????這是個錯誤。法國和希臘的新政府需要明白，經濟增長和政府緊縮并不排斥。通過政府支出取得的經濟增長，尤其是就業(yè)增加，必須要有私營部門相應足夠快的增長給予支撐，才能持續(xù)。否則，任何經濟增長都是暫時的，而且還會增加債務負擔。這涉及到資源的有效利用。花費數十億歐元重新雇傭幾千名對法國整體經濟產生不了多少價值的政府工作人員，效果自然不同于花費數十億歐元打造可自我持續(xù)的經濟增長引擎，如研究基地或向種子初創(chuàng)公司提供資金。

????但所有這些關于“增長－緊縮”的探討涉及到的只是希臘、法國和歐元區(qū)其他國家的短期經濟困境，忽略了造成主權債務危機的首要結構性問題。如果歐元區(qū)17個成員國不能實現財政貨幣政策的完全整合，這個危機就永遠不會解決。當然，這意味著大幅的主權出讓，可能很難被大多數歐元區(qū)政府所接受。

????不過，奧朗德表示，他贊成歐洲央行（European Central Bank）發(fā)行“歐元債券”來支持那些難以在公開市場融資的歐元區(qū)成員國。這可以作為歐洲央行“長期再融資操作計劃”（LTRO）的替代選擇；LTRO目前的做法是給銀行提供大量低息現金、用于購買主權債務，間接作為很多歐元區(qū)政府的融資機制。目前，LTRO計劃是阻止葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利等主權債券利率達到不可維持高水平的唯一制約因素。

????但LTRO計劃只是一個臨時性措施，如果持續(xù)實施，必將引發(fā)超高通脹。在所有17個成員國的支持下發(fā)行歐元債券將是一個更為持續(xù)的解決方案，但如果所有成員國不構建起一個聯合財政體制，這也行不通。因為這意味著歐元區(qū)債務的相互融合和風險轉移。這種信任只有在歐元區(qū)所有成員國在支出上保持一致的基礎才能建立。

????因此，奧朗德支持發(fā)行歐元債券是正確的，因為這將是鞏固共同貨幣聯盟而走出的真正第一步，但還不清楚他是否有任何想法將此變?yōu)楝F實。為此，他不僅需要說服本國政府放棄財政控制權，還要說服包括德國在內的其他歐元區(qū)國家也這么做，而眼下德國強烈反對這一建議。在此之前，他還需要讓市場和其他歐元