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讓前首席執(zhí)行官擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)是明智的做法嗎?

GEOFF COLVIN
2023-09-01

“執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)”現(xiàn)象在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層繼任方面變得越發(fā)盛行。

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誰(shuí)說(shuō)了算?在將首席執(zhí)行官職務(wù)交給繼任者鮑勃·查佩克(左)之后,迪士尼的鮑勃·艾格(右)作為執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)依然大權(quán)在握。圖片來(lái)源:GERARDO MORA—GETTY IMAGES

當(dāng)?shù)鲜磕幔―isney)首席執(zhí)行官鮑勃·艾格2020年2月突然宣布將讓位于公園業(yè)務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)人鮑勃·查佩克時(shí),好萊塢震驚了。2013年以來(lái),艾格的退休計(jì)劃已經(jīng)推遲了四次。當(dāng)時(shí),在周五下午的新聞發(fā)布會(huì)中,他突然宣布退休,終于交出了手中大權(quán)。商業(yè)新聞媒體發(fā)表了十幾篇文章,全面回顧了其48年的職業(yè)生涯,細(xì)數(shù)了其成就,并推測(cè)他在完成掌管迪士尼的使命后會(huì)做什么。

但就是沒(méi)有想到,他掌管迪士尼的使命并沒(méi)有結(jié)束。

隨著媒體的注意力幾乎清一色地轉(zhuǎn)移至查佩克,艾格成為了“執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)”,這并不是一個(gè)顯赫的職務(wù),而且可能被輕易地誤認(rèn)為是一個(gè)榮譽(yù)頭銜。然而,事實(shí)正好相反。該聲明稱,艾格“將領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的創(chuàng)意業(yè)務(wù)”——該業(yè)務(wù)在公司有著舉足輕重的地位,每年通過(guò)電影、電視和主題公園將數(shù)十億美元收入囊中。此外,新聞發(fā)布會(huì)中還含有一個(gè)深藏不露的真相:查佩克將直接向艾格一人以及艾格執(zhí)掌的董事會(huì)匯報(bào)。

一句話,艾格依然是真正的首席執(zhí)行官。他擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)將近兩年的時(shí)間,并在這之后終于徹底退居二線。(他隨后在11個(gè)月后回歸,接替查佩克擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官,但這是后話。)

被人們忽視的是,“執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)”現(xiàn)象在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層繼任方面變得越發(fā)盛行。至于是否是件好事無(wú)人知曉。高管獵頭公司Spencer Stuart稱,2019年新任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)的人數(shù)長(zhǎng)比2010年增長(zhǎng)了50%。這一態(tài)勢(shì)在疫情期間告一段落,但如今又開始延續(xù)。如今,64家《財(cái)富》世界500強(qiáng)公司都設(shè)有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職,包括耐克(Nike)、聯(lián)邦快遞(FedEx)、Visa、霍尼韋爾(Honeywell)和西南航空(Southwest Airlines)這些大型公司。

為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)這一趨勢(shì)?在大多數(shù)案例(64個(gè)中有54個(gè),包括上述提及的這些公司)中,公司都會(huì)遵循迪士尼的模式,即前首席執(zhí)行官在幕后作為執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)執(zhí)掌大權(quán)。然而平均來(lái)看,這種模式的效果并不好。4年前,Spencer Stuart審視了那些設(shè)有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職以及沒(méi)有該職位的公司的業(yè)績(jī),對(duì)比了每個(gè)公司組別內(nèi)部的股東回報(bào)增速;最近,該公司更新了研究,以查看當(dāng)前更加疲軟的經(jīng)濟(jì)是否會(huì)影響研究結(jié)果。答案是否定的。Spencer Stuart全球首席執(zhí)行官與董事會(huì)實(shí)踐負(fù)責(zé)人詹森·鮑姆加滕表示,在這兩個(gè)時(shí)期,那些設(shè)有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職的公司在業(yè)績(jī)方面趕不上那些未設(shè)有該職務(wù)的公司。詹森也是該研究的成員之一。艾格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的迪士尼是一個(gè)顯著的例子,公司幾乎錯(cuò)過(guò)了疫情后時(shí)代的股市大漲,落后標(biāo)普500高達(dá)31個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

