直到去年8月,馬克·諾貝爾才意識到出了什么事。
作為金融服務公司Horizon ETFs負責ETF策略的執行副總裁,諾貝爾處于觀察大麻股的極佳位置。他說:“那曾是個破了的泡沫。”該公司的Marijuana Life Sciences ETF持有Canopy Growth、Tilray和Aurora Cannabis等大麻類股票,其價格已從2018年的20多美元跌至本月的7美元左右。
去年市場熱炒之際,投資者紛紛涉足新興大麻板塊。步入成年的千禧一代成為一批新的投資者,將資金投入到這些預示著增長和綠色的閃亮新股中。實際上, 去年6月Aurora Cannabis擊敗了科技巨頭蘋果公司,成為Z世代和千禧一代投資App Robinhood上交投最活躍的股票。
但還不到6個月,這些天真的投資者就看到了截然不同的景象。華爾街的擔憂開始加重,原因是主要大麻公司公布了令人失望的業績并且裁員,甚至還有一些出現了合規丑聞。砰的一聲,泡沫破了。
從去年6月到年底,Aurora Cannabis和Tilray這兩家主要大麻公司的股價分別暴跌70%和60%左右。加拿大大麻指數(它追蹤著Tilray、Canopy和Aurora Cannabis等一線大麻上市公司)去年3月以來的跌幅也已超過77%。
這和大麻在美國越發受到歡迎而且愈加合法的局面形成了不可思議的反差。原因有很多。但有一點毋庸置疑,那就是大量財富在非常短的時間里化為烏有。
綠色管理?
最能體現過去一年中這番過山車行情的非MedMen莫屬。
正在審理的一宗案件顯示,MedMen前首席財務官詹姆斯·帕克指控其他高層通過非法行為迫使他在2018年11月離開了這家公司,被告包括聯合創始人亞當·比爾曼和前CEO、首席品牌官安德魯·莫德林。原告提出的非法行為包括“為[聯合創始人的]個人利益揮霍公司資金”,試圖炒高MedMen的股價以及“充斥著種族主義、恐同和厭惡女性的表述和誹謗”的工作文化。MedMen則否認了這些指控。
案件顯示,盡管MedMen正在快速燒錢,但高層仍將公司資金用于“CEO、總裁及其家人的24小時武裝貼身保護(安保)”、私人飛機……以及“多張單價數萬美元的豪華定制會議長桌”。
MedMen拒絕向《財富》雜志發表評論。比爾曼在聲明中否認了所有指控,稱“帕克先生的煽動性指控顯然是想為自己毫無價值的官司吸引眼球。”《財富》雜志未能找到比爾曼和莫德林發表進一步評論。該公司董事會也發表聲明稱上述指控“毫無根據”。
無論官司進展如何,現金問題一直層出不窮。股票、金融和商業新聞網站MarketWatch發現(而且已得到該公司確認的)電子郵件顯示,MedMen一直想用自家股票跟供應商交換大麻產品,原因是公司公告顯示,MedMen極為糟糕的現金狀況迫使他們“[修改]付款條款”。去年2月至今MedMen的市值已蒸發約90%。
但讓投資者誤入歧途的不只MedMen一家公司。
去年夏天,加拿大最大的大麻公司之一CannTrust爆出了監管丑聞。內部通信和電子郵件顯示,該公司高層知道有未獲許可的場地非法種植大麻,此事讓CannTrust成為新聞焦點,其股價也因此暴跌20%以上。
更早一些,加拿大衛生部在2016年曾發現CannTrust數次違規,包括囤積了價值600萬美元的產品,是許可庫存價值的四倍。該部調查還發現,CannTrust的種植室有發霉問題。
去年2月至今,CannTrust已損失逾九成市值。該公司向《財富》雜志發表聲明稱,去年夏天以來它“一直聚焦于補救和公司治理”,而且“已經采取重大措施來改善自身的治理文化及監管合規,還對設施進行了修整。”
加拿大會計師事務所MNP全國上市公司實務主管馬魯夫·拉扎2014年首次跟大麻公司打交道,當時他負責處理上市大麻公司的審計和會計事務。后者的管理有什么明顯特征呢?具體來說就是,呈現綠色的不光是他們的產品。
拉扎對《財富》雜志回憶道,和這些年輕公司一起做會計和審計工作時,“剛開始需要手把手教的東西要多得多。”他說,整體而言團隊較小的較年輕公司起步時需要較多協助并不反常,但私募市場融資問題把這些公司推到公眾面前的時間可能比其他行業的公司要早。
拉扎表示:“追根尋源,許多這樣的公司在四年前實際上還是初創企業。而現在,其中一些已經從一文不名發展成了市值數十億美元的跨國集團。”
但他指出,目前這些公司的董事會結構已經“截然不同”,甚至是和四年前相比。來自《財富》500強的管理人員一直在慢慢進入部分頂尖大麻公司的董事會并“當上了司機”,Canopy Growth就是一例(飲料巨頭Constellation Brands持有前者近40%股份,其多位現任和前任高層已經成為Canopy Growth的董事)。
