2008年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)引發(fā)了美國(guó)歷史上最轟動(dòng)的一些破產(chǎn)案例,包括雷曼兄弟、通用汽車和華盛頓互惠銀行。如今,冠狀病毒疫情全球爆發(fā),可能引發(fā)更嚴(yán)重的危機(jī),其他大公司也面臨著類似的命運(yùn)。
“全美和全球的破產(chǎn)律師都正在為破產(chǎn)潮做準(zhǔn)備。”奧睿律所資深律師馬克·萊文森說。
萊文森和其他專家稱,破產(chǎn)潮要在數(shù)月之后才能完全顯現(xiàn),目前,公司和出借方依然在努力評(píng)估危機(jī)的破壞程度和政府的應(yīng)對(duì)舉措,但有鑒于新冠疫情的性質(zhì),很多行業(yè),如旅游、酒店和娛樂業(yè)里的公司都必然會(huì)面臨財(cái)務(wù)災(zāi)難。
一些受創(chuàng)最嚴(yán)重的公司可能會(huì)被迫清算,但更多的美國(guó)公司可能傾向于按照該國(guó)《破產(chǎn)法》第11章來申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù),依據(jù)這一條法令,公司可在聯(lián)邦破產(chǎn)法官監(jiān)督下,重新與供應(yīng)商和雇員協(xié)商債務(wù)條款和合約義務(wù)。依據(jù)第11章進(jìn)行的成功重組可以防止公司在營(yíng)收大幅下跌時(shí)倒閉,在當(dāng)前的新冠疫情這類危機(jī)期間,這條法令是一個(gè)有著重要價(jià)值的工具。
好消息是,相對(duì)于2008-09年期間,目前政府決策者和美國(guó)破產(chǎn)管理體制的準(zhǔn)備更為充分,因而能夠更好地應(yīng)對(duì)即將到來的倒閉潮,但當(dāng)前的危機(jī)也為政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者們出了一個(gè)難題:是否應(yīng)該通過撥款或貸款幫助某些行業(yè)擺脫困境,就像現(xiàn)在國(guó)會(huì)正打算對(duì)航空業(yè)施加的緊急援助那樣,還是說寄希望于第11章的規(guī)定,讓企業(yè)重塑自身財(cái)務(wù)健康。
雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)是前車之鑒
投行雷曼兄弟在2008年9月15日的突然破產(chǎn)成為了金融危機(jī)的標(biāo)志性時(shí)刻之一,眾多驚慌失措、衣冠楚楚的交易員在一夜之間成為了曼哈頓街頭的淪落人。雷曼混亂的倒閉場(chǎng)面也助推了更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩,也就是眾所周知的“經(jīng)濟(jì)大衰退”。
“大多數(shù)破產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者都有一個(gè)共識(shí),雷曼的破產(chǎn)處理是很笨拙的。” 哥倫比亞大學(xué)法學(xué)教授艾德·莫里森說,“雷曼轟然倒塌,沒有人試著挽救它,這也給其他銀行帶來了不確定因素。”
莫里森表示,雷曼混亂的倒閉場(chǎng)面之所以發(fā)生,是因?yàn)闆Q策者在解決雷曼窘境的根本原因上行動(dòng)緩慢,那就是信貸安排失靈,它帶來的流動(dòng)性危機(jī)讓雷曼無法償還債務(wù)。政府的猶豫不決也營(yíng)造了一種不確定氛圍,讓經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)雪上加霜。
最終,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)和財(cái)政部聯(lián)手出臺(tái)了一些政策工具,主要以借貸擔(dān)保的形式來防止其他銀行的倒閉,確保市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性,但這些政策出臺(tái)之際,經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了更大范圍的危機(jī)。
在當(dāng)前的新冠疫情危機(jī)中,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)迅速部署了08年后開發(fā)的用于規(guī)避經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的政策工具,其中包括買進(jìn)學(xué)生、企業(yè)債務(wù)和抵押支持債券的緊急借貸安排。