出現(xiàn)這個(gè)結(jié)果實(shí)屬正常。大多數(shù)新任首席執(zhí)行官希望進(jìn)行變革,而且“與前首席執(zhí)行官共處一室是一件困難的事情”,Spencer Stuart北美董事會(huì)實(shí)踐負(fù)責(zé)人朱莉·多姆說(shuō)道。公司隨后可能陷入癱瘓狀態(tài)。任命一位執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)之后再另行任命一位首席執(zhí)行官的做法也會(huì)讓雇員感到疑惑。密歇根大學(xué)羅斯商學(xué)院(University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business)管理學(xué)教授諾埃爾·蒂奇表示:“誰(shuí)才是老板?沒(méi)有人知道。因此人們會(huì)采用我們?cè)诤⑻釙r(shí)代就學(xué)會(huì)的本領(lǐng),如果你從媽媽那里得不到答案,就去問(wèn)爸爸,反之亦然。”(迪士尼便上演了這出與層級(jí)有關(guān)的游戲,高管們會(huì)與其中一位老板見(jiàn)面,甚至在一位老板面前說(shuō)另一位的壞話。)

毫無(wú)疑問(wèn),像養(yǎng)老金和共同基金這類持有美國(guó)公司大多數(shù)股份的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,并不喜歡設(shè)立執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職這種做法。多姆說(shuō):“這些機(jī)構(gòu)將執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)視為頑固不化或阻礙變革的人。”為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者提供如何在公司年度大會(huì)上為股東建議投票的ISS Governance,亦持有同樣的看法。各大公司幾乎總是會(huì)反對(duì)要求設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事長(zhǎng)一職(選擇與公司無(wú)關(guān)的人擔(dān)任這一職務(wù))的股東建議。然而,如果公司設(shè)立了執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職,ISS更有可能建議投票反對(duì)公司的意愿,并贊成設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事長(zhǎng)一職的建議。

有鑒于所有這些反對(duì)執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)理念的外力,人們不得不思考,為什么此舉會(huì)越發(fā)獲得各大公司的青睞。賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)沃頓商學(xué)院(University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School)的管理學(xué)教授彼得·卡佩利問(wèn)道:“這種安排能夠解決什么問(wèn)題?如果公司的想法是,前首席執(zhí)行官會(huì)能夠給新首席執(zhí)行官指點(diǎn)迷津,那么何須設(shè)立一個(gè)正式職務(wù)來(lái)做這件事?如果公司的想法是前首席執(zhí)行官應(yīng)指導(dǎo)新首席執(zhí)行官該如何行事,那么延長(zhǎng)老首席執(zhí)行官的任期不就行了嗎?”

對(duì)于資深首席執(zhí)行官來(lái)說(shuō),要求越大,優(yōu)勢(shì)就更多

卡佩利設(shè)問(wèn)的答案充分說(shuō)明了經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的首席執(zhí)行官的就業(yè)市場(chǎng)在過(guò)去二十年中的變化。

讓離任首席執(zhí)行官擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)最常見(jiàn)的原因始于私募股權(quán)公司的增長(zhǎng)。為了經(jīng)營(yíng)其資產(chǎn)組合公司,這些公司通常會(huì)聘請(qǐng)離開上市公司的首席執(zhí)行官。哈佛大學(xué)與芝加哥大學(xué)的研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn),71%新收購(gòu)的私募股權(quán)資產(chǎn)組合公司會(huì)安插新首席執(zhí)行官,而且這些新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)中的75%則來(lái)自于公司外部。各大公司并沒(méi)有選擇與私募股權(quán)公司爭(zhēng)搶現(xiàn)任的首席執(zhí)行官,而是更多地提拔以前從未擔(dān)任過(guò)這一職務(wù)的新人。去年,標(biāo)普500公司80%的新任首席執(zhí)行官都來(lái)自公司內(nèi)部,是7年以來(lái)的最高比例。董事會(huì)有時(shí)候會(huì)覺(jué)得這些新人需要一些時(shí)間才能適應(yīng)新的工作,因此他們認(rèn)為,執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)便可以承擔(dān)一些職責(zé),至少短期內(nèi)是如此。鮑姆加滕表示,問(wèn)題在于,“沒(méi)有明確的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)數(shù)據(jù)表明,”如果前任首席執(zhí)行官繼續(xù)在公司擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng),那么投資者就會(huì)對(duì)公司繼任者感到更加放心。