FlowerHire專為大麻公司提供高管獵頭服務,而處于有利觀察位置的創始人兼CEO大衛·貝爾斯基認為,大麻公司對具有扭虧經驗的高管和中低層管理人員的需求較大。FlowerHire目前正在幫助這些公司尋找投資者關系和公關主管。
拉扎說,盡管也許有些高管在緊張氣氛中離了職,但許多創始人和管理團隊都開始意識到自己并非帶領這些公司進入下一階段,也就是成為大型上市公司的合適人選。
收入問題
與此同時,供需問題極大的損害了取悅華爾街的法寶,也就是業績預期。
盡管加拿大正在推動大麻合法化,但由于零售店鋪數量不多,許多公司都很難推斷需求和產品結構,從而造成某些產品供給過剩。在美國,大麻在聯邦層面依然非法,監管氣候和去年夏天的電子煙危機更是讓上述現金問題雪上加霜。
去年9月,最大上市大麻公司之一Aurora Cannabis披露的業績未能達到該公司前不久自行發布的預期,即扣除消費稅后的凈收入為7500-8000萬美元。相反,其實際凈收入約為7400萬美元,比短短五周前的自身預期低了100多萬美元。另一主要大麻公司Canopy Growth披露的2020年第二財務季度業績遠低于其預期。當季該公司每股虧損0.72美元左右,而預期為每股收益約0.30美元。
大麻生產商Hexo同樣受到重創,原因是該公司警告稱第四財季收入約為1090-1240萬美元,遠低于去年10月份市場預測的1850萬美元,從而造成投資者爭相拋售其股票。
就像大麻行業咨詢機構GreenWave Advisors創始人馬修·卡恩斯所說:“曾經出現了大規模炒作以及過度樂觀的看法,但到了動真格的時候,這些公司卻表示和預期相差很大,”從而造成多家公司的估值直線下跌。他說:“市場預期一直都很難管理,而且我覺得造成這種情況的真正原因一直都是許多公司缺乏經驗。”
由于產品基本上處于法律灰色地帶,許多大麻公司的另一個難題是應付它難以捉摸的稅收和會計負擔。
加拿大大麻公司(如Aurora Cannabis和Canopy Growth)的痛點在于他們必須在種植大麻時就估算出這些產品出售時的市場價值,這被稱為“公允價值”。或者,就像拉扎總結的那樣:“你實際上是要在銷售產品前確認收入。”國際財務報告準則(IFRS)將大麻列入國際會計準則第41號——農業(IAS 41)之中,大麻公司必須依此估算種植作物的公允價值。
大麻公司采用這條標準的問題在于,其他生產較傳統農產品(如小麥或牲畜)的公司有基于大宗商品的定價,而且可以借助期貨來估算產品的公允價值,而和前者不同,拉扎說:“大麻還做不到這些。因此,你的賬目中會有大量估算和判斷。”雖然某個品種在某個月份或許會有確定的市場價格,但下個月它的價值可能上升或下降。這些估算和判斷將各大麻公司置于不公平的環境中,拉扎說,它們并非“一一對應”。
但拉扎仍認為這種不一致并非惡意。他指出:“大多數大麻公司,乃至所有大麻公司最不愿意做的事就是違反這條農產品標準,”反而在出售產品時確認收入。但盡管為估算所種產品的價值耗費了時間和資源,拉扎說:“可惜,他們被這項標準束縛了手腳。”
作為審計人員,拉扎說他看到這些公司試圖“找出連接實際數據和預期的正確橋梁”,這給審計機構MNP和管理層帶來了有些混亂的情況,“所以相關做法一直受到大量批評”。
Aurora Cannabis管理層提交給美國證券交易委員會的討論和分析文件恰好體現出了這一點,該公司披露,2016年第一季度凈利潤(約190萬美元)“主要源于生物資產公允價值變動帶來的未確認收益”,而在2016年第二和第三季度中,Aurora Cannabis的凈虧損(分別為420萬美元和560萬美元左右)主因是公允價值變動帶來的“未確認收益減少”。
這就讓投資者感到困惑,原因是它表明由于公允價值難以估算,公司也許不得不披露差異很大的利潤或虧損,而這要取決于他們估算的公允價值和源于大麻的收益實際上有多大的差距。對投資者或分析師來說,這會讓他們在判斷哪些大麻公司的生產效率最高時遇到挑戰。
IFRS委員會消息人士告訴《財富》雜志,投資者已經向該機構提出,他們擔心按照上述標準提供的信息不充分,因而無助于評估部分大麻公司的利潤率。雖然IFRS確實有估算生物資產整體價值的標準,但并無具體條款規定怎樣專門評估大麻的公允價值(而且對于大麻公司財報需要就公允價值提供哪些信息,IFRS的要求“并不是非常規范”)。這些消息人士向《財富》雜志透露,目前還沒有專門針對大麻重新考量IAS 41的計劃,但該委員會正準備要求公司(不只是大麻行業)披露更詳細的業績數據,包括營業利潤或虧損以及非美國通用會計準則下的數字。
復雜的稅收和會計
GreenWave Advisors創始人馬修·卡恩斯以前從事審計工作時對此有所了解。他回憶說,有一次他到大麻公司的某處設施考察并詢問一位員工(“可不是低級別員工”)該公司供審計的賬目(books)由誰保管。“[那位員工]回答說,‘你指什么,是圖書館里的那種書嗎?’”