所有這一切,再加上08年后,銀行業(yè)“壓力測(cè)試”中,要求銀行加大現(xiàn)金儲(chǔ)備以應(yīng)對(duì)緊急情況的要求,這些都有助于預(yù)防金融領(lǐng)域再次出現(xiàn)雷曼式的崩塌。
對(duì)于金融業(yè)來說,這些經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)防措施尤為重要,因?yàn)榧词埂镀飘a(chǎn)法》第11章可以防止債權(quán)人收繳破產(chǎn)公司資產(chǎn),但這條“安全港”條款并不包含金融公司。“破產(chǎn)法對(duì)于拯救銀行來說并不是很理想,當(dāng)雷曼兄弟提出申請(qǐng)時(shí),破產(chǎn)法提供的保護(hù)非常有限,因此債權(quán)人毫無顧忌地瓜分了他們的資產(chǎn)。”莫里森說。
但對(duì)于零售商、電影院、賭場(chǎng)和度假服務(wù)提供商而言,他們完全可以尋求《破產(chǎn)法》的保護(hù)。威嘉律師事務(wù)所重組業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)席主席嘉里·霍爾茨說,如果這些行業(yè)無法獲得新的流動(dòng)性,那么它們?cè)诮酉聛淼膸讉€(gè)月中均面臨破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
霍爾茨說,他的電話已在響個(gè)不停,大公司紛紛致電詢問如何終止合約,如何獲得信貸額度,以及如何應(yīng)對(duì)接下來的局面。
現(xiàn)成法律可保護(hù)受困企業(yè)
國(guó)會(huì)已經(jīng)為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)準(zhǔn)備了2萬億美元的拯救方案,其中數(shù)億美元用于援助航空公司和其他受沖擊行業(yè)。但是,盡管這些企業(yè)所面臨的困境是顯而易見的,也有人對(duì)國(guó)會(huì)援助的必要性表示質(zhì)疑。
“決策者看似對(duì)破產(chǎn)十分抵觸,這是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。” 哥大的莫里森說,“既然我們有《破產(chǎn)法》第11章這個(gè)現(xiàn)成的方法來解決航空公司危機(jī),那么為什么還要給他們?nèi)鲥X呢?”
莫里森表示,有序的破產(chǎn)能夠讓公司在維持運(yùn)營(yíng)的同時(shí),清理資產(chǎn)負(fù)債,而且在很多情況下還能為未來的盈利做好鋪墊。他提到,2009年通用汽車依據(jù)第11章破產(chǎn),就是一個(gè)典型案例,盡管這一過程中,有很多政客和工會(huì)從中阻撓。
加州大學(xué)黑斯廷斯法學(xué)院破產(chǎn)法學(xué)者杰瑞德·埃利亞斯提到了2009年另一件依第11章成功申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)的案例,申請(qǐng)者是購(gòu)物中心物業(yè)主“通用增長(zhǎng)物業(yè)公司”(General Growth Properties),這個(gè)案例對(duì)于當(dāng)前的新冠危機(jī)尤為有借鑒意義。在他看來,通用增長(zhǎng)在當(dāng)時(shí)是一家一流的公司,其申請(qǐng)300億美元的破產(chǎn)保護(hù),是為了免遭投機(jī)債權(quán)人的毒手,這些人希望將其資產(chǎn)止贖,待金融危機(jī)過后再倒手賣個(gè)好價(jià)錢。最后,這家房產(chǎn)公司在第11章的保護(hù)下挺過了危機(jī),減少了債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān),并將一部分資產(chǎn)剝離至一家新公司。
在當(dāng)前危機(jī)中,埃利亞斯認(rèn)為,通用增長(zhǎng)物業(yè)公司成功的破產(chǎn)保護(hù)流程可以為滑雪勝地、郵輪運(yùn)營(yíng)商、酒店和出現(xiàn)巨額財(cái)務(wù)損失的其他行業(yè)提供了一個(gè)可參考的路線圖。與此同時(shí),破產(chǎn)法近期有所修改,簡(jiǎn)化版的第11章可適用于更多的小型企業(yè)。奧睿律所的律師萊文森稱,這里的小企業(yè)是指無需向美國(guó)證券委員會(huì)報(bào)備,且債務(wù)低于200萬美元的企業(yè)。
