????過(guò)去幾周，巴克萊（Barclays）首席執(zhí)行官鮑勃?戴蒙德一直站在舞臺(tái)（或者審訊室）中央，直到他日薄西山，黯然下臺(tái)。而即將在本周五舉行的長(zhǎng)達(dá)兩小時(shí)的季度財(cái)報(bào)發(fā)布會(huì)上，摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙將會(huì)成為公眾新的焦點(diǎn)。

????很多人會(huì)和證券交易委員會(huì)（SEC）一樣，仔細(xì)審視戴蒙的一言一行。信息披露是資本主義制度的重要基石，但摩根大通最近對(duì)巨額交易損失的一系列披露不免讓人對(duì)這一制度心生疑竇。戴蒙在5月份通報(bào)了20億美元的損失，這和眾議員斯賓塞?巴克斯在6月份聲稱的60億美元數(shù)據(jù)大相徑庭，而戴蒙當(dāng)時(shí)也在場(chǎng)。現(xiàn)在根據(jù)媒體報(bào)道，實(shí)際損失可能高達(dá)90億美元。

????人們不禁要想，難道是又一個(gè)安然（Enron）丑聞嗎？不僅僅是摩根大通的表現(xiàn)：在最近的一樁電力價(jià)格操縱調(diào)查中，他們拒絕移交電子郵件；當(dāng)前也有很多對(duì)該公司行為的調(diào)查，包括可能存在的Lobor操縱行為。而且很多資本主義制度的一線防衛(wèi)就像10年前一樣虛弱。更可怕的是，出于種種原因，現(xiàn)在我們似乎厭倦了，甚至不愿去關(guān)注、了解實(shí)際發(fā)生了什么。

????并不是我們忘記了歷史，我們記得很清楚。但與此同時(shí)，我們并不那么神思清明；我們似乎安于現(xiàn)狀，無(wú)法采取措施做出應(yīng)有的改變。

????有機(jī)會(huì)我們還是會(huì)抽時(shí)間觀看7月13日早晨7:30的季報(bào)發(fā)布會(huì)。除了戴蒙，我還想看看分析師們的表現(xiàn)，他們會(huì)像參議員在6月13日的聽(tīng)證會(huì)上那樣屈從于戴蒙，還是會(huì)鼓起勇氣，像較真的英國(guó)下議院（House of Commons）議員挑戰(zhàn)首相那樣咄咄逼人。

????其實(shí)我們真正想看到的是具有敏銳直覺(jué)的分析師，他們往往能嗅出蛛絲馬跡，窮追不舍。4月6日的《金融時(shí)報(bào)》（Financial Times）和彭博社（Bloomberg）都報(bào)道了摩根大通“在某個(gè)信用違約掉期指數(shù)上積累了巨大頭寸，大到足以影響市場(chǎng)走勢(shì)”，而且“扭曲了市場(chǎng)價(jià)格”。在現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)臭名昭著的4月13日季報(bào)發(fā)布會(huì)中，摩根大通的首席財(cái)務(wù)官道格?布朗斯坦聲稱首席投資辦公室（CIO）投資的是“高等級(jí)低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的證券。”只有一位分析師，美國(guó)銀行（Bank of America）的蓋伊?莫什考斯基就此提問(wèn)，而提問(wèn)的開(kāi)頭是這樣的：“關(guān)于CIO的問(wèn)題，顯然你們已經(jīng)討論過(guò)，本周也已經(jīng)獲得媒體廣泛報(bào)道，我可以再問(wèn)一個(gè)問(wèn)題嗎…？”戴蒙的回應(yīng)就是無(wú)須擔(dān)心，然后就沒(méi)有下文了。摩根大通的發(fā)言人對(duì)CIO的最新動(dòng)態(tài)拒絕置評(píng)。

????根據(jù)彭博社和《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（Wall Street Journal）的報(bào)道，其實(shí)早在2010年，就有關(guān)于CIO的幕后警報(bào)。戴蒙后來(lái)作證說(shuō)，3月份CIO達(dá)到了其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)限制，4月上旬該行就此向監(jiān)管部門(mén)通報(bào)了情況。

????5月10日，戴蒙從其4月13日聲明的立場(chǎng)妥協(xié)，宣布了20億美元的損失，并承認(rèn)在1季度就已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了少量損失。