卡恩斯對《財富》雜志回憶道:“我暗想,‘休斯敦,我們有麻煩了。’”不過,雖然缺乏經驗或許一直是某些公司的問題所在,卡恩斯卻明確指出,還有一個更大的問題正在削弱大麻公司的利潤。
受產品性質,或者說禁令成本影響,部分在美國的大麻公司一直深受沉重稅務負擔困擾。美國大麻公司的經營遵循美國稅法280E條款,而后者一直在抽取許多大麻公司的現金。
按照280E條款,與美國藥品管制法規定的一類或二類藥品“生意”有關的總收入無法用一般經營費用抵稅。或者說,大麻公司的大多數經營費用都不可抵稅(盡管某些間接成本可計為銷售成本,但卡恩斯說這給部分公司帶來了“挑戰底線”的機會,從而有可能讓它們成為美國國稅局嚴格審查的目標)。
卡恩斯說:“甚至是在虧損狀態下,它們仍不得不納稅,而且[數額可能]達到幾百萬美元。這抽走了本來可以再次投入這些公司的資金。”
GreenWave Advisors對市值超過5億美元的美國上市大麻公司(不包括MedMen)的分析顯示,2018日歷年僅有三家公司實現盈利,而它們的實際稅率各不相同,介于30%-59%之間。但基于這些公司的結構,總的來說大麻公司一般都不能通過營業虧損結轉(將本年度凈營業虧損計入今后年份的凈利潤中,旨在減輕稅收負擔)來抵補今后利潤,從而享受稅收優惠。
GreenWave Advisors分析了8家上市的跨州大麻公司,后者從2018年第一季度到2019年第三季度的整體凈虧損約為5.42億美元。在這8家公司中,2019年前三季度未出現凈營業虧損的只有1家,GreenWave Advisors估算它們損失的凈營業虧損抵稅額一共為1.145億美元左右(簡而言之,在最壞情況下,這些大麻公司失去了逾1.14億美元的抵稅機會)。
大麻股前景如何?
由此產生的影響是什么呢?那就是一些較大的大麻公司大量裁員。僅在過去幾個月,多家大麻公司一共裁掉了約2000人。
處境艱難的MedMen去年11月裁員190人。今年2月,Tilray表示將裁員10%左右,以便降低成本并進一步向盈利靠攏。當月,Aurora Cannabis也采取了同樣的行動,裁員約500人。Canopy、CannTrust、MedMen和Aurora Cannabis都更換了CEO。
拉扎認為這和上市初創公司類似:“實際情況是,股市上發生的許多事情通常都會出現在私募市場中。你可以想想硅谷,它的生態系統為多少科技公司提供資金呢?數以千計。在這些公司中,最終活下來的有多少呢?”
2019年的收入預期過于樂觀(而且往往未能實現),這種情況可能不會延續到2020年。FlowerHire首席收入官斯隆·巴伯指出:“[投資者]會回來拍著他們的肩膀說,‘不,騙我一次,丟人的是你。騙我兩次,丟人的是我。’”
不過,從經營角度講,MNP的拉扎認為許多大麻公司或許都剛剛“進入第二局”。晨星分析師克里斯托弗·英頓建議,大麻股投資者需要將自己視為風投人士,他說:“他們不要考慮一年以后的情況,而是要想想市場[潛力]。”
專家們都看到了增長潛力。拉扎相信許多大麻公司最終都會實現自身設定的目標,但他也指出,這“需要時間和耐心,而正如我們所知,股市并不總是有耐心。”新興行業中數十家有希望的初創公司在高速發展前都曾步履維艱,就像它們一樣,并不是所有大麻公司都處在同一起跑線上。
拉扎說:“整體上這些公司都在股市環境下起起落落。并不是所有公司都能生存下來。”
Horizon ETFs的大麻ETF仍未復蘇。諾貝爾說,這只ETF目前價格為7美元,比2017年剛上市的價格低3美元。但諾貝爾并未完全放棄希望。他說自己仍將長期投身這一領域,而且“已經得到體現的悲觀失望比上升空間大”。
換句話說就是,這個板塊目前或許處于低點。但很難說,總有可能很快出現高點。(財富中文網)
譯者:Charlie
審校:夏林
直到去年8月,馬克·諾貝爾才意識到出了什么事。
作為金融服務公司Horizon ETFs負責ETF策略的執行副總裁,諾貝爾處于觀察大麻股的極佳位置。他說:“那曾是個破了的泡沫。”該公司的Marijuana Life Sciences ETF持有Canopy Growth、Tilray和Aurora Cannabis等大麻類股票,其價格已從2018年的20多美元跌至本月的7美元左右。
去年市場熱炒之際,投資者紛紛涉足新興大麻板塊。步入成年的千禧一代成為一批新的投資者,將資金投入到這些預示著增長和綠色的閃亮新股中。實際上, 去年6月Aurora Cannabis擊敗了科技巨頭蘋果公司,成為Z世代和千禧一代投資App Robinhood上交投最活躍的股票。
但還不到6個月,這些天真的投資者就看到了截然不同的景象。華爾街的擔憂開始加重,原因是主要大麻公司公布了令人失望的業績并且裁員,甚至還有一些出現了合規丑聞。砰的一聲,泡沫破了。
從去年6月到年底,Aurora Cannabis和Tilray這兩家主要大麻公司的股價分別暴跌70%和60%左右。加拿大大麻指數(它追蹤著Tilray、Canopy和Aurora Cannabis等一線大麻上市公司)去年3月以來的跌幅也已超過77%。
這和大麻在美國越發受到歡迎而且愈加合法的局面形成了不可思議的反差。原因有很多。但有一點毋庸置疑,那就是大量財富在非常短的時間里化為烏有。
綠色管理?