就大公司而言,使用破產(chǎn)法第11章而不是接受政府緊急援助,還有著道德層面上的意義。莫里森指出,政府為航空等行業(yè)提供的救濟(jì)款來自每一位納稅人,如果被援助行業(yè)后續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)不善,所有的納稅人,包括低收入人群,都要承擔(dān)損失。相比之下,破產(chǎn)保護(hù)申請(qǐng)通常意味著損失僅由其股東來消化。莫里森認(rèn)為,后者更為公平,因?yàn)楣蓶|從一開始就對(duì)這樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)做了背書。
莫里森和其他人還指出,航空公司、賭場(chǎng)和其他遭受疫情沖擊的公司,此前曾經(jīng)歷過破產(chǎn)的,現(xiàn)在仍可以再次申請(qǐng)。
但是,盡管無論從現(xiàn)實(shí)還是道義上講,大企業(yè)申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)都更有道理,但它從政治上講卻并不有利,比如,第11章實(shí)施后,就會(huì)出現(xiàn)更多的失業(yè)。此外,莫里森表示,特朗普總統(tǒng)愛用股市指數(shù)的攀升來標(biāo)榜其執(zhí)政的成功,然而,一旦諸多美國(guó)大型企業(yè)申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù),這些指數(shù)會(huì)應(yīng)聲下跌。
未來會(huì)“面目全非”
盡管上一次金融危機(jī)的破產(chǎn)潮為當(dāng)前的疫情危機(jī)提供了一些可借鑒的經(jīng)驗(yàn),但專家們表示,當(dāng)前的不確定性因素太多,所以很難做出明確的預(yù)測(cè),一是不知道疫情到底造成了多大的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失,二則取決于美國(guó)政府的應(yīng)對(duì)舉措。不過,近些天來,各項(xiàng)應(yīng)對(duì)措施的細(xì)節(jié),包括大規(guī)模的刺激方案,變得逐漸明朗起來。
然而,這里還有一個(gè)更大的不確定性,那就是,因?yàn)橐咔楹腿穗H隔離,消費(fèi)者生活、工作和購(gòu)物的方式可能會(huì)發(fā)生永久的變化,這就更難去預(yù)測(cè),陷入困境的公司到底是不是還有前途。
黑斯廷斯法學(xué)院的埃利亞斯教授表示,一切事物的需求,從辦公空間到餐廳座椅,在疫情過后都會(huì)出現(xiàn)很大的變化。這會(huì)使得那些債權(quán)人和重組專家們,在公司要推動(dòng)破產(chǎn)重組申請(qǐng)時(shí),不會(huì)很積極,因?yàn)椋麄兊墓ぷ魇窃u(píng)估公司未來的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值,所以,他們一定要確認(rèn)公司在疫情危機(jī)后的盈利能力,才會(huì)真正去推動(dòng)重組。
威嘉律所的霍爾茨說,當(dāng)前危機(jī)有別于上一場(chǎng)金融危機(jī)的另一點(diǎn),在于大公司業(yè)務(wù)全球化的程度。他預(yù)測(cè),冠狀疫情危機(jī)后,更多公司可能會(huì)搬遷去那些有著優(yōu)惠經(jīng)濟(jì)措施,更容易宣布破產(chǎn)的地方,或者干脆撤出其他地區(qū)。
政府援助與破產(chǎn)重組相結(jié)合,應(yīng)該基本可以幫助大多數(shù)受沖擊最嚴(yán)重的企業(yè)度過危機(jī),但他們的業(yè)務(wù)可能在未來發(fā)生巨大的變化。“我們很難弄清楚疫情之后會(huì)是什么情況。歷史告訴我們,當(dāng)很多事情一起發(fā)生的時(shí)候,一切都會(huì)變得面目全非。”埃利亞斯說。
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
責(zé)編:雨晨
2008年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)引發(fā)了美國(guó)歷史上最轟動(dòng)的一些破產(chǎn)案例,包括雷曼兄弟、通用汽車和華盛頓互惠銀行。如今,冠狀病毒疫情全球爆發(fā),可能引發(fā)更嚴(yán)重的危機(jī),其他大公司也面臨著類似的命運(yùn)。