????《財(cái)富》雜志（Fortune）的斯蒂芬?甘道爾推測(cè)，戴蒙可能曾經(jīng)給2季度業(yè)績(jī)“洗大澡”，那是新上任的首席執(zhí)行官常用的手段。如果他盡可能地減記損失，推遲一次性的盈利，調(diào)整資產(chǎn)價(jià)格，或者預(yù)留大量的儲(chǔ)備金，他就可以徹底放棄這個(gè)季度，但為未來(lái)的驕人業(yè)績(jī)打下基礎(chǔ)。甘道爾說(shuō)，戴蒙也可能反其道而行之，盡量降低損失。這種平滑化的策略也很常見(jiàn)。

????戴蒙可沒(méi)那么簡(jiǎn)單。當(dāng)他接手第一銀行（Bank One，后與摩根大通合并——譯注）時(shí)，他并沒(méi)有一次性地計(jì)入所有損失，而是將其分散到早期的季度中，導(dǎo)致了異乎尋常的盈利震蕩。他增加儲(chǔ)備金，實(shí)施減記，甚至一度停止了信用卡證券化。這些措施都有利于提升未來(lái)的盈利。他在5月10日告訴分析師，他們將看到“本季度余下時(shí)間和下季度的大幅震蕩。”

????For the last couple of weeks, it has been Barclays (BCS) CEO Bob Diamond's moment in the sun (or interrogation lights) -- until he rode off into the sunset, that is. But it will be J.P. Morgan (JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon's turn to take the spotlight on Friday for two hours of quarterly earnings announcements and questions.

????The SEC and plenty others will be watching Dimon carefully. Disclosure is one of the bedrocks of our capitalist system, but J.P. Morgan's recent massive trading loss disclosures are putting our faith in the system to the test. Dimon reported $2 billion in losses in May, which contrasted starkly with the $6 billion figure Congressman Spencer Bachus told other members of Congress in Dimon's presence in June. And the loss could actually be as high as $9 billion according to media reports.

????Part of what is happening feels like Enron all over again. Not just because of J.P. Morgan's refusal to turn over emails in an energy pricing manipulation investigation, or that there are so many ongoing investigations into the company's behavior -- including the possibility of Libor manipulation investigations -- but because many of the frontline safeguards for our capitalist system are as weak now as they were a decade ago. Worse, we seem tired, somehow, and even less willing now to focus our attention and really get a hold of what is going on.

????It's not that we don't remember the past. We remember our history all right, but, at the same time, we are not fully aware; we seem stuck and unable to take action to change our course.

????Given the opportunity, however, we should take a moment to observe the July 13 7:30 am call. In addition to seeing what Dimon has to say, I'll be looking to see whether the analysts are as subservient as the senators were during their June 13 session with Dimon -- or whether the analysts will pull up their suspenders and ask questions like earnest members of the House of Commons might ask the UK prime minister.

????Intuitive analysts who can spot a scent and follow it would be welcome indeed. On April 6, theFinancial Times and Bloomberg reported that J.P. Morgan "had amassed a big position in an index of credit default swaps, sufficient in size to move the markets," and that it was "distorting prices." J.P. Morgan CFO Doug Braunstein on the now infamous April 13 call said the chief investment office (CIO) invested "in high-grade, low-risk securities." But only one analyst, Bank of America's Guy Moszkowski, raised a question in response: "On the CIO question, which obviously you've addressed and has gotten so much attention in the press this week, can I just ask one further question…?" he began. In response to his questions, all Dimon had to do was say there was nothing to worry about and the matter was dropped. A spokesperson for J.P. Morgan declined to comment on the CIO update.

????Behind the scenes in 2010, there had been warnings about the CIO, according to Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal reports. In March, the CIO risk limits had been hit, and in early April, the bank had notified regulators of the situation, Dimon later testified.

????Dimon backtracked from his April 13 statements on May 10 and announced the $2 billion in losses, noting there had been smaller, less substantial losses in the first quarter.

????Fortune's Stephen Gandel has speculated that Dimon could kitchen sink the second quarter, as some new CEOs are inclined to do. If he writes off all he can, delays one-time gains, adjusts pricing, or sets up large reserves, he could trash the quarter but set himself up to look like a hero later on. Or, Gandel suggests, he could do the opposite to minimize the loss. That is a familiar tactic called smoothing.

????Dimon, however, might be more subtle than that. When he took over at Bank One, he didn't take all the hits to earnings at once. He spaced them over the early quarters, which created an unusually volatile earnings pattern. He built reserves, did write-offs, and even stopped credit card securitizations for a time, which made it easier to boost earnings later on. On May 10, he told analysts they could expect that "volatility for the rest of this quarter and next quarter or so will be high."