另一個(gè)從未公開的說(shuō)法是為了應(yīng)對(duì)即將離任的首席執(zhí)行官在機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部的影響力。鮑姆加滕表示:“如果即將離任的首席執(zhí)行官希望繼續(xù)獲得與首席執(zhí)行官相近的薪酬方案,而不是按需式咨詢師的薪酬方案,那么公司很難在沒(méi)有設(shè)立正式職務(wù)的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)。”如果董事會(huì)希望即將離任的首席執(zhí)行官在辭去職務(wù)之前開展一些令人不快的變革,例如解雇高管或削減成本,那么這些首席執(zhí)行官還會(huì)擁有更大的話語(yǔ)權(quán)。鮑姆加滕指出,設(shè)立一個(gè)執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)職務(wù)可能對(duì)于“權(quán)力的和平交接具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。”

執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)的做法可能會(huì)十分奏效,尤其是其任期不長(zhǎng)的情況下。當(dāng)亞歷克斯·戈?duì)査够趶?qiáng)生公司(Johnson & Johnson)完成了其輝煌的十年首席執(zhí)行官任期之后,他擔(dān)任了執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一年的時(shí)間,然后離開了董事會(huì)。期間,強(qiáng)生公司繼續(xù)發(fā)展壯大。然而,這類故事更多地是以悲劇收?qǐng)觥.?dāng)Peloton的業(yè)務(wù)隨著疫情結(jié)束而崩塌時(shí),董事會(huì)讓聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官約翰·弗利擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)。盡管新首席執(zhí)行官巴里·麥卡錫實(shí)施了一項(xiàng)激進(jìn)的變革,否定了弗利的大多數(shù)策略,但公司的業(yè)績(jī)持續(xù)下滑,而且弗利和另一名聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人最終離開了公司。

執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)職務(wù)的未來(lái)將取決于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、緊張的董事會(huì)以及即將離任的強(qiáng)勢(shì)首席執(zhí)行官這三方面的角力。鮑姆加滕預(yù)測(cè)這種退休升任潮將延續(xù),“尤其是有關(guān)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性的情緒不斷蔓延的情況下。”無(wú)論在哪個(gè)接任案例中,盡管這個(gè)職務(wù)看似十分平淡,但我們不用去懷疑其真實(shí)用意。曾服務(wù)于多個(gè)董事會(huì)的企業(yè)治理專家查爾斯·埃爾森表示:“當(dāng)你成為執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)時(shí),你就得擔(dān)負(fù)這個(gè)責(zé)任。這種職務(wù)的變化并沒(méi)有多少意義,你依然得掌控大局。僅此而已。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:馮豐

審校:夏林

當(dāng)?shù)鲜磕幔―isney)首席執(zhí)行官鮑勃·艾格2020年2月突然宣布將讓位于公園業(yè)務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)人鮑勃·查佩克時(shí),好萊塢震驚了。2013年以來(lái),艾格的退休計(jì)劃已經(jīng)推遲了四次。當(dāng)時(shí),在周五下午的新聞發(fā)布會(huì)中,他突然宣布退休,終于交出了手中大權(quán)。商業(yè)新聞媒體發(fā)表了十幾篇文章,全面回顧了其48年的職業(yè)生涯,細(xì)數(shù)了其成就,并推測(cè)他在完成掌管迪士尼的使命后會(huì)做什么。

