爾說道。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
編譯:陳怡軒
眾所周知,特朗普本周正在琢磨著封禁字節(jié)跳動(dòng)旗下受到歡迎的短視頻應(yīng)用程序TikTok。就在特朗普揚(yáng)言要下架TikTok的前一天,美國國務(wù)卿蓬佩奧也發(fā)表了類似的言論。
然而,就算特朗普政府轟轟烈烈地大談“封禁”,也沒有人知道他們到底要如何才能把這件事施行下去。在美國,任何強(qiáng)行禁止用戶使用App的行為都是違反憲法的,此舉必將受到數(shù)百萬人的抵制,尤其是美國的年輕人。對(duì)他們而言,TikTok已然成為了一種獨(dú)特的文化表達(dá)方式。
宣傳數(shù)字版權(quán)的法律組織電子前線基金會(huì)(宣傳數(shù)字版權(quán)的法律組織)的律師表示,與其把特朗普“封禁TikTok”之語當(dāng)作一項(xiàng)可行的政策,還不如說是一種氣勢洶洶的恐嚇。
該基金會(huì)的法律顧問庫爾特?奧普薩爾認(rèn)為,白宮目前的措施主要是以下幾種:其一,禁止聯(lián)邦政府的工作人員使用TikTok;其二,禁止任何形式的聯(lián)邦政府資金流向TikTok;其三,利用《出口管制條例》實(shí)行“合作許可證”政策,阻礙本土企業(yè)與TikTok的合作行為。相對(duì)而言,第三種方案要更為激進(jìn),主要針對(duì)的是蘋果及谷歌兩家公司,因?yàn)檫@兩者的應(yīng)用商店是大部分用戶下載TikTok最主要的途徑。
一年前,美國曾經(jīng)用過類似的方法來制裁中國的華為和中興,但當(dāng)制裁對(duì)象變?yōu)橐粋€(gè)App的時(shí)候,這一切還能再生效么?一方面,美國《出口管制條例》禁止的是芯片或者技術(shù)的出口,但蘋果和谷歌的應(yīng)用商店僅僅是一種服務(wù),并不能稱作為技術(shù)。另一方面,TikTok的運(yùn)營主體本來就位于美國當(dāng)?shù)兀耆梢詫?duì)這種出口規(guī)定提出申訴。
至此,“是否能夠封禁TikTok”這個(gè)問題已經(jīng)變得相當(dāng)復(fù)雜,更何況TikTok在本質(zhì)上是一種軟件代碼,而軟件代碼的發(fā)布和使用又是受到美國憲法《第一修正案》的保護(hù)的。
在分析這個(gè)問題時(shí),電子前線基金會(huì)的高級(jí)律師米奇?斯托爾茨提到了一個(gè)最近發(fā)生的案例,在這個(gè)案例中,聯(lián)邦政府試圖借助與“武器出口”相關(guān)的條規(guī),以審查為由,強(qiáng)迫一位密碼學(xué)研究者上交他的代碼。該案最終被美國第九巡回法院判決為無效,這進(jìn)一步說明了TikTok也會(huì)受到美國法律的保護(hù),想要封禁它,并非是一件易事。
不過,以上這些因素并不意味著特朗普政府會(huì)對(duì)TikTok束手無策。目前,美國兩黨參議員都在呼吁深入調(diào)查TikTok,包括印度在內(nèi)的其他國家已經(jīng)采取了明確的措施下架TikTok。只能說在短期,TikTok還不會(huì)太快地淡出美國人的視線。
“我們可以盡情地預(yù)測美國政府可能會(huì)采取的舉措,但對(duì)政府本身而言,如何讓這個(gè)制裁合法化,如果使大眾接受并理解這個(gè)行為,才是問題的關(guān)鍵所在。”奧普薩爾說道。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
編譯:陳怡軒
President Trump this week mused about barring the popular short video app TikTok. His comments came a day after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo floated such a ban as part of an escalating trade war with China. TikTok is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance.
But while the Trump administration has talked about “banning” TikTok, it’s unclear how exactly such a ban would be carried out. Any sort of decree ordering people not to use the app would likely be unconstitutional—and would be met with resistance from millions of Americans, especially young ones, for whom TikTok has become a form of cultural expression.
According to lawyers at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a digital rights group, Trump's pledge to ban TikTok may reflect bluster more than any sort of coherent policy.
Kurt Opsahl, general counsel of EFF, says the White House could attempt tactics such as barring federal workers from using TikTok or preventing federal money from being spent on the app. A more aggressive approach, he suggests, could involve using export regulations to require U.S. companies to obtain a license to do business with TikTok. For practical purposes, such a licensing requirement would likely target Apple and Google, whose app stores are where the vast majority of people get the TikTok app in the first place.
But it’s unclear if export regulations—which the U.S. has successfully employed to limit Chinese hardware manufacturers like Huawei and ZTE—could apply to something like an app. The use of such regulations typically entails barring a U.S. company from exporting chips or other technology, and Apple and Google don’t appear to do anything of the sort in providing their app stores. Moreover, TikTok has significant U.S.-based operations and could argue export regulations don’t apply to them.
Any proposal to “ban” TikTok is further complicated by the fact that the app is a type of software code, and courts have found that publishing and using code can be protected by the First Amendment.
Mitch Stoltz, a senior attorney at EFF, points to a recent case in which the Ninth Circuit of Appeals ruled the federal government could not use regulations related to weapons exports to force a cryptography researcher to submit his code for license and review. This suggests any attempt to ban TikTok could face legal challenges invoking free speech.
All of this doesn’t mean attempts to limit TikTok will fail. Senators of both parties have called for investigations of the app’s ties to China, and other countries—notably India—are taking measures to ban the app. But in the short term, Americans can feel confident TikTok is not going away anytime soon.
“We could spend a lot of time spinning our wheels trying to anticipate ways that the administration could try to ban, but it still remains their job to figure out what they meant, and explain how it is a lawful and constitutional exercise of executive power,” says Opsahl.