“全美和全球的破產(chǎn)律師都正在為破產(chǎn)潮做準(zhǔn)備。”奧睿律所資深律師馬克·萊文森說。
萊文森和其他專家稱,破產(chǎn)潮要在數(shù)月之后才能完全顯現(xiàn),目前,公司和出借方依然在努力評(píng)估危機(jī)的破壞程度和政府的應(yīng)對(duì)舉措,但有鑒于新冠疫情的性質(zhì),很多行業(yè),如旅游、酒店和娛樂業(yè)里的公司都必然會(huì)面臨財(cái)務(wù)災(zāi)難。
一些受創(chuàng)最嚴(yán)重的公司可能會(huì)被迫清算,但更多的美國(guó)公司可能傾向于按照該國(guó)《破產(chǎn)法》第11章來申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù),依據(jù)這一條法令,公司可在聯(lián)邦破產(chǎn)法官監(jiān)督下,重新與供應(yīng)商和雇員協(xié)商債務(wù)條款和合約義務(wù)。依據(jù)第11章進(jìn)行的成功重組可以防止公司在營(yíng)收大幅下跌時(shí)倒閉,在當(dāng)前的新冠疫情這類危機(jī)期間,這條法令是一個(gè)有著重要價(jià)值的工具。
好消息是,相對(duì)于2008-09年期間,目前政府決策者和美國(guó)破產(chǎn)管理體制的準(zhǔn)備更為充分,因而能夠更好地應(yīng)對(duì)即將到來的倒閉潮,但當(dāng)前的危機(jī)也為政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者們出了一個(gè)難題:是否應(yīng)該通過撥款或貸款幫助某些行業(yè)擺脫困境,就像現(xiàn)在國(guó)會(huì)正打算對(duì)航空業(yè)施加的緊急援助那樣,還是說寄希望于第11章的規(guī)定,讓企業(yè)重塑自身財(cái)務(wù)健康。
雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)是前車之鑒
投行雷曼兄弟在2008年9月15日的突然破產(chǎn)成為了金融危機(jī)的標(biāo)志性時(shí)刻之一,眾多驚慌失措、衣冠楚楚的交易員在一夜之間成為了曼哈頓街頭的淪落人。雷曼混亂的倒閉場(chǎng)面也助推了更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩,也就是眾所周知的“經(jīng)濟(jì)大衰退”。
“大多數(shù)破產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者都有一個(gè)共識(shí),雷曼的破產(chǎn)處理是很笨拙的。” 哥倫比亞大學(xué)法學(xué)教授艾德·莫里森說,“雷曼轟然倒塌,沒有人試著挽救它,這也給其他銀行帶來了不確定因素。”
莫里森表示,雷曼混亂的倒閉場(chǎng)面之所以發(fā)生,是因?yàn)闆Q策者在解決雷曼窘境的根本原因上行動(dòng)緩慢,那就是信貸安排失靈,它帶來的流動(dòng)性危機(jī)讓雷曼無法償還債務(wù)。政府的猶豫不決也營(yíng)造了一種不確定氛圍,讓經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)雪上加霜。
最終,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)和財(cái)政部聯(lián)手出臺(tái)了一些政策工具,主要以借貸擔(dān)保的形式來防止其他銀行的倒閉,確保市場(chǎng)流動(dòng)性,但這些政策出臺(tái)之際,經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了更大范圍的危機(jī)。
在當(dāng)前的新冠疫情危機(jī)中,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)迅速部署了08年后開發(fā)的用于規(guī)避經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的政策工具,其中包括買進(jìn)學(xué)生、企業(yè)債務(wù)和抵押支持債券的緊急借貸安排。
所有這一切,再加上08年后,銀行業(yè)“壓力測(cè)試”中,要求銀行加大現(xiàn)金儲(chǔ)備以應(yīng)對(duì)緊急情況的要求,這些都有助于預(yù)防金融領(lǐng)域再次出現(xiàn)雷曼式的崩塌。