但就是沒(méi)有想到,他掌管迪士尼的使命并沒(méi)有結(jié)束。

隨著媒體的注意力幾乎清一色地轉(zhuǎn)移至查佩克,艾格成為了“執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)”,這并不是一個(gè)顯赫的職務(wù),而且可能被輕易地誤認(rèn)為是一個(gè)榮譽(yù)頭銜。然而,事實(shí)正好相反。該聲明稱,艾格“將領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的創(chuàng)意業(yè)務(wù)”——該業(yè)務(wù)在公司有著舉足輕重的地位,每年通過(guò)電影、電視和主題公園將數(shù)十億美元收入囊中。此外,新聞發(fā)布會(huì)中還含有一個(gè)深藏不露的真相:查佩克將直接向艾格一人以及艾格執(zhí)掌的董事會(huì)匯報(bào)。

一句話,艾格依然是真正的首席執(zhí)行官。他擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)將近兩年的時(shí)間,并在這之后終于徹底退居二線。(他隨后在11個(gè)月后回歸,接替查佩克擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官,但這是后話。)

被人們忽視的是,“執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)”現(xiàn)象在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層繼任方面變得越發(fā)盛行。至于是否是件好事無(wú)人知曉。高管獵頭公司Spencer Stuart稱,2019年新任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)的人數(shù)長(zhǎng)比2010年增長(zhǎng)了50%。這一態(tài)勢(shì)在疫情期間告一段落,但如今又開始延續(xù)。如今,64家《財(cái)富》世界500強(qiáng)公司都設(shè)有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職,包括耐克(Nike)、聯(lián)邦快遞(FedEx)、Visa、霍尼韋爾(Honeywell)和西南航空(Southwest Airlines)這些大型公司。

為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)這一趨勢(shì)?在大多數(shù)案例(64個(gè)中有54個(gè),包括上述提及的這些公司)中,公司都會(huì)遵循迪士尼的模式,即前首席執(zhí)行官在幕后作為執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)執(zhí)掌大權(quán)。然而平均來(lái)看,這種模式的效果并不好。4年前,Spencer Stuart審視了那些設(shè)有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職以及沒(méi)有該職位的公司的業(yè)績(jī),對(duì)比了每個(gè)公司組別內(nèi)部的股東回報(bào)增速;最近,該公司更新了研究,以查看當(dāng)前更加疲軟的經(jīng)濟(jì)是否會(huì)影響研究結(jié)果。答案是否定的。Spencer Stuart全球首席執(zhí)行官與董事會(huì)實(shí)踐負(fù)責(zé)人詹森·鮑姆加滕表示,在這兩個(gè)時(shí)期,那些設(shè)有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職的公司在業(yè)績(jī)方面趕不上那些未設(shè)有該職務(wù)的公司。詹森也是該研究的成員之一。艾格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的迪士尼是一個(gè)顯著的例子,公司幾乎錯(cuò)過(guò)了疫情后時(shí)代的股市大漲,落后標(biāo)普500高達(dá)31個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

出現(xiàn)這個(gè)結(jié)果實(shí)屬正常。大多數(shù)新任首席執(zhí)行官希望進(jìn)行變革,而且“與前首席執(zhí)行官共處一室是一件困難的事情”,Spencer Stuart北美董事會(huì)實(shí)踐負(fù)責(zé)人朱莉·多姆說(shuō)道。公司隨后可能陷入癱瘓狀態(tài)。任命一位執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)之后再另行任命一位首席執(zhí)行官的做法也會(huì)讓雇員感到疑惑。密歇根大學(xué)羅斯商學(xué)院(University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business)管理學(xué)教授諾埃爾·蒂奇表示:“誰(shuí)才是老板?沒(méi)有人知道。因此人們會(huì)采用我們?cè)诤⑻釙r(shí)代就學(xué)會(huì)的本領(lǐng),如果你從媽媽那里得不到答案,就去問(wèn)爸爸,反之亦然。”(迪士尼便上演了這出與層級(jí)有關(guān)的游戲,高管們會(huì)與其中一位老板見(jiàn)面,甚至在一位老板面前說(shuō)另一位的壞話。)

