????風險投資經常被稱為學徒行當，原因是，經驗很重要，而且積累經驗需要時間。但成功的企業能把經驗帶來的智慧轉化為自身的記憶，或者融入自己的記憶之中，并在這個過程中總結出哪些東西可行，哪些不可行。2007年，我們曾和我們的生命科學行業投資團隊共同編制了一份清單，詳細說明了當時我們在生物科技領域的投資所帶來的教訓。最近我們又回顧了這份清單，也重溫我們的思路。

????從2000年起，我們投資了近60家生物科技企業，所以我們可以考慮較多的負面問題，同時把我們觀察到的結果一并拿出來和大家分享。

????下文是對這些教訓的總結，非常簡單扼要。從宏觀層面看，許多內容都相當乏味，其中的見解也并不是非常深刻。但通過實際操作，每項投資都從想法變成了行動（不作為則會帶來問題）。為免于傷及無辜，我刪掉了大多數公司的名稱。同時，所有這些要點基本上都來自于實戰經驗，而不是閉門造車。

????1. 管理、管理、還是管理。 初創型生物科技公司的成功主要依靠管理團隊，這不是什么新鮮事。風投的原則就是，在發展初期找到合適的創業者和管理者是關鍵所在。但對剛剛起步的生物科技公司來說，做到這一點往往并不容易。

????? 處在不同階段的生物科技公司往往需要不同的管理團隊，而且實際上許多處于萌芽狀態和起步狀態的生物科技企業并不需要首席執行官(CEO)。這些公司受科技左右，需要很棒的首席科學官(CSO)來為它奠定基礎，還需要負責業務開發的董事來幫助它建立整體愿景。完成這項工作后，它們才需要找到一名非常出色的首席執行官。在發展初期把一名參與公司設立的CSO任命為CEO會帶來不必要的沖突，那就是在招聘未來CEO時需要這位CSO讓賢，而這會被看做是降級，會很尷尬，而且是原本可以避免的情況。讓負責開發業務的創業者在早期填補CEO的空白也會造成這樣的局面。讓CEO一職從一開始就處于空缺狀態可以避免隨后出現的尷尬場面，或者至少能盡量降低尷尬的程度。

????? 管理不善時，董事會往往會開始負責公司的運營。隨后就會出現惡性循環：在第一季度董事會議上，管理層認為自己服從于董事會并因此追逐某一個目標；而在第二季度董事會議上，董事會說他們覺得另一個目標更好，而管理層則認為自己所做的符合董事會的要求；到了第三季度董事會議，董事會就會覺得公司缺乏方向并因此感到困惑，接下來就是一片混亂。這絕不是一個良性循環，當然也不會這么簡單。好的董事能夠指明方向，實施監管并提供建議，而好的管理層則能過濾董事會的反饋，把它轉化成為公司戰略方向的一部分。這是一個均衡而有張力的有利局面。關鍵在于，不要讓董事會干涉選擇哪些項目這樣的日常事務。但在這里，一個重要的細微差別是，某一個活躍的董事會或者某一名活躍的牽頭投資人在初創型企業的起步階段扮演代理CEO的角色非常普遍，而且這是個好現象（特別是在考慮到上文所述要點的情況下，那就是科技導向的初創型公司最初并不需要正式的CEO）。

????? 迅速調整管理層幾乎總是正確的選擇。以往，即使知道管理層運轉不良，我們對高管的調整也總是不夠迅速。相信直覺很重要，如果你覺得管理層成效不佳，實際情況很可能就是如此。在負責這家公司的投資團隊看來，高管的情況可能也是這樣。此外，如果在結束一筆新投資時出現了實質性的管理問題，情況就不太可能得到改善。我發現在結束投資前往往值得向現有團隊說明對他們的預期和可能采取的行動。感覺并非一帆風順時就要結束投資，然后立即解雇CEO。

????Venture capital is often called an apprenticeship business because experience matters and takes time to accumulate. But successful firms are able to translate and transfer experiential wisdom through institutional memory, which involves codifying what works and what doesn't. Back in 2007, we did this with our life science team by pulling together a detailed list of "Lessons Learned" from our existing biotech portfolio. We recently went back and revisited that list of reflections.

????Since 2000, we've invested in nearly 60 biotech companies, so we've had a reasonable 'n' to think about and inform our collective observations.

????Below is a very distilled and rather sanitized summary of our "Lessons Learned." At the macro level, many of these are rather prosaic and not very insightful, but practical reality of each deal is where insight becomes actionable (and inaction causes issues). To spare the innocent, I've dropped most of the company names, but all of these points were largely informed by experience in the trenches not abstract thinking.

????1. Management, management, management. It's not news that the success of a biotech startup depends largely on the management team. This is an axiom in venture: getting the right group of early entrepreneurs and executives around the table is critical. But this is often not easy in early stage biotech companies.

????? Different management teams are often required at different stages of a biotech, and the reality is that many seed- and early-stage deals don't need a CEO. They are science-driven companies that need great Chief Scientific Officers to build the fundamentals of the story, and a BD executive to help build the broader vision. It's upon that progress with which a company can recruit a great CEO. Putting a founding CSO in as the CEO early on can create unnecessary conflict: having the conversation about a perceived "demotion" to CSO when hiring the future CEO is uncomfortable and avoidable. Same goes for putting the lead BD entrepreneur in as CEO early on to "fill the role". Keeping the role vacant in the beginning prevents future discomfort, or at least minimizes it.

????? With weak management, boards often begin to run companies. And then it's a vicious cycle: At the 1Q board meeting, the management thinks they are responding to the board so they chase after XYZ; then at the 2Q meeting, the board says they think chasing ABC is a better idea, which the management does thinking it’s being responsive; and then at the 3Q meeting, the board wonders why the company has no direction and chaos ensues. Never a good cycle, but of course it’s not as simple as this. A good board is able to provide direction, governance, and input, and a good management is able to distill that feedback and integrate it into the strategic direction of the company. It's a healthy balance and tension. But keeping the board away from whiplashing the "day to day" program choices of what to "chase" is key. An important nuance is worth mentioning here though: an active board chairman or single lead investor playing the role of an acting CEO is very typical in an early stage startup, and is a good thing (especially given the point above about not having a formal CEO in a science-led startup at the beginning).

????? Making management changes quickly is almost always the right answer. We historically have not moved fast enough to make senior management changes even when we knew it wasn't working. Trusting one's instincts is important: If it feels like it’s not working, it probably isn't. And the team working in the company probably sees the same thing from their view of the executives. Further, if real management questions are present at the closing of a new investment, it's unlikely to improve. I find it's often worth being explicit about this with the existing team before the closing to lay out expectations and possible action plans. Closing the deal and then firing the CEO immediately after doesn't feel like the high road.