最能體現過去一年中這番過山車行情的非MedMen莫屬。
正在審理的一宗案件顯示,MedMen前首席財務官詹姆斯·帕克指控其他高層通過非法行為迫使他在2018年11月離開了這家公司,被告包括聯合創始人亞當·比爾曼和前CEO、首席品牌官安德魯·莫德林。原告提出的非法行為包括“為[聯合創始人的]個人利益揮霍公司資金”,試圖炒高MedMen的股價以及“充斥著種族主義、恐同和厭惡女性的表述和誹謗”的工作文化。MedMen則否認了這些指控。
案件顯示,盡管MedMen正在快速燒錢,但高層仍將公司資金用于“CEO、總裁及其家人的24小時武裝貼身保護(安保)”、私人飛機……以及“多張單價數萬美元的豪華定制會議長桌”。
MedMen拒絕向《財富》雜志發表評論。比爾曼在聲明中否認了所有指控,稱“帕克先生的煽動性指控顯然是想為自己毫無價值的官司吸引眼球。”《財富》雜志未能找到比爾曼和莫德林發表進一步評論。該公司董事會也發表聲明稱上述指控“毫無根據”。
無論官司進展如何,現金問題一直層出不窮。股票、金融和商業新聞網站MarketWatch發現(而且已得到該公司確認的)電子郵件顯示,MedMen一直想用自家股票跟供應商交換大麻產品,原因是公司公告顯示,MedMen極為糟糕的現金狀況迫使他們“[修改]付款條款”。去年2月至今MedMen的市值已蒸發約90%。
但讓投資者誤入歧途的不只MedMen一家公司。
去年夏天,加拿大最大的大麻公司之一CannTrust爆出了監管丑聞。內部通信和電子郵件顯示,該公司高層知道有未獲許可的場地非法種植大麻,此事讓CannTrust成為新聞焦點,其股價也因此暴跌20%以上。
更早一些,加拿大衛生部在2016年曾發現CannTrust數次違規,包括囤積了價值600萬美元的產品,是許可庫存價值的四倍。該部調查還發現,CannTrust的種植室有發霉問題。
去年2月至今,CannTrust已損失逾九成市值。該公司向《財富》雜志發表聲明稱,去年夏天以來它“一直聚焦于補救和公司治理”,而且“已經采取重大措施來改善自身的治理文化及監管合規,還對設施進行了修整。”
CannTrust Holdings去年夏天上了新聞,原因是曝光的內部通信和電子郵件顯示該公司高層知道有未獲許可的場地非法種植大麻,其股價因此暴跌。
加拿大會計師事務所MNP全國上市公司實務主管馬魯夫·拉扎2014年首次跟大麻公司打交道,當時他負責處理上市大麻公司的審計和會計事務。后者的管理有什么明顯特征呢?具體來說就是,呈現綠色的不光是他們的產品。
拉扎對《財富》雜志回憶道,和這些年輕公司一起做會計和審計工作時,“剛開始需要手把手教的東西要多得多。”他說,整體而言團隊較小的較年輕公司起步時需要較多協助并不反常,但私募市場融資問題把這些公司推到公眾面前的時間可能比其他行業的公司要早。
拉扎表示:“追根尋源,許多這樣的公司在四年前實際上還是初創企業。而現在,其中一些已經從一文不名發展成了市值數十億美元的跨國集團。”
但他指出,目前這些公司的董事會結構已經“截然不同”,甚至是和四年前相比。來自《財富》500強的管理人員一直在慢慢進入部分頂尖大麻公司的董事會并“當上了司機”,Canopy Growth就是一例(飲料巨頭Constellation Brands持有前者近40%股份,其多位現任和前任高層已經成為Canopy Growth的董事)。
FlowerHire專為大麻公司提供高管獵頭服務,而處于有利觀察位置的創始人兼CEO大衛·貝爾斯基認為,大麻公司對具有扭虧經驗的高管和中低層管理人員的需求較大。FlowerHire目前正在幫助這些公司尋找投資者關系和公關主管。
拉扎說,盡管也許有些高管在緊張氣氛中離了職,但許多創始人和管理團隊都開始意識到自己并非帶領這些公司進入下一階段,也就是成為大型上市公司的合適人選。
收入問題
與此同時,供需問題極大的損害了取悅華爾街的法寶,也就是業績預期。
盡管加拿大正在推動大麻合法化,但由于零售店鋪數量不多,許多公司都很難推斷需求和產品結構,從而造成某些產品供給過剩。在美國,大麻在聯邦層面依然非法,監管氣候和去年夏天的電子煙危機更是讓上述現金問題雪上加霜。
去年9月,最大上市大麻公司之一Aurora Cannabis披露的業績未能達到該公司前不久自行發布的預期,即扣除消費稅后的凈收入為7500-8000萬美元。相反,其實際凈收入約為7400萬美元,比短短五周前的自身預期低了100多萬美元。另一主要大麻公司Canopy Growth披露的2020年第二財務季度業績遠低于其預期。當季該公司每股虧損0.72美元左右,而預期為每股收益約0.30美元。
大麻生產商Hexo同樣受到重創,原因是該公司警告稱第四財季收入約為1090-1240萬美元,遠低于去年10月份市場預測的1850萬美元,從而造成投資者爭相拋售其股票。
就像大麻行業咨詢機構GreenWave Advisors創始人馬修·卡恩斯所說:“曾經出現了大規模炒作以及過度樂觀的看法,但到了動真格的時候,這些公司卻表示和預期相差很大,”從而造成多家公司的估值直線下跌。他說:“市場預期一直都很難管理,而且我覺得造成這種情況的真正原因一直都是許多公司缺乏經驗。”
