????您去年有沒(méi)有得到像樣的加薪？不用跳槽，不用為升職而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，也不需要比同行表現(xiàn)更出色，就能獲得28%的加薪，您意下如何？

????如果你是一家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500（S&P 500）公司的CEO，而你去年的工資卻只漲了28%，那可真是不值一提，因?yàn)樵谀愕耐兄校幸话肴说募有椒榷汲^(guò)了你。

????美國(guó)的失業(yè)人數(shù)多達(dá)數(shù)百萬(wàn)，可無(wú)論經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況是好是壞，美國(guó)的CEO們總能得到加薪。原因何在？簡(jiǎn)而言之，就是許多人的支持，還有一些細(xì)微的差別。

????以下是美國(guó)CEO們獲得加薪的幾個(gè)步驟。

????第一步：在確定薪酬時(shí)，忽略全球基準(zhǔn)。

????盡管業(yè)務(wù)外包會(huì)使非CEO高管們的薪酬受到負(fù)面影響，甚至影響就業(yè)；但美國(guó)CEO的薪酬大幅上漲，在某種程度上來(lái)說(shuō)，是因?yàn)楣径聲?huì)沒(méi)有將他們的薪酬水平與全球的同行進(jìn)行對(duì)比。

????例如，埃克森石油公司（Exxon）的董事會(huì)在確定CEO的薪酬時(shí)，并沒(méi)有參考其他跨國(guó)能源公司的薪酬設(shè)置。

????而沃爾瑪公司（Wal-Mart）董事會(huì)則只是將其CEO的薪酬與其他美國(guó)企業(yè)的CEO進(jìn)行對(duì)比，卻沒(méi)有把世界零售企業(yè)中排名第2的家樂(lè)福（Carrefour）、排名第3的麥德龍（Metro AG），或者排名第4的樂(lè)購(gòu)（Tesco）作為參考對(duì)象。

????忽視同行業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)會(huì)帶來(lái)什么影響呢？

????努諾?費(fèi)爾南德斯、米格爾?費(fèi)雷拉、佩德羅?馬托斯和凱文?墨菲近期開(kāi)展的一項(xiàng)研究顯示，在2003年到2008年期間，美國(guó)CEO們的平均薪酬是其他國(guó)家CEO們的兩倍。而且，在根據(jù)公司規(guī)模和行業(yè)進(jìn)行調(diào)整后，相比國(guó)外同行，美國(guó)CEO們的薪酬依然高出80%。

????第二步：讓老板相信， CEO的薪酬不需要根據(jù)績(jī)效來(lái)確定。實(shí)際上，他們?cè)诖_定薪酬的時(shí)候，完全可以忽略績(jī)效。

????每次，當(dāng)聽(tīng)到有人說(shuō)CEO的薪酬采取“按績(jī)效支付”的原則，我們可能都會(huì)信以為真。但費(fèi)爾南德斯及其同事們的研究顯示，美國(guó)CEO的薪酬達(dá)到其全球同行的兩倍，并不是因?yàn)樗麄儽憩F(xiàn)非凡。（另外一項(xiàng)研究也證明，美國(guó)CEO的薪酬與他們的工作績(jī)效沒(méi)有太大的關(guān)系。）

????既然跟績(jī)效沒(méi)有什么關(guān)系，那究竟是什么推動(dòng)了CEO的薪酬上漲呢？

????第三步：獲得股權(quán)

????研究結(jié)果顯示，美國(guó)CEO們的薪酬之所以高人一等，主要是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)的CEO獲得了高水平的股權(quán)薪酬，其中包括公司股票和股票期權(quán)。

????但事實(shí)還不止如此。

????第四步：為繼續(xù)占有這個(gè)肥差，要讓機(jī)構(gòu)股東相信，以股權(quán)形式支付CEO薪酬對(duì)他們有利。

????研究顯示，如果公司有美國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)股東，董事會(huì)更有可能提供高水平的股權(quán)薪酬（從而推高薪酬總額）。美國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)股東要求更多按股權(quán)支付薪酬，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為提供股票和股票期權(quán)等薪酬獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，可以提高CEO的績(jī)效，并使薪酬與績(jī)效掛鉤。但事實(shí)卻并非如此。

????如果公司——以家族企業(yè)為例，由內(nèi)部股東控股，而不是機(jī)構(gòu)股東，那么內(nèi)部股東能夠“把CEO的薪酬控制在較低水平”。這樣的公司有一套“更好的制度”。費(fèi)爾南德斯認(rèn)為，與機(jī)構(gòu)股東相比，內(nèi)部股東能更好地控制CEO。

????第五步：由獨(dú)立委員會(huì)確定CEO的薪酬。

????費(fèi)爾南德斯及其同事的研究顯示，不論公司的規(guī)模大小，公司董事會(huì)中獨(dú)立董事的人數(shù)越多，CEO的薪酬便會(huì)越高。這聽(tīng)起來(lái)是不是不合常理？表面看來(lái)，確實(shí)如此，但實(shí)際上，獨(dú)立董事對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)股東的利益更為敏感。

