????希臘斷然拒絕債權人最新提出的有條件援助，這本在意料之中：眾所周知，到目前為止緊縮政策并不奏效，而且還帶來了嚴重的社會問題；歐洲債權人上周的行為可能弊大于利；國際貨幣基金組織進行債務重組的強烈建議必然會提升希臘政府的地位；而現在也許可以看出，在任何與破產有關的談判中，一旦人們意識到債務規模過大，談判的天平就真的有可能向債務人傾斜。

????不過，公投的結果——61.3%反對接受新的緊縮和改革措施，38.7%的人表示接受——這確實讓人深感意外。此前的民意調查顯示支持票和反對票將非常接近。大多數外部人士都按非希臘人的思路來定義本次公投的意義所在，也就是是否放棄歐元。與之相反，希臘人似乎更相信他們的總理阿萊克斯?齊普拉斯宣揚的版本，那就是把公投作為談判戰術，目的是向歐元區施壓，迫使后者減免希臘的債務。盡管一系列數據能清楚反映出本屆希臘政府上臺后的局勢變化，但齊普拉斯似乎已成功地把目前的問題歸咎于“外國人”。說到底，由于支持和反對派差距明顯，追究細枝末節已經毫無意義。現實就是，希臘人已經受夠了，他們非常希望出現實質性變化，因此不惜豪賭一場。

????可惜的是，他們不太可能看到自己希望的變化，即大舉重組債務的同時還不喪失印制和使用歐元的權力。他們甚至不太可能看到一個大膽的、現代化的政府在新貨幣的幫助下帶領希臘走進新時代，也就是所謂的次優方案。歐元區其他國家和希臘處于極為對立的狀態，這讓希臘被迫退出歐元區成為眼下最有可能出現的情況。相反，現在接受希臘的要求只能表明對歐元區來說希臘已成尾大不掉之勢，這將對歐元區的長期信譽產生巨大危害。

????希臘的歐元現金已基本耗盡，除非歐央行放松信貸條件，否則希臘銀行業將無法滿足儲戶逾1200億歐元的提款需求，這一點顯而易見。希臘財政部長雅尼斯·瓦魯法基斯對英國《每日電訊報》表示：“如有必要，我們將發行平行貨幣，并通過電子方式像加州政府那樣打欠條。一周前我們就應該這樣做。”（對瓦魯法基斯持批評態度的人將指出，公投結束前希臘方面從未表達過此類意愿。）

????2009年（雷曼兄弟倒閉使市場陷入冬眠后），加州政府曾為彌補預算赤字打過欠條。這種情況2012年又出現了一次。希臘政府顯然已經破產，基于它的承諾來發放短期貸款，可能不會令身為銀行業監管機構的歐洲央行感冒。歐洲央行絕對有權要求希臘銀行業償還用政府抵押品取得的890億歐元緊急貸款，只是保持金融穩定的責任使歐央行不能這樣做。

????和以前一樣，如果沒有明確的政治保障，歐央行就不太可能令自己涉足于危機之中。為此，它需要等歐元區其他國家的財政部長在7月7日做出決定（德國總理安吉拉·默克爾和法國總統弗朗索瓦·奧朗德將于7月6日會面，為7日的財長會議奠定基調）。默克爾在政界身經百戰，目前德國國內給她施加了很大壓力，要求對希臘放任自流，令其自謀生路，而西班牙和愛爾蘭等國家的政府也堅決反對接受為期三年的緊縮方案，以免讓自己顯得逆來順受。至于歐元區是否愿意讓歐央行觸發危機，則取決于他們認為這樣做將給自己帶來多大的傷害。新建立的防火墻機制是否足以防止危機擴散？他們做的工作是否足以避免自己首先遭到外界質疑？