對(duì)于金融業(yè)來說,這些經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)防措施尤為重要,因?yàn)榧词埂镀飘a(chǎn)法》第11章可以防止債權(quán)人收繳破產(chǎn)公司資產(chǎn),但這條“安全港”條款并不包含金融公司。“破產(chǎn)法對(duì)于拯救銀行來說并不是很理想,當(dāng)雷曼兄弟提出申請(qǐng)時(shí),破產(chǎn)法提供的保護(hù)非常有限,因此債權(quán)人毫無顧忌地瓜分了他們的資產(chǎn)。”莫里森說。
但對(duì)于零售商、電影院、賭場(chǎng)和度假服務(wù)提供商而言,他們完全可以尋求《破產(chǎn)法》的保護(hù)。威嘉律師事務(wù)所重組業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)席主席嘉里·霍爾茨說,如果這些行業(yè)無法獲得新的流動(dòng)性,那么它們?cè)诮酉聛淼膸讉€(gè)月中均面臨破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
霍爾茨說,他的電話已在響個(gè)不停,大公司紛紛致電詢問如何終止合約,如何獲得信貸額度,以及如何應(yīng)對(duì)接下來的局面。
現(xiàn)成法律可保護(hù)受困企業(yè)
國(guó)會(huì)已經(jīng)為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)準(zhǔn)備了2萬億美元的拯救方案,其中數(shù)億美元用于援助航空公司和其他受沖擊行業(yè)。但是,盡管這些企業(yè)所面臨的困境是顯而易見的,也有人對(duì)國(guó)會(huì)援助的必要性表示質(zhì)疑。
“決策者看似對(duì)破產(chǎn)十分抵觸,這是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。” 哥大的莫里森說,“既然我們有《破產(chǎn)法》第11章這個(gè)現(xiàn)成的方法來解決航空公司危機(jī),那么為什么還要給他們?nèi)鲥X呢?”
莫里森表示,有序的破產(chǎn)能夠讓公司在維持運(yùn)營(yíng)的同時(shí),清理資產(chǎn)負(fù)債,而且在很多情況下還能為未來的盈利做好鋪墊。他提到,2009年通用汽車依據(jù)第11章破產(chǎn),就是一個(gè)典型案例,盡管這一過程中,有很多政客和工會(huì)從中阻撓。
加州大學(xué)黑斯廷斯法學(xué)院破產(chǎn)法學(xué)者杰瑞德·埃利亞斯提到了2009年另一件依第11章成功申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)的案例,申請(qǐng)者是購(gòu)物中心物業(yè)主“通用增長(zhǎng)物業(yè)公司”(General Growth Properties),這個(gè)案例對(duì)于當(dāng)前的新冠危機(jī)尤為有借鑒意義。在他看來,通用增長(zhǎng)在當(dāng)時(shí)是一家一流的公司,其申請(qǐng)300億美元的破產(chǎn)保護(hù),是為了免遭投機(jī)債權(quán)人的毒手,這些人希望將其資產(chǎn)止贖,待金融危機(jī)過后再倒手賣個(gè)好價(jià)錢。最后,這家房產(chǎn)公司在第11章的保護(hù)下挺過了危機(jī),減少了債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān),并將一部分資產(chǎn)剝離至一家新公司。
在當(dāng)前危機(jī)中,埃利亞斯認(rèn)為,通用增長(zhǎng)物業(yè)公司成功的破產(chǎn)保護(hù)流程可以為滑雪勝地、郵輪運(yùn)營(yíng)商、酒店和出現(xiàn)巨額財(cái)務(wù)損失的其他行業(yè)提供了一個(gè)可參考的路線圖。與此同時(shí),破產(chǎn)法近期有所修改,簡(jiǎn)化版的第11章可適用于更多的小型企業(yè)。奧睿律所的律師萊文森稱,這里的小企業(yè)是指無需向美國(guó)證券委員會(huì)報(bào)備,且債務(wù)低于200萬美元的企業(yè)。