由于產品基本上處于法律灰色地帶,許多大麻公司的另一個難題是應付它難以捉摸的稅收和會計負擔。
加拿大大麻公司(如Aurora Cannabis和Canopy Growth)的痛點在于他們必須在種植大麻時就估算出這些產品出售時的市場價值,這被稱為“公允價值”。或者,就像拉扎總結的那樣:“你實際上是要在銷售產品前確認收入。”國際財務報告準則(IFRS)將大麻列入國際會計準則第41號——農業(IAS 41)之中,大麻公司必須依此估算種植作物的公允價值。
大麻公司采用這條標準的問題在于,其他生產較傳統農產品(如小麥或牲畜)的公司有基于大宗商品的定價,而且可以借助期貨來估算產品的公允價值,而和前者不同,拉扎說:“大麻還做不到這些。因此,你的賬目中會有大量估算和判斷。”雖然某個品種在某個月份或許會有確定的市場價格,但下個月它的價值可能上升或下降。這些估算和判斷將各大麻公司置于不公平的環境中,拉扎說,它們并非“一一對應”。
但拉扎仍認為這種不一致并非惡意。他指出:“大多數大麻公司,乃至所有大麻公司最不愿意做的事就是違反這條農產品標準,”反而在出售產品時確認收入。但盡管為估算所種產品的價值耗費了時間和資源,拉扎說:“可惜,他們被這項標準束縛了手腳。”
作為審計人員,拉扎說他看到這些公司試圖“找出連接實際數據和預期的正確橋梁”,這給審計機構MNP和管理層帶來了有些混亂的情況,“所以相關做法一直受到大量批評”。
Aurora Cannabis管理層提交給美國證券交易委員會的討論和分析文件恰好體現出了這一點,該公司披露,2016年第一季度凈利潤(約190萬美元)“主要源于生物資產公允價值變動帶來的未確認收益”,而在2016年第二和第三季度中,Aurora Cannabis的凈虧損(分別為420萬美元和560萬美元左右)主因是公允價值變動帶來的“未確認收益減少”。
這就讓投資者感到困惑,原因是它表明由于公允價值難以估算,公司也許不得不披露差異很大的利潤或虧損,而這要取決于他們估算的公允價值和源于大麻的收益實際上有多大的差距。對投資者或分析師來說,這會讓他們在判斷哪些大麻公司的生產效率最高時遇到挑戰。
IFRS委員會消息人士告訴《財富》雜志,投資者已經向該機構提出,他們擔心按照上述標準提供的信息不充分,因而無助于評估部分大麻公司的利潤率。雖然IFRS確實有估算生物資產整體價值的標準,但并無具體條款規定怎樣專門評估大麻的公允價值(而且對于大麻公司財報需要就公允價值提供哪些信息,IFRS的要求“并不是非常規范”)。這些消息人士向《財富》雜志透露,目前還沒有專門針對大麻重新考量IAS 41的計劃,但該委員會正準備要求公司(不只是大麻行業)披露更詳細的業績數據,包括營業利潤或虧損以及非美國通用會計準則下的數字。
復雜的稅收和會計
GreenWave Advisors創始人馬修·卡恩斯以前從事審計工作時對此有所了解。他回憶說,有一次他到大麻公司的某處設施考察并詢問一位員工(“可不是低級別員工”)該公司供審計的賬目(books)由誰保管。“[那位員工]回答說,‘你指什么,是圖書館里的那種書嗎?’”
卡恩斯對《財富》雜志回憶道:“我暗想,‘休斯敦,我們有麻煩了。’”不過,雖然缺乏經驗或許一直是某些公司的問題所在,卡恩斯卻明確指出,還有一個更大的問題正在削弱大麻公司的利潤。
受產品性質,或者說禁令成本影響,部分在美國的大麻公司一直深受沉重稅務負擔困擾。美國大麻公司的經營遵循美國稅法280E條款,而后者一直在抽取許多大麻公司的現金。
按照280E條款,與美國藥品管制法規定的一類或二類藥品“生意”有關的總收入無法用一般經營費用抵稅。或者說,大麻公司的大多數經營費用都不可抵稅(盡管某些間接成本可計為銷售成本,但卡恩斯說這給部分公司帶來了“挑戰底線”的機會,從而有可能讓它們成為美國國稅局嚴格審查的目標)。
卡恩斯說:“甚至是在虧損狀態下,它們仍不得不納稅,而且[數額可能]達到幾百萬美元。這抽走了本來可以再次投入這些公司的資金。”
GreenWave Advisors對市值超過5億美元的美國上市大麻公司(不包括MedMen)的分析顯示,2018日歷年僅有三家公司實現盈利,而它們的實際稅率各不相同,介于30%-59%之間。但基于這些公司的結構,總的來說大麻公司一般都不能通過營業虧損結轉(將本年度凈營業虧損計入今后年份的凈利潤中,旨在減輕稅收負擔)來抵補今后利潤,從而享受稅收優惠。
GreenWave Advisors分析了8家上市的跨州大麻公司,后者從2018年第一季度到2019年第三季度的整體凈虧損約為5.42億美元。在這8家公司中,2019年前三季度未出現凈營業虧損的只有1家,GreenWave Advisors估算它們損失的凈營業虧損抵稅額一共為1.145億美元左右(簡而言之,在最壞情況下,這些大麻公司失去了逾1.14億美元的抵稅機會)。
大麻股前景如何?
