優步（Uber）并不是真正的顛覆式創業企業。至少，哈佛商學院教授克萊頓?克里斯坦森是這樣認為的。“顛覆式創新”這個術語，正是他在1997年的著作《創新者的窘境》中首創的，此后便風靡全球商界。

近期，克萊頓?克里斯坦森發表了最新文章《什么才是顛覆式創新？》，對人們肆意亂用“顛覆式創新”進行撥亂反正。他以優步作為例子分析，表示許多評論者理解有誤，從而太過寬泛地應用這一術語。

克里斯坦森寫道，一家企業要具有顛覆性，要么必須在一個被忽略的低端市場站穩腳跟，以獲得更多有助于盈利的顧客，要么必須創立一個全新的市場，讓非顧客變成顧客。優步不符合其中任何一項，它針對的是已經使用出租車服務的用戶，也沒有提供特別低端（或者說特別便宜）的體驗。

在他看來，所謂“顛覆”，是指一個僅有有限資源的新生公司逐漸具有向占據優勢的大企業挑戰實力的過程。更具體說來，優勢企業注重那些最為苛刻（同時也是帶來最大利潤的）客戶群體，忽視了另一些群體的需求。而那些后來被認可為“顛覆”企業的新生軍，往往一開始就是針對這些被忽視的群體，通過提供更合適的、并且經常是更便宜的服務來站穩腳跟。

優勢企業忙于追求核心客戶群體帶來的更高利潤，往往不會采取及時有效的反擊戰略。新生企業借此得以更進一步，滿足那些優勢企業的主流客戶的需要，同時仍然保有給他們帶來早期成功的優勢。當優勢企業原先的主流客戶也開始廣泛接受新生企業的產品和服務時，“顛覆”就水到渠成了。

克里斯坦森表示，優步不符合顛覆者的第二個特質，其原因在于，真正的顛覆式創業企業都是以低質量服務起家，隨后通過提高服務質量搶占主流市場。

相比之下，這位管理學教授把Netflix看作是“經典”的顛覆式創業企業：其最初的服務根本無法吸引DVD租賃公司Blockbuster的主流用戶，因為這些人希望在選擇電影時獲得即時滿足。隨著服務質量的提升，Netflix對Blockbuster用戶的吸引力有所提升。最終，相當一部分用戶拋棄了Blockbuster，才導致該公司在2010年破產。

克里斯坦森表示，在某種程度上，顛覆式創新理論也成為了自身大范圍普及的犧牲品。他寫道：“盡管這一理論得到了廣泛傳播，但它的核心概念卻被許多人誤解，其基本原則也常被誤用。”

而在過去20年里，對這一理論的必要改良也往往淹沒在最初版本的超高人氣之中。這讓該理論一些本已得到完善的缺點，有時仍然受到抨擊。

還有另外一點令人不安：根據克里斯坦森的經驗，有太多談論“顛覆性”的人，根本沒有閱讀過相關主題的嚴肅著作或文章。很多時候，他們用這個術語隨意地形容創新的概念，以支持自己的任何理論。許多研究者、作者和顧問都用“顛覆式創新”來描述一切有關行業重組、此前成功的企業陷于困境等情形。但這個用法太寬泛了。

許多人將顛覆式創新與任何改變行業競爭模式的突破混為一談。其問題在于，不同的創新需要不同的戰略方針。也就是說，人們從顛覆式創新者（或阻止顛覆式創新者）身上學習到的成功經驗，并不適用于不斷變化的市場上的每一家公司。如果我們草率地亂貼標簽，或是沒能將后續研究和經驗得出的見解與原始理論整合起來，那么領導者也許就會使用錯誤的工具來分析自家企業的情況，從而降低了成功的幾率。隨著時間的推移，這個理論的適用性就會隨之減弱。(財富中文網)

譯者：嚴匡正

審校：任文科

Uber is not genuinely disruptive. At least, so says Clayton Christensen, the Harvard Business School professor who coined the term disruptive innovation in his 1997 book, The Innovator’s Dilemma.

In an article for the Harvard Business Review, Christensen corrects the record on what he defines as true innovative disruption, using Uber as an example of where many commentators go wrong, applying the term too broadly.

In order for a business to be disruptive, it must gain a foothold in a low-end market that had been ignored by the incumbent in favor of more profitable customers, Christensen writes. Otherwise, the disruptor must create an entirely new market, turning non-customers into customers. Uber doesn’t fit into either of those boxes: it targets people who already use taxi services, and it doesn’t provide a particularly lower-end or cheap experience.

In his opinion，“disruption” describes a process whereby a smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent businesses. Specifically, as incumbents focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding (and usually most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and ignore the needs of others.

Entrants that prove disruptive begin by successfully targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a foothold by delivering more suitable functionality frequently at a lower price. Incumbents, chasing higher profitability in more demanding segments, tend not to respond vigorously. Entrants then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents’mainstream customers require, while preserving the advantages that drove their early success.When mainstream customers start adopting the entrants’offerings in volume, disruption has occurred.

The second quality of a disruptor where Uber falls short, according to Christensen, is that a truly disruptive business begins with low-quality offerings, then eventually captures the mainstream market by improving quality.

In comparison, the author presents Netflix as a “classically” disruptive model: its initial service wasn’t terribly appealing to Blockbuster’s mainstream customers, who wanted instant gratification when choosing movies. As its quality improved, so did its appeal to Blockbuster’s customers, who eventually peeled off in high enough numbers to force the incumbent business into bankruptcy in 2010.

In some ways, the theory of disruptive innovation hasfallen victim to its own popularity, Christensen writes: “Despite broad dissemination, the theory’s core concepts have been widely misunderstood and its basic tenets frequently misapplied.”

Furthermore, essential refinements in the theory over the past 20 years appear to have been overshadowed by the popularity of the initial formulation. As a result, the theory is sometimes criticized for shortcomings that have already been addressed.

There’s another troubling concern: In Christensen's experience, too many people who speak of “disruption” have not read a serious book or article on the subject. Too frequently, they use the term loosely to invoke the concept of innovation in support of whatever it is they wish to do. Many researchers, writers, and consultants use “disruptive innovation” to describe any situation in which an industry is shaken up and previously successful incumbents stumble. But that’s much too broad a usage.

Christensen stressed, the problem with conflating a disruptive innovation with any breakthrough that changes an industry’s competitive patterns is that different types of innovation require different strategic approaches. To put it another way, the lessons we’ve learned about succeeding as a disruptive innovator (or defending against a disruptive challenger) will not apply to every company in a shifting market. If we get sloppy with our labels or fail to integrate insights from subsequent research and experience into the original theory, then managers may end up using the wrong tools for their context, reducing their chances of success. Over time, the theory’s usefulness will be undermined.