就大公司而言,使用破產(chǎn)法第11章而不是接受政府緊急援助,還有著道德層面上的意義。莫里森指出,政府為航空等行業(yè)提供的救濟(jì)款來自每一位納稅人,如果被援助行業(yè)后續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)不善,所有的納稅人,包括低收入人群,都要承擔(dān)損失。相比之下,破產(chǎn)保護(hù)申請(qǐng)通常意味著損失僅由其股東來消化。莫里森認(rèn)為,后者更為公平,因?yàn)楣蓶|從一開始就對(duì)這樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)做了背書。
莫里森和其他人還指出,航空公司、賭場(chǎng)和其他遭受疫情沖擊的公司,此前曾經(jīng)歷過破產(chǎn)的,現(xiàn)在仍可以再次申請(qǐng)。
但是,盡管無論從現(xiàn)實(shí)還是道義上講,大企業(yè)申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)都更有道理,但它從政治上講卻并不有利,比如,第11章實(shí)施后,就會(huì)出現(xiàn)更多的失業(yè)。此外,莫里森表示,特朗普總統(tǒng)愛用股市指數(shù)的攀升來標(biāo)榜其執(zhí)政的成功,然而,一旦諸多美國(guó)大型企業(yè)申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)保護(hù),這些指數(shù)會(huì)應(yīng)聲下跌。
未來會(huì)“面目全非”
盡管上一次金融危機(jī)的破產(chǎn)潮為當(dāng)前的疫情危機(jī)提供了一些可借鑒的經(jīng)驗(yàn),但專家們表示,當(dāng)前的不確定性因素太多,所以很難做出明確的預(yù)測(cè),一是不知道疫情到底造成了多大的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失,二則取決于美國(guó)政府的應(yīng)對(duì)舉措。不過,近些天來,各項(xiàng)應(yīng)對(duì)措施的細(xì)節(jié),包括大規(guī)模的刺激方案,變得逐漸明朗起來。
然而,這里還有一個(gè)更大的不確定性,那就是,因?yàn)橐咔楹腿穗H隔離,消費(fèi)者生活、工作和購(gòu)物的方式可能會(huì)發(fā)生永久的變化,這就更難去預(yù)測(cè),陷入困境的公司到底是不是還有前途。
黑斯廷斯法學(xué)院的埃利亞斯教授表示,一切事物的需求,從辦公空間到餐廳座椅,在疫情過后都會(huì)出現(xiàn)很大的變化。這會(huì)使得那些債權(quán)人和重組專家們,在公司要推動(dòng)破產(chǎn)重組申請(qǐng)時(shí),不會(huì)很積極,因?yàn)椋麄兊墓ぷ魇窃u(píng)估公司未來的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值,所以,他們一定要確認(rèn)公司在疫情危機(jī)后的盈利能力,才會(huì)真正去推動(dòng)重組。
威嘉律所的霍爾茨說,當(dāng)前危機(jī)有別于上一場(chǎng)金融危機(jī)的另一點(diǎn),在于大公司業(yè)務(wù)全球化的程度。他預(yù)測(cè),冠狀疫情危機(jī)后,更多公司可能會(huì)搬遷去那些有著優(yōu)惠經(jīng)濟(jì)措施,更容易宣布破產(chǎn)的地方,或者干脆撤出其他地區(qū)。
政府援助與破產(chǎn)重組相結(jié)合,應(yīng)該基本可以幫助大多數(shù)受沖擊最嚴(yán)重的企業(yè)度過危機(jī),但他們的業(yè)務(wù)可能在未來發(fā)生巨大的變化。“我們很難弄清楚疫情之后會(huì)是什么情況。歷史告訴我們,當(dāng)很多事情一起發(fā)生的時(shí)候,一切都會(huì)變得面目全非。”埃利亞斯說。
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
責(zé)編:雨晨
The economic collapse of 2008 triggered some of the most high-profile bankruptcies in U.S. history, including those of Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and Washington Mutual. Now, in the face of the even larger crisis brought about by the coronavirus, other big companies are bracing for a similar fate.