毫無(wú)疑問(wèn),像養(yǎng)老金和共同基金這類持有美國(guó)公司大多數(shù)股份的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,并不喜歡設(shè)立執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職這種做法。多姆說(shuō):“這些機(jī)構(gòu)將執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)視為頑固不化或阻礙變革的人。”為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者提供如何在公司年度大會(huì)上為股東建議投票的ISS Governance,亦持有同樣的看法。各大公司幾乎總是會(huì)反對(duì)要求設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事長(zhǎng)一職(選擇與公司無(wú)關(guān)的人擔(dān)任這一職務(wù))的股東建議。然而,如果公司設(shè)立了執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一職,ISS更有可能建議投票反對(duì)公司的意愿,并贊成設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事長(zhǎng)一職的建議。

有鑒于所有這些反對(duì)執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)理念的外力,人們不得不思考,為什么此舉會(huì)越發(fā)獲得各大公司的青睞。賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)沃頓商學(xué)院(University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School)的管理學(xué)教授彼得·卡佩利問(wèn)道:“這種安排能夠解決什么問(wèn)題?如果公司的想法是,前首席執(zhí)行官會(huì)能夠給新首席執(zhí)行官指點(diǎn)迷津,那么何須設(shè)立一個(gè)正式職務(wù)來(lái)做這件事?如果公司的想法是前首席執(zhí)行官應(yīng)指導(dǎo)新首席執(zhí)行官該如何行事,那么延長(zhǎng)老首席執(zhí)行官的任期不就行了嗎?”

對(duì)于資深首席執(zhí)行官來(lái)說(shuō),要求越大,優(yōu)勢(shì)就更多

卡佩利設(shè)問(wèn)的答案充分說(shuō)明了經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的首席執(zhí)行官的就業(yè)市場(chǎng)在過(guò)去二十年中的變化。

讓離任首席執(zhí)行官擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)最常見(jiàn)的原因始于私募股權(quán)公司的增長(zhǎng)。為了經(jīng)營(yíng)其資產(chǎn)組合公司,這些公司通常會(huì)聘請(qǐng)離開上市公司的首席執(zhí)行官。哈佛大學(xué)與芝加哥大學(xué)的研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn),71%新收購(gòu)的私募股權(quán)資產(chǎn)組合公司會(huì)安插新首席執(zhí)行官,而且這些新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)中的75%則來(lái)自于公司外部。各大公司并沒(méi)有選擇與私募股權(quán)公司爭(zhēng)搶現(xiàn)任的首席執(zhí)行官,而是更多地提拔以前從未擔(dān)任過(guò)這一職務(wù)的新人。去年,標(biāo)普500公司80%的新任首席執(zhí)行官都來(lái)自公司內(nèi)部,是7年以來(lái)的最高比例。董事會(huì)有時(shí)候會(huì)覺(jué)得這些新人需要一些時(shí)間才能適應(yīng)新的工作,因此他們認(rèn)為,執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)便可以承擔(dān)一些職責(zé),至少短期內(nèi)是如此。鮑姆加滕表示,問(wèn)題在于,“沒(méi)有明確的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)數(shù)據(jù)表明,”如果前任首席執(zhí)行官繼續(xù)在公司擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng),那么投資者就會(huì)對(duì)公司繼任者感到更加放心。

另一個(gè)從未公開的說(shuō)法是為了應(yīng)對(duì)即將離任的首席執(zhí)行官在機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部的影響力。鮑姆加滕表示:“如果即將離任的首席執(zhí)行官希望繼續(xù)獲得與首席執(zhí)行官相近的薪酬方案,而不是按需式咨詢師的薪酬方案,那么公司很難在沒(méi)有設(shè)立正式職務(wù)的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)。”如果董事會(huì)希望即將離任的首席執(zhí)行官在辭去職務(wù)之前開展一些令人不快的變革,例如解雇高管或削減成本,那么這些首席執(zhí)行官還會(huì)擁有更大的話語(yǔ)權(quán)。鮑姆加滕指出,設(shè)立一個(gè)執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)職務(wù)可能對(duì)于“權(quán)力的和平交接具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。”

