如果你隨便找一個上幼兒園的小孩，讓他/她說出一位價值投資者的名字，他/她很可能都會說：“地球人都知道，沃倫?巴菲特！”

但在今年第三季度，巴菲特購買或增持的一些股票的估值水平，可能會讓大多數(shù)傳統(tǒng)的價值投資者望而卻步。比如，生產(chǎn)汽車漆和其他涂料的艾仕得涂料系統(tǒng)。

根據(jù)伯克希爾-哈撒韋最新信息，巴菲特領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的這家公司已從凱雷投資集團(tuán)手中購買了艾仕得8.7%的股份。你也許會問，這位奧馬哈先知又撈到了一只便宜股票嗎？并不盡然。按伯克希爾-哈撒韋的收購價計算，艾仕得的靜態(tài)市盈率達(dá)到了令人吃驚的130倍，動態(tài)市盈率也有22倍。

與之相比，整個美國股市的靜態(tài)市盈率約為22倍，動態(tài)市盈率為17倍。就算與同類公司相比，艾仕得的價格也依然較高。在標(biāo)普1500綜合指數(shù)中，特種化工細(xì)分指數(shù)的動態(tài)市盈率都不到21倍。

因此，從理論上講，這樣一只股票應(yīng)該很難引起那些自詡為“抄底者”的投資人士的興趣。然而，艾仕得還不是唯一的例子。巴菲特最近選擇的其他三只股票也會讓價值投資者大跌眼鏡。它們分別是：

?森科能源公司（Suncor Energy）。這家綜合型石油天然氣公司目前的靜態(tài)市盈率為577倍，動態(tài)市盈率為25.9倍。

?特許通訊公司（Charter Communications）。這家有線電視和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商目前尚未盈利，動態(tài)市盈率為256.4倍。

?卡夫亨氏公司（The Kraft Heinz Co.）。這家食品飲料巨擘的靜態(tài)市盈率為105倍，動態(tài)市盈率為22.1倍。

在這些公司，其他的一些持股人也很不一般。比如說，艾仕得的大股東包括Prudential Jennison Mid-Cap Growth和Goldman Sachs Growth Opportunities等純粹的成長型基金。晨星提供的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，上次公布持股情況至今，大型成長型基金Fidelity Contrafund在特許通訊公司的持股增加了6.6%。其他的價值型基金經(jīng)理也有類似動向，T. Rowe Price Value最近就開始買進(jìn)森科能源，Vanguard Wellesley Income Fund也投資了卡夫亨氏。

那么，到底發(fā)生了什么，以致于沃倫?巴菲特都不按常理出牌了？

嗯，這還得說到巴菲特的價值投資理念。巴菲特在1989年的年度股東信中介紹了自己的抄底哲學(xué)，其內(nèi)容并不完全符合教科書對價值的定義。舉例來說，他表示雖然有一種“雪茄煙蒂式”價值投資法，但他不會遵循這樣的策略。他在信中寫道：

“扔在街頭的雪茄煙蒂只能再抽一口，而且可能吸不出多少煙味來，但抄底會讓這一口煙都變成利潤。除非打算清倉處理，否則這種收購公司的做法就顯得很傻。首先，實際情況可能證明，當(dāng)初的‘抄底價’可能一點(diǎn)兒也不便宜。陷入困境的企業(yè)往往會一波未平一波又起——廚房里的蟑螂從來都不會只有一只。”

他還說：“用一般的價格介入一家很棒的公司，遠(yuǎn)好于用很棒的價格介入一家一般的公司。”（It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.）

就艾仕得來說，巴菲特增持的原因是他越來越看好汽車行業(yè)。艾仕得60%的利潤都來自汽車漆。據(jù)彭博社的跟蹤預(yù)測數(shù)據(jù)，外界預(yù)計該公司的利潤增速將是特種化工行業(yè)的三倍，原因也許就在這里。

對卡夫亨氏的投資則讓巴菲特成了北美第三大食品公司的股東。

巴菲特也許還借鑒了成長型投資者的做法，那就是發(fā)現(xiàn)暫時處于低谷的盈利水平，而不僅僅看股價。降低市盈率有兩條途徑，一是股價下降，二是利潤上升。

上述這些公司的動態(tài)市盈率都遠(yuǎn)低于靜態(tài)市盈率。盡管按價值型基金經(jīng)理的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，它們的動態(tài)市盈率仍偏高，但利潤的增長可能讓這些股票在今后幾年變得更加便宜。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

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譯者：Charlie

校對：詹妮

If you were to ask a random kindergartner to name a value investor, she’d probably respond, “Warren Buffett. Everybody knows that.”

Yet the valuations on some of the stocks Buffett bought or added to during the third quarter would make most traditional value investors cringe.

Consider Axalta Coating Systems, which makes automobile finishes and other coatings.

Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company Buffett runs, bought an 8.7% stake in the company from The Carlyle Group. Another cheap stock scooped up by the Oracle of Omaha? Not exactly. Axalta sells for a whopping 130 times its past 12 months of earnings and sports a price/earnings ratio of 22 based on future estimated profits.

To put that in perspective, the P/E ratio for the broad market is about 22 based on trailing 12 month earnings and 17 based on projected profits. If you compare Axalta to its industry peers, it’s still relatively expensive. The forward P/E for the S&P Composite 1500 specialty chemicals index is less than 21.

On paper, this would hardly seem like a stock that a vaunted bargain hunter would gravitate to. Yet Axalta isn’t the only example. Three others recent Buffett picks would make a value investor’s eye twitch:

? Suncor Energy. This integrated oil and gas producer is now trading at 577 times its past 12 months of earnings and 25.9 times estimated profits.

? Charter Communications. The cable and internet service provider has no current profits and trades for 256.4 times forward earnings.

? The Kraft Heinz Co.. Shares of the food and beverage giant sell for a P/E of 105 based on trailing profits and 22.1 based on forecasted earnings.

Buffett also has some unusual bedfellows in some of these stocks.

Some of the largest owners of Axalta, for example, are dyed-in-the-wool growth funds such as Prudential Jennison Mid-Cap Growth and Goldman Sachs Growth Opportunities. Fidelity Contrafund, a large growth fund, has goosed up its position in Charter Communications by 6.6% since its last portfolio report, according to Morningstar.

To be fair, other value managers are walking a similar path. T. Rowe Price Value recently started buying Suncor, and Kraft Heintz is part of the secret sauce in the Vanguard Wellesley Income fund.

What’s going on?

Well, chalk it up to Buffett’s take on value investing. In his 1989 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, he spelled out his personal philosophy to bargain hunting that doesn’t fit the textbook definition of value. He noted, for instance, that while there’s a “cigar butt” school to value investing, he doesn’t adhere to it.

As he wrote:

A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the “bargain purchase” will make that puff all profit. Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original “bargain” price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces — never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen.

He went on to note that “it’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.”

In the case of Axalta, he’s increasing his bullish bet on the automotive industry: The company gets 60% of its profits from automotive refinishing. This might explain why Axalta’s earnings are expected to grow three times faster than profits for the specialty chemical industry, according to estimates tracked by Bloomberg.

With Kraft Heinz, Buffett is getting a portion of the third-largest food company in North America.

Buffett may also be taking a page from a growth investor’s book by looking at temporarily depressed earnings, rather than simply price. There are two ways to get a lower PE ratio: Decreasing price or increasing earnings.

The forward PE ratios on all these companies are sharply lower than the trailing PE ratios. While those forward PEs are still high by a value manager’s lights, increased profits could make the stock look cheaper in coming years.