????如果美國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)股東希望更多以股權(quán)形式支付薪酬，獨(dú)立董事極有可能把機(jī)構(gòu)股東的想法付諸實(shí)施，進(jìn)而使美國(guó)的CEO（與非其他國(guó)家CEO相比）獲得超高的薪酬。費(fèi)爾南德斯表示，董事們開(kāi)出“更高的股權(quán)薪酬”，是為了“回避（責(zé)任）問(wèn)題。”

????第六步：確保公司在美國(guó)上市。

????費(fèi)爾南德斯認(rèn)為，美國(guó)正在向其他國(guó)家輸出其薪酬制度。外國(guó)公司在美國(guó)上市后，公司的CEO薪酬也會(huì)上漲。

????第七步：利用法規(guī)增加薪酬，證明提高CEO的薪酬符合股東的最大利益。（這么做看上去確實(shí)是“為了”股東。）

????如何才能做到呢？利用法規(guī)和會(huì)計(jì)慣例，證明提高CEO薪酬是符合規(guī)定的。

????例如，1993年，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)立法，規(guī)定公司高管基本薪酬一百萬(wàn)美元以上部分，公司不能申請(qǐng)減免稅收。該項(xiàng)立法通常被認(rèn)為是導(dǎo)致CEO激勵(lì)性工資提高的因素之一。

????另外一個(gè)推動(dòng)因素，是美國(guó)以往采取的與股票期權(quán)相關(guān)的會(huì)計(jì)慣例。過(guò)去，通過(guò)股票期權(quán)的形式向高管發(fā)放薪酬的成本不必記入公司的損益表。這種會(huì)計(jì)方法使公司的損益表更好看，因?yàn)楣善逼跈?quán)薪酬不會(huì)作為開(kāi)支出現(xiàn)，因此這種會(huì)計(jì)慣例通常被認(rèn)為是造成CEO激勵(lì)性工資提高的一項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵因素。

????而且，高管薪酬咨詢(xún)公司James F. Reda and Associates的創(chuàng)始人兼執(zhí)行董事詹姆斯?里達(dá)預(yù)測(cè)，新《多德弗蘭克法案》（Dodd-Frank Act）要求利用圖表對(duì)比高管的薪酬與績(jī)效，這將成為美國(guó)公司提高CEO薪酬的另外一個(gè)借口。

????他表示：“公司會(huì)把這作為提高薪酬的口號(hào)，”而且公司可以“采取任何方式隨意分析那些信息。”里達(dá)認(rèn)為，如果一個(gè)績(jī)效指標(biāo)不合適，他們就會(huì)換其他標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比。

????里達(dá)預(yù)測(cè)，五年內(nèi)，美國(guó)CEO的薪酬將在目前水平基礎(chǔ)上再翻一番。

????采取以上七個(gè)步驟，就可以像美國(guó)CEO一樣獲得高薪。不過(guò)，我輩不是CEO，要想復(fù)制這些做法并非易事。

????當(dāng)然，公司董事會(huì)也可以采取其他措施，對(duì)表現(xiàn)優(yōu)秀的CEO進(jìn)行激勵(lì)和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，而且公司確實(shí)應(yīng)該關(guān)注這一問(wèn)題。全美企業(yè)董事協(xié)會(huì)（National Association of Corporate Directors）與薪酬咨詢(xún)公司Pearl Meyer & Partners五月份發(fā)布的一份調(diào)查顯示，“33%的受訪對(duì)象把‘挑選與股東價(jià)值創(chuàng)造相一致的績(jī)效目標(biāo)’作為董事會(huì)的首要任務(wù)。”

????或許，機(jī)構(gòu)股東也可以重新考慮他們的需求。提供更高的股權(quán)薪酬對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)是否值得？他們到底想釋放什么信號(hào)？

????或許，更高的薪酬也不見(jiàn)得對(duì)CEO本身完全有利。因?yàn)檫@意味著公司財(cái)庫(kù)中能用來(lái)為你加薪的資金更少了，也意味著公司無(wú)法取得更好的業(yè)績(jī)，更多員工失業(yè)，更不可能招聘新人來(lái)替你分擔(dān)日益繁重的工作負(fù)擔(dān)。

????或許，我們現(xiàn)在需要做的，除了埋怨，還有更多。希望美國(guó)的“高薪傳染病”不會(huì)蔓延得太遠(yuǎn)、太快。

????本文作者Eleanor Bloxham是董事會(huì)咨詢(xún)公司價(jià)值聯(lián)盟與公司治理聯(lián)盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance）（http://thevaluealliance.com/）首席執(zhí)行官。

????（翻譯 劉進(jìn)龍）

????Did you get a decent raise last year? How about 28% without having to change jobs, vie for a promotion or outperform your peers?

????If you were a CEO of an S&P 500 company last year and your pay only went up 28%, then sorry, but half your peers did better than you.

????So with millions out of work, how do U.S. CEOs keep their pay rising in good times and bad? The short answer is an army of support and a few small distinctions.

????Here's how it's done.

????Step One. Ignore global benchmarks in setting pay.