執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)的做法可能會(huì)十分奏效,尤其是其任期不長(zhǎng)的情況下。當(dāng)亞歷克斯·戈?duì)査够趶?qiáng)生公司(Johnson & Johnson)完成了其輝煌的十年首席執(zhí)行官任期之后,他擔(dān)任了執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)一年的時(shí)間,然后離開了董事會(huì)。期間,強(qiáng)生公司繼續(xù)發(fā)展壯大。然而,這類故事更多地是以悲劇收?qǐng)觥.?dāng)Peloton的業(yè)務(wù)隨著疫情結(jié)束而崩塌時(shí),董事會(huì)讓聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官約翰·弗利擔(dān)任執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)。盡管新首席執(zhí)行官巴里·麥卡錫實(shí)施了一項(xiàng)激進(jìn)的變革,否定了弗利的大多數(shù)策略,但公司的業(yè)績(jī)持續(xù)下滑,而且弗利和另一名聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人最終離開了公司。

執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)職務(wù)的未來(lái)將取決于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、緊張的董事會(huì)以及即將離任的強(qiáng)勢(shì)首席執(zhí)行官這三方面的角力。鮑姆加滕預(yù)測(cè)這種退休升任潮將延續(xù),“尤其是有關(guān)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性的情緒不斷蔓延的情況下。”無(wú)論在哪個(gè)接任案例中,盡管這個(gè)職務(wù)看似十分平淡,但我們不用去懷疑其真實(shí)用意。曾服務(wù)于多個(gè)董事會(huì)的企業(yè)治理專家查爾斯·埃爾森表示:“當(dāng)你成為執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng)時(shí),你就得擔(dān)負(fù)這個(gè)責(zé)任。這種職務(wù)的變化并沒(méi)有多少意義,你依然得掌控大局。僅此而已。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:馮豐

審校:夏林

Hollywood was shocked when Disney CEO Bob Iger abruptly announced in February 2020 that he was handing the top job to parks chief Bob Chapek, effective immediately. Iger had scheduled and then postponed his retirement four times since 2013. Now, in a Friday afternoon press release, he was suddenly, finally stepping down. The business press responded with dozens of sweeping recaps of Iger’s 48-year career, listing his achievements and speculating about what he would do now that he was finished running Disney.

Except he wasn’t finished running Disney.

As media attention shifted almost entirely to Chapek, Iger became “executive chairman,” a bland title that could easily be mistaken for an honorary position. But it was just the opposite. The announcement said Iger “will direct the Company’s creative endeavors”—a significant share of the business at a company that makes tens of billions of dollars a year from movies, television, and theme parks. Further, buried deep in the press release was the revelation that Chapek would report directly to Iger individually—as well as to the board of directors, which Iger chaired.

In short, Iger was still the real CEO. He remained executive chairman for almost two years, after which he finally stepped down completely. (He then returned 11 months later to displace Chapek as CEO, but that’s another story.)

Flying under the radar, the “executive chairman” phenomenon is an increasingly popular element of leadership succession. Whether that’s a good thing is far from clear. The Spencer Stuart executive search firm reports that 50% more executive chairs assumed that role in 2019 than did so in 2010; the increase paused during the pandemic, when many companies postponed CEO successions, but it is now resuming.Today 64 of the Fortune 500 have an executive chair, including major firms such as Nike, FedEx, Visa, Honeywell, and Southwest Airlines.

Why this trend? Good question. In most cases—54 of the 64, including all those cited above— companies follow the Disney model, with the previous CEO wielding power behind the scenes as executive chair. But on average, that model doesn’t work well. Four years ago, Spencer Stuart examined the performance of companies with an executive chair vs. those without one, measured by growth of shareholder returns within each company’s peer group; recently the firm updated the study to see if today’s weaker economy had altered the results. It didn’t. “In both time periods, companies with an executive chair underperformed those without one,” says Jason Baumgarten, head of Spencer Stuart’s global CEO and boards practice, who was one of the researchers. Disney under Iger’s chairmanship was a case in point: It largely missed out on a post-pandemic stock rally, trailing the S&P 500 by an imposing 31 percentage points.