由此產生的影響是什么呢?那就是一些較大的大麻公司大量裁員。僅在過去幾個月,多家大麻公司一共裁掉了約2000人。
處境艱難的MedMen去年11月裁員190人。今年2月,Tilray表示將裁員10%左右,以便降低成本并進一步向盈利靠攏。當月,Aurora Cannabis也采取了同樣的行動,裁員約500人。Canopy、CannTrust、MedMen和Aurora Cannabis都更換了CEO。
拉扎認為這和上市初創公司類似:“實際情況是,股市上發生的許多事情通常都會出現在私募市場中。你可以想想硅谷,它的生態系統為多少科技公司提供資金呢?數以千計。在這些公司中,最終活下來的有多少呢?”
2019年的收入預期過于樂觀(而且往往未能實現),這種情況可能不會延續到2020年。FlowerHire首席收入官斯隆·巴伯指出:“[投資者]會回來拍著他們的肩膀說,‘不,騙我一次,丟人的是你。騙我兩次,丟人的是我。’”
不過,從經營角度講,MNP的拉扎認為許多大麻公司或許都剛剛“進入第二局”。晨星分析師克里斯托弗·英頓建議,大麻股投資者需要將自己視為風投人士,他說:“他們不要考慮一年以后的情況,而是要想想市場[潛力]。”
專家們都看到了增長潛力。拉扎相信許多大麻公司最終都會實現自身設定的目標,但他也指出,這“需要時間和耐心,而正如我們所知,股市并不總是有耐心。”新興行業中數十家有希望的初創公司在高速發展前都曾步履維艱,就像它們一樣,并不是所有大麻公司都處在同一起跑線上。
拉扎說:“整體上這些公司都在股市環境下起起落落。并不是所有公司都能生存下來。”
Horizon ETFs的大麻ETF仍未復蘇。諾貝爾說,這只ETF目前價格為7美元,比2017年剛上市的價格低3美元。但諾貝爾并未完全放棄希望。他說自己仍將長期投身這一領域,而且“已經得到體現的悲觀失望比上升空間大”。
換句話說就是,這個板塊目前或許處于低點。但很難說,總有可能很快出現高點。(財富中文網)
譯者:Charlie
審校:夏林
It wasn’t until August that Mark Noble realized what was happening.
As the executive vice president of ETF strategy at Horizon ETFs, Noble had a perfect perch from which to watch cannabis stocks. "This was a bubble that burst," he says. Horizon's Marijuana Life Sciences ETF, which holds names like Canopy Growth, Tilray, and Aurora Cannabis, plunged from over $20 in 2018 to around $7 this month.
Last year, investors clamored to buy into the burgeoning cannabis industry in a moment of market zeitgeist. A new kind of investor was coming of age—millennials poured money into the flashy new stocks that promised growth and green. In fact, back in June, the most popular trade on Gen Z and millennial investment app Robinhood was Aurora Cannabis—beating out tech giant Apple.
But within six months those wide-eyed investors were looking at an entirely different picture. Wall Street grew weary as major cannabis companies reported disappointing earnings, laid off employees, and even in some cases, faced compliance scandals. Pop! The bubble had burst.
Big names like Aurora and Tilray plunged around 70% and 60% respectively from June to the end the year. The Canadian Marijuana Index (which tracks some of the biggest public pot companies like Tilray, Canopy, and Aurora) is down over 77% from March of last year.
It's an incredible disconnect with the widening popularity and spreading legalization of pot in the U.S. And the catalysts are many. But one thing is for sure: in a very short time, a lot of money went up in smoke.
Green management?
Perhaps no company better illustrates the wild ride of the past year better than MedMen.
According to an ongoing lawsuit, James Parker, the former CFO at MedMen, alleged that executive management including co-founders Adam Bierman and Andrew Modlin, the firm’s ex-CEO and chief brand officer, respectively, were engaged in unlawful behaviors that forced Parker's ousting in November of 2018. The suit alleges that the unlawful behavior included "profligate spending of company funds for [the co-founders’] own personal benefit," attempts to buoy MedMen’s stock, and a work culture "replete with racial, homophobic and misogynistic epithets and slurs," Parker's suit claims. The allegations have been denied by MedMen.
According to the suit, executives at MedMen spent company money on "24-hour armed Executive Protection (security) for the CEO, President, and their families," private jets, ... and "tens of thousands of dollars apiece on multiple extravagant custom conference room tables," despite burning cash at a rapid rate, according to the lawsuit.
MedMen declined to comment to Fortune. In a statement, Bierman denied the allegations, stating that "Mr. Parker’s inflammatory allegations are a transparent attempt to gain attention for his meritless lawsuit." Fortune was not able to reach Bierman or Modlin for further comment. MedMen's board also issued a statement calling the allegations "baseless."
Regardless of the legal situation, cash problems abound. An email viewed by MarketWatch shows (and the company confirmed) MedMen has been trying to offer stock as payment to vendors for cannabis products, as the company's dire cash situation has prompted them to "[modify] payment terms," per a statement from MedMen. Since February of last year, the stock has shed about 90% of its market cap.
But MedMen wasn't alone in giving investors a bad trip.