????While outsourcing may be negatively affecting your pay as a non-CEO or your ability to find work, U.S. CEO salaries are soaring in part because of the failure of boards to compare the pay of U.S. CEOs against their global counterparts.

????Exxon's (XOM) board, for example, doesn't use other global energy firms when setting their CEO's pay.

????And Wal-Mart's (WMT) board compares its CEO's pay mainly to CEO pay at other U.S. firms and fails to include no. 2 world retailer Carrefour, no. 3 Metro AG, , or no. 4 Tesco among their benchmark companies.

????Why does that have an impact?

????Recent research by professors Nuno Fernandes, Miguel Ferreira, Pedro Matos, and Kevin Murphy finds that, on average, U.S. CEOs earned double their non-U.S. counterparts between 2003 and 2008. And, adjusting for firm size and industry, U.S. CEOs still earn around 80% more than their non U.S. based peers.

????Step Two. Convince your bosses that pay need not be based on your performance. In fact, they can just ignore performance in setting pay.

????While we'd all like to have a nickel every time someone said CEO pay is based on the principles of "pay for performance", research by Fernandes and his colleagues shows that U.S. CEOs aren't being paid double their global counterparts because they are doing a fantastic job. (Additional research supports the argument that U.S. CEO pay has little relationship to a CEO's job performance.)

????So, if it's not to do with performance, what is driving CEO pay upward?

????Step Three: Get equity.

????The research shows that U.S. CEO pay is higher primarily because U.S. CEOs are awarded high levels of equity compensation, which includes pay in the form of company stock and stock options.

????But you can't stop there.

????Step Four: To make sure the gravy train doesn't stop, get institutional shareholders to believe your equity pay benefits them.

????When companies have U.S. institutional owners, boards are more likely to offer high levels of equity compensation (and, in turn, total compensation), the research shows. U.S. institutional owners have pushed for greater equity-based pay based on the assumption that offering pay incentives like stock and stock options boost performance and align pay with performance. That has not been the case, however.

????When insiders, rather than institutions, hold more of a company's stock -- for example, in family-owned firms -- "they keep pay down," says Fernandes. There's "better discipline." Insiders do a better job of controlling the CEO than outside institutional owners have, he says.

????Step Five: Get an independent committee to determine your pay.

????According to the research from Fernandes and Co., regardless of a company's size, higher CEO pay is associated with a board comprised of more independent directors. But isn't it counterintuitive that having more independent directors would lead to higher pay? Perhaps on the surface, yes, but independent directors are likely more attuned to institutional owners' interests.

????If U.S. institutional owners want more equity-based pay, which leads to outsized U.S. (versus non U.S.) pay, independent directors are more likely to deliver what they think institutional owners want. The directors are "shielding themselves from [liability] problems" by handing out "higher equity based pay," Fernandes says.

????Step Six: Make sure your company is listed in the U.S.

????Fernandes says that the U.S. is exporting its pay practices abroad. When non-U.S. firms are traded on U.S. exchanges, the firm's CEO pay gets a boost.

????Step Seven: Take advantage of regulation to boost your pay and make the case that your additional pay is in shareholders' best interests. (You are really doing it for them.)

????How do you pull this one off? Use regulation and accounting conventions to justify pay increases.

????For example, in 1993, Congress passed legislation that limited the amount of base executive pay that companies could deduct in their taxes to $1 million. This legislation is often cited as one of the drivers for the rise of CEO incentive pay.

????Another driver has been past U.S. accounting conventions related to stock options. In the past, the expense of paying executives with stock options did not have to be included on the company's income statement. This accounting, which made companies' income statements look better because the stock option compensation did not show up as an expense, is often cited as a key contributor to the rise in CEO incentive pay.

????Going forward, James Reda, founder and managing director of compensation firm James F. Reda and Associates, predicts that a new Dodd-Frank requirement to include a chart that compares executive pay with performance will be used as yet another "excuse to increase pay" for CEOs at U.S. companies.

????"Companies will use this as a rallying cry to increase pay," he says, and they'll be "slicing and dicing the information any way they like." If one performance metric doesn't work, they'll just change the comparison, Reda says.

????Reda predicts in five years we'll see a doubling of U.S. CEO pay from the current levels.

????So those are your seven steps to be paid like a U.S. CEO -- although they may not be so easy to duplicate for the non-CEOs among us.

????Of course, corporate boards could study other approaches to motivating and rewarding good CEO performance, which does seem to be an issue of concern. A survey released in May by the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) with compensation consultants Pearl Meyer & Partners showed that "a total of 33% of respondents … ranked 'the selection of performance goals that align with shareholder value creation' as their top Board issue."

????Perhaps institutional owners could also rethink what they want. Has higher equity based pay been worth the money they've spent? What signals do they really want to send?

????Higher CEO pay is likely not going to benefit you. It means fewer dollars in the coffers for your raises, no better performance for your company, and more unemployed workers, rather than new hires who could help you with your growing workload.

????Maybe it's time for more than a collective sigh. Let's hope the U.S. contagion won't spread too far too fast.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com/), a board advisory firm.