That result shouldn’t be surprising. Most new CEOs want to make changes, and “it is very difficult to have the former CEO sitting in the room,” says Julie Daum, who leads Spencer Stuart’s North American board practice. Paralysis may follow. Appointing an executive chair and a separate CEO also confuses employees. “Who’s the boss?” says Noel Tichy, a management professor at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business. “No one is sure. So people revert to what we all learned as kids—if you don’t get the answer you want from Mom, go ask Dad, or vice versa.” (Just such gaming of the hierarchy played out at Disney, with executives meeting with one boss but not the other and even bad-mouthing one to the other.)

Little wonder that institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds, which own most of the shares in U.S. companies, don’t like executive chairs. “They see it as somebody clinging on or inhibiting change,” says Daum. ISS Governance, which advises institutional investors about how to vote on shareholder proposals at companies’ annual meetings, feels the same. Companies almost always oppose shareholder proposals demanding an independent board chair—someone with no affiliation to the company. But if the company has an executive chair, ISS is more likely to recommend a vote against the company’s wishes and in favor of the proposal.

With all those forces pushing against the concept of the executive chair, you have to wonder why companies increasingly use it. “What is the problem this arrangement solves?” asks Peter Cappelli, a management professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. “If the idea is that the ex-CEO could then give the new CEO advice, why do you need an official role to make that happen? If the idea is that the ex-CEO should be telling the new CEO what to do, then why not just keep the old one on longer?”

More demand, and more leverage, for veteran CEOs

The answers to Cappelli’s rhetorical questions say a lot about changes in the job market for experienced CEOs over the past couple of decades.

The most common rationale for elevating the outgoing CEO to executive chair begins with the growth of private equity firms. To run their portfolio companies, those firms often hire CEOs away from publicly traded corporations. Researchers at Harvard and the University of Chicago find that 71% of newly acquired PE portfolio companies install new CEOs, and 75% of those new leaders are external hires. Rather than compete with PE firms to steal sitting CEOs, companies are increasingly promoting first-timers; 80% of new S&P 500 CEOs last year were internal hires, the highest proportion in seven years. Boards of directors sometimes feel these novices should be eased into the new job, and an executive chair, the thinking goes, can carry some of the burden, at least for a while. The trouble is, says Baumgarten, “there’s no clear financial evidence” that investors feel more comfortable about a succession if the former CEO stays on as executive chair.

A different rationale, never voiced publicly, is a response to the outgoing CEO’s power within the organization. “If the outgoing CEO wants to continue [with] a compensation package that is closer to that of a CEO than an on-demand consultant, it’s hard to do that without a more formal role,” says Baumgarten. The departing chief may also hold leverage if the board wants them to make unpleasant changes, such as firing a high-level executive or cutting costs, before handing over the CEO title. Creating an executive chair position, says Baumgarten, may be “practically important for a peaceful transfer of power.”

Executive chairs can work out well, especially if they don’t stay long. When Alex Gorsky stepped down after a successful decade as Johnson & Johnson’s CEO, he became executive chair for a year, then left the board. The company has continued to thrive. More often, the story isn’t so happy. When Peloton’s business collapsed as the pandemic waned, the board elevated co-founder and CEO John Foley to executive chair. New CEO Barry McCarthy engineered a radical makeover repudiating much of Foley’s strategy, but the decline continued, and Foley and another cofounder eventually departed.

The future of the executive chair position will be shaped by a three-way tussle among institutional investors, nervous boards of directors, and powerful outgoing CEOs. Baumgarten predicts a continuation of the retiring-upward trend, “especially as the sense of macro uncertainty plays out.” What shouldn’t be in doubt in any succession is the true meaning of that seemingly bland title. “When you’re executive chair, the buck stops with you,” says Charles Elson, a corporate governance expert who has served on multiple boards. “It’s a title change with little meaning. You’re still running the show. Period.”

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