“Bankruptcy lawyers across the country and the world are preparing for an onslaught,” says Marc Levinson, senior counsel at the law firm Orrick.
The full onslaught is several months away, predict Levinson and other experts, who say companies and lenders are still trying to assess the magnitude of the current crisis, as well as the government response to it. But the nature of the coronavirus means financial catastrophe is inevitable for many companies in sectors like travel, hospitality, and entertainment.
Some of the hardest-hit companies may be forced to liquidate. But more are likely to opt for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Under Chapter 11, a company can renegotiate the terms of its debts and contractual obligations with suppliers and employees, through a process overseen by a federal bankruptcy judge. A successful Chapter 11 reorganization can prevent a company from having to go out of business if its revenue plummets—making it a potentially invaluable tool during a crisis like the current one.
The good news is that government policymakers and the U.S. bankruptcy regime are better prepared than in 2008–09 to weather the impending wave of business failures. But the current crisis will also present political leaders with hard choices about whether to bail out certain industries with grants and loans—as Congress is set to do for the airline industry—or instead rely on Chapter 11 in hopes of restoring them to financial health.
Different from Lehman
The sudden bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on Sept. 15, 2008, became one of the signature moments of the financial crisis, casting shocked traders in expensive suits abruptly onto the streets of Manhattan. Lehman’s chaotic collapse also helped spur the broader economic upheaval that became known as the Great Recession.
“The consensus among most bankruptcy scholars is the handling of Lehman was bungled,” says Ed Morrison, a law professor at Columbia University. “It was allowed to fail in a spectacular way, and created uncertainty about the other banks.”
Morrison says the chaos of Lehman’s collapse came about because policymakers were slow to address the underlying cause of the bank’s distress—the seizing up of credit facilities, which created a liquidity crisis that meant Lehman couldn’t meet its borrowing obligations. Government dithering also produced a climate of uncertainty that exacerbated the economic fallout.
Eventually, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department devised tools—primarily in the form of backstops for lending—to prevent the collapse of other banks, and to ensure liquidity in the markets. But by the time those tools were deployed, the wider economy had been battered.
In the present crisis, the Federal Reserve has been nimble in deploying the policy tools it developed in 2008 to mitigate the economic fallout. These include emergency lending facilities that will buy up student and corporate debt, as well as mortgage-backed securities.
All of this—along with post-2008 “stress tests” that have required banks to maintain larger cash reserves for emergencies—have helped forestall a Lehman-style meltdown in the financial sector.
This has been doubly important since some Chapter 11 “safe harbor” provisions, which prevent creditors from seizing a bankrupt company’s assets, don’t extend to financial firms. “The bankruptcy code is not very good for saving banks. When Lehman filed, bankruptcy offered little shelter, and creditors were free to rip it apart,” Morrison says.
This is not the case for the likes of retailers, movie theaters, casinos, and vacation providers—all of which face exposure to bankruptcy in the coming months if they are unable to source new liquidity, according to Gary Holtzer, who cochairs the restructuring practice at Weil Gotshal & Manges.
Holtzer says his phone is already ringing constantly with big companies inquiring about how to terminate contracts, deploy lines of credit, and, more generally, brace for what’s to come.