Over the summer, a regulatory scandal unraveled at one of Canada's biggest cannabis companies, CannTrust. The company made headlines last summer when internal communications and emails came to light showing members of the company's C-suite were aware that cannabis was being illegally grown in unlicensed rooms—sending the stock plummeting over 20% when news broke.
That was preceded in 2016 by several compliance violations?with Health Canada—including having $6 million worth of seized product in its vault at the time, four times more than it was licensed to have, and having mold in the grow rooms—according to inspection findings by Health Canada.
Since February of last year, CannTrust has lost over 90% of its market cap. CannTrust told Fortune in a statement that since the summer, the company is "focused on remediation and governance activities," and that "significant steps have been taken to improve the company’s corporate culture and regulatory compliance and remediate its facilities."
When he first started working with cannabis companies in 2014, Maruf Raza, the national director of the public companies practice at Canadian accounting firm MNP, was tasked with handling audits and accounting for public cannabis companies. What stood out about the management? Namely, their products weren't the only thing that was green.
"Initially, there was a lot more hand holding," working through accounting and audits with young companies, Raza recounts to Fortune. He says it's not unusual for younger companies in general with smaller teams to need more assistance at the beginning, but that challenges in raising capital in the private markets had pushed these companies into the public eye perhaps sooner than others in different industries would be pressured to.
"The genesis of these companies is that a lot of [them] were effectively startups four years ago," says Raza. "They’ve gone from zero to now, in some cases, multi-national companies with multi-billion dollar market caps."
But now, Raza says that the board composition at these companies is "night and day" from even four years ago. Professionals from Fortune 500 companies have been slowly filling seats at some of the top cannabis companies and "driving the bus," like at Canopy Growth (where many of the seats are filled by current or former executives at beverage giant Constellation Brands, which owns a nearly 40% stake in the company).
From the vantage point of David Belsky, the founder and CEO of FlowerHire, a cannabis-specific executive search and staffing company, there's more demand from cannabis companies for C-suites and lower management with turnaround experience. FlowerHire is now helping companies fill roles in investor relations and communications.
Although there may have been some tense C-suite departures, Raza says, many founders and management teams are realizing on their own that they are not the right teams to lead companies into their next phase as large public companies.
The revenue problem
Meanwhile, supply and demand issues have wreaked havoc on that Holy Grail of pleasing Wall Street—earnings estimates.
Despite the roll-out of legal marijuana in Canada, many companies struggled to gauge demand and product mix amid a lackluster number of retail stores in Canada, resulting in an oversupply of product for some. And in the U.S., where cannabis is still federally illegal, the regulatory climate and a vaping crisis last summer only exacerbated cash problems.
Back in September, one of the biggest names in the public markets, Aurora Cannabis, missed its own recently issued guidance for its 4th quarter and full year earnings, estimating roughly $75 million to $80 million USD in net revenue after accounting for net excise taxes paid. Instead, the company posted roughly $74 million in net revenue—an over $1 million miss from guidance it provided merely five weeks before reporting. Canopy Growth, another heavy hitter in the space, wildly missed earnings estimates in its 2nd fiscal quarter for 2020—reporting a loss of about $0.72 in USD per share versus roughly $0.30 estimates.
Cannabis producer Hexo was also hit hard after warning of a fiscal 4th quarter revenue miss of $10.9 million in USD to roughly $12.4 million, well below Street estimates of $18.5 million in October—sending investors into a frenzied sell-off.
As GreenWave Advisors founder Matthew Karnes (who describes himself as someone who isn't "ra, ra, ra, pot, pot, pot") tells it, "There was a big hype and sense of over-exuberance, but when push came to shove, and these companies reported, they didn’t come near it," sending valuations into a nosedive for many. "Managing Street expectations has been challenging, and I think that’s really been driven by lack of experience throughout many of these organizations," he says.
Another challenge for many cannabis companies has been navigating the arcane tax and accounting burdens for a product that largely falls into a legal grey area.
A sore spot for Canada-based cannabis companies (like Aurora Cannabis and Canopy Growth) is that they are required to estimate the market value of their products when they're sold while they are still growing them—called "fair value." Or, as Raza surmises, "you’re effectively recognizing income before you’re selling the product." Cannabis companies are required to fair value their growing plants as biological assets under the International Accounting Standard 41 Agriculture (IAS 41), by the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS).
The problem when this standard is applied to cannabis companies is that, unlike other companies producing more traditional agricultural goods (like wheat or cattle) that have commodity-based pricing and futures to help them fair value their product, "cannabis is not there yet," Raza says. "As a result, you have a lot of estimates and judgement that’s gone into some of the accounting." While one strain may go to market for a certain price one month, it might be worth more or less the next. These estimates and judgement have created a somewhat uneven playing field across different pot companies—it's not "apples to apples," says Raza.
But Raza maintains these inconsistencies aren't nefarious: "Most of these cannabis companies, if not all, would like nothing more than to not apply this agricultural standard," he argues, and instead recognize the income when they sell it. But despite the drain on time and resources estimating the value of companies' growing products, "Unfortunately they're handcuffed by the standard," Raza says.
As an auditor, MNP's Raza says he sees these companies trying to "figure out what the right bridge for the actual versus the projected [is]," which has made things a bit messy for MNP as auditors and for management, "so there’s been a lot of criticism about the math involved."