????上周的情況似乎一直是希臘在虛張聲勢。周日的公投結果令人吃驚，這是希臘人在最后一刻下注，從而使希臘政府能在最后攤牌前提高賭注。但歐元區手里的牌仍然更好一些，籌碼也更大。除非完全喪失信心，否則這場牌局仍然只會有一種結果。最大的問題在于，如果希臘退出歐元區，德國等國家愿意為前者的政治穩定付出多少努力。（財富中文網）

????譯者：Charlie

????校對：詹妮

????It ought to be no surprise that Greece has have voted so emphatically against its creditors’ latest word on conditional aid: the failure of the policy so far, and the social disaster it has caused, are well known; the behavior of the European creditors in the last week probably hindered their cause more than helped it; the IMF’s strong call for debt restructuring certainly bolstered the government’s position; and, as may now become clear, the balance of of power in any bankruptcy negotiation really can shift in the debtor’s favor the minute that its debts are realized as too large.

????And yet the referendum result–a crushing 61.3%-38.7% vote against new austerity and reform measures, is just that–a big surprise. The polls suggested a very close vote. Most people outside Greece saw the vote in the terms that non-Greeks had framed it: whether or not to abandon the euro. Instead, it seems Greeks believed the version their Prime Minister had sold them: it was just a negotiating tactic that would call the Eurozone’s bluff and force it into relieving Greece’s debts. It seems that Alexis Tsipras successfully deflected blame for the current situation onto ‘the foreigners’, despite a host of data that trace a clear line back to the day his government took power. But ultimately, the size of the winning margin makes nuanced analysis superfluous: Greeks have had enough and want real change so badly that they’ll take a huge gamble to get it.

????Sadly for them, they are unlikely to get the change they want–a radical restructuring of their debt without the loss of their privileges to print and spend euros. They’re not even likely to get the second-best alternative: a bold, modernising government that can drag the country into the modern age with the help of a new currency. The rest of the Eurozone is so set against Greece that the country’s being forced out of the currency union is now by far the likeliest outcome. By contrast, a surrender to Greek demands at this point would only prove that the Greek tail is waving the Eurozone dog, with serious consequences for its long-term credibility.

????With virtually no euro cash reserves left, it’s clear that Greece’s banks cannot honor depositors’ claims of over €120 billion unless the European Central Bank relaxes the credit straitjacket. Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis told the U.K.’s Daily Telegraph that: “If necessary, we will issue parallel liquidity and California-style IOU’s, in an electronic form. We should have done it a week ago.” (Varoufakis’ critics will note there was no talk of that sort before the polls had already closed.)

????California had issued IOUs to bridge its budget gap in 2009 (after the collapse of Lehman Brothers froze markets), and again in 2012. The ECB, in its role as the banks’ supervisor, is likely to take a dim view of giving short-term loans against the promise of a government that is now obviously bankrupt. It would have every right to call in the €89 billion in emergency loans to Greek banks against government collateral, and only its duty to preserve financial stability argues against doing so.

????As before, the ECB is unlikely to precipitate a crisis without explicit political cover. For that, it needs the conclusions of yet another group of Eurozone finance ministers on Tuesday (a meeting that will in turn take its cue from a meeting Monday between Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Francois Hollande). Merkel, the great political survivor, is under the most domestic pressure to cut the Greeks adrift, but others, such as the governments of Spain and Ireland, are also bitterly opposed to any policy that would make them look like patsies for accepting harsh austerity medicine lying down for three years. Whether or not the Eurozone allows the ECB to trigger a crisis depends on how much damage they think they will do themselves by doing so. Are the new institutional firebreaks strong enough to stop contagion? Have we done enough to deter people speculating against us in the first place?

????All of last week, it seemed that Greece was bluffing. Sunday’s stunning vote result is a last-minute buy-in that that allows it to raise the stakes just one more time before the final showdown. But it is still the Eurozone that has the better cards, and the bigger stack. Unless it loses its nerve completely, this game of poker is still going to end only one way. The biggest question is how far Berlin and others will go to keep Greece politically stable as it leaves the Eurozone.