The case for bankruptcy
Congress has prepared a $2 trillion rescue package for the U.S. economy, which includes hundreds of millions of dollars in aid for airlines and other distressed industries. While the plight of these businesses is obvious, not everyone believes aid from Congress is necessary.
“It’s a mistake for policymakers to be as averse to bankruptcy as they seem to be,” says Morrison, the Columbia law professor. “Why do we need bailouts when we have a ready-made solution to airline distress called Chapter 11?”
Morrison notes that an orderly bankruptcy allows firms to maintain operations and clean up their balance sheets and, in many cases, become profitable in the future. He cites the 2009 bankruptcy of General Motors as the “poster child” for Chapter 11, notwithstanding the influence of politicians and unions on the process.
Jared Ellias, a bankruptcy scholar at UC Hastings College of the Law, points to another Chapter 11 filing from 2009—that of mall operator General Growth Properties—as particularly instructive for the present crisis. He describes GGP at the time as a “best in class” company and explains that its $30 billion bankruptcy filing shielded it from opportunistic creditors who hoped to foreclose on its properties and sell them for a markup when the financial crisis passed. Instead, GGP weathered the crisis by means of Chapter 11, reducing its debt load and spinning off some of its assets into a new company.
In the current crisis, Ellias suggests that GGP’s successful bankruptcy process could provide a road map for ski resorts, cruise operators, hotels, and other industries facing devastating financial losses. Meanwhile, recent changes to the bankruptcy code mean a streamlined version Chapter 11 is available to many more small businesses. According to Levinson, the Orrick attorney, the small-business regime is available to companies that don’t report to the SEC and have less than $2 million in debt.
In the case of big companies, there may also be a moral case for using Chapter 11 rather than government bailouts to weather the coronavirus shock. Morrison points out that government-backed rescues for the airlines and other industries would stick every American taxpayer—including low-income ones—with any losses that arise. By contrast, a bankruptcy filing typically means it is shareholders who absorb the losses. Morrison suggests the latter outcome is more fair, since shareholders signed on for such a risk in the first place.
Morrison and others also point out that airlines, casinos, and other companies currently facing the coronavirus shock have gone through bankruptcy before and could do so again.
But despite the practical and moral arguments in favor of letting big companies go bankrupt, there are powerful political ones against doing so. These include the job losses and other disruptions that Chapter 11 typically entails. Meanwhile, Morrison notes that the current President has pegged much of his administration’s success to the stock market indexes—and that those indexes would decline if a series of major American companies were to file for bankruptcy.
What lies ahead
While the bankruptcies of the last financial crisis provide lessons for the current one, experts note that there is simply too much uncertainty right now to make confident predictions. Part of this uncertainty, of course, relates to the extent of the economic damage the virus will inflict, while part of it surrounds the response of the U.S. government—though details of that response, including the massive stimulus package, have become clearer in recent days.
There is a further source of uncertainty, however, that makes the future fate of troubled companies even harder to predict. This relates to the possibility that some of the changes wrought by the pandemic and social distancing will permanently alter how consumers live, work, and shop.
Ellias, the UC Hastings professor, notes that demand for everything from office space to seats at restaurants could be very different once the coronavirus has passed. This means that creditors and restructuring experts, who rely on evaluating the future value of assets, will be skittish about pushing companies to enter bankruptcy until they can assess what their revenues might look like after the crisis.
Another factor that makes the current crisis different from the last one is the degree to which big companies have globalized their operations, says Holtzer, the Weil lawyer. He predicts the coronavirus crisis could lead firms to consolidate production in parts of the world where governments offer favorable economic terms and declare bankruptcy, or simply pull out of other regions.
A combination of bailouts and bankruptcy are likely to help most of the hardest-hit companies survive the coronavirus crisis. But their businesses may also look very different in the future.
“It’s hard to know what’s on the other side. History teaches us that when things are snapped together, they won’t look like they did when all this began,” says Ellias.