Case in point: in Aurora Cannabis' Management's Discussion & Analysis filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the company disclosed that, in the quarter ending in March 2016, Aurora's net income (of roughly $1.9 million in USD) was "primarily attributable to the unrealized gain on the changes in fair value of biological assets," whereas in the quarters ended September 30, 2016 and June 30, 2016, the net losses (of roughly $4.2 million in USD and $5.6 million respectively) were primary due to a "decrease in unrealized gain" on changes in fair value.
This is a frustration point for investors because it shows that, due to the challenges of estimating fair value, companies might have to substantially report different income or losses depending on how their fair value estimates actually match up with what they make off the plant—making it a challenge for investors or analysts to determine which cannabis companies have the most efficient production (and which are performing the best).
Sources at the IFRS Board tell Fortune that investors have raised concerns with the Board regarding insufficient information provided through the standard to help assess profit margins of some of these companies. While the IFRS does have standards for fair valuing biological assets en masse, there is no specific literature addressing how to fair value cannabis in particular (and their requirements of what information cannabis companies need to provide in their income statements regarding fair value are "not very prescriptive"). Sources at the IFRS Board tell Fortune there are currently no plans to reexamine IAS 41 in regard to cannabis specifically, but the Board is in the process of proposing to require companies (not limited to the cannabis industry) to report more detailed financial performance, including operating profit or loss and non-GAAP transparency.
Tax and accounting complexity
GreenWave Advisors' Matthew Karnes has seen a thing or two in his day as a former auditor.
He recalls touring a pot facility once and asking an employee ("not just a low-level employee") who kept the company's books for auditing. "[The employee] is like, 'what do you mean, like the library books?'"
"So I’m thinking to myself, 'Houston, we have a problem,'" Karnes recounts to Fortune. But while inexperience may have been the thorn in the side for certain companies, he asserts there's a bigger issue—altogether above-board—that's hurting cannabis companies' bottom lines.
Some pot companies in the U.S. have been hit hard with massive tax burdens due to the nature of their product—in other words, the cost of prohibition. U.S. pot companies operate under Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Service tax code—which has been draining many pot companies of cash.
Under?Section 280E, businesses aren't able to deduct ordinary business expenses from gross income associated with the "trafficking" of Schedule I or II substances, as defined by the Controlled Substances Act. In other words: most of the operating expenses for pot companies are nondeductible (although certain overhead costs can be allocated to cost of sales, but Karnes says this provides an opportunity for some companies to "push the envelope," which could make them targets for IRS scrutiny).
"Even if they’re suffering losses, they still have to pay taxes—[which could be] millions of dollars. That’s a drain on cash that would otherwise be [deployed] as reinvestment into these companies," says Karnes.
According to an analysis by GreenWave Advisors of public U.S. cannabis companies with a market cap of over $500 million (with the exception of MedMen), tax rates among the only three companies that were profitable in calendar year 2018 had varying effective tax rates, from 30% to 59%—but generally, depending on how the companies are structured, the tax benefit of operating loss carryforwards (which are intended to reduce tax liability by applying the current year's net operating loss to future years' net income) for cannabis companies are generally not permitted to offset future income.
The eight publicly-held multi-state operators (MSOs) GreenWave examined from the 1st quarter of 2018 through the 3rd quarter of 2019 collectively incurred net losses of roughly $542 million. And of those eight companies, all but one of which was operating at a net loss for the first nine months of 2019, GreenWave Advisors' analysis estimates a total loss of around $114.5 million of lost net operation loss tax credits. (In short: in the worst case scenario, these cannabis companies are missing out on over $114 million in tax credits).
What's next for cannabis stocks?
The fallout? Significant job cuts at some of the bigger cannabis companies. In the past several months alone, the sector has seen around 2,000 jobs cut across various companies.
Embattled MedMen cut 190 jobs in November. In February, Tilray announced it would cut about 10% of its staff in a ploy to reduce costs and inch closer to profitability. That same month, Aurora Cannabis followed suit, cutting about 500 jobs. Canopy, CannTrust, MedMen and Aurora have all replaced their CEOs.
Raza likens it to public startups: "The reality is, a lot of the stuff that’s happening in the public markets normally plays itself out in the private market. When you think of Silicon Valley, how many tech companies does the Silicon Valley ecosystem fund? Thousands. Of those companies, how many ultimately survive?”
The overenthusiastic (and often missed) revenue estimates of 2019 will likely no longer fly in 2020 —"[Investors] are going to come back in with a chip on their shoulder, saying, ‘no, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me,'" FlowerHire's chief revenue officer Sloane Barbour notes.
Still, from an operational standpoint, MNP's Raza thinks many of these companies may be only in "the second inning." And Morningstar's Kristoffer Inton suggests cannabis investors need to think of themselves as venture capitalists—"They don’t think about one year’s time—they think about the market [potential]," he says.
That growth potential is there, experts say. MNP's Raza believes many will end up getting to where they said they would, but it's a "function of time and patience, and as we know, public markets are not always going to be patient," he contends. But just as dozens of hopeful startups in nascent industries have choked out before hitting their stride, not all cannabis companies are created equal.
"The entire rise and fall of these companies is being played out in a public setting," Raza says. "And not all of them are going to survive."
Horizon's marijuana ETF still hasn't recovered. Noble says that at $7, the ETF is trading at $3 less than the price it began trading in 2017. But Noble hasn't entirely lost faith. He says he remains committed long term to the potential of the space, and that "there’s more doom and gloom than upside priced in."
In other words, the sector may currently be at a low. But you never know, there could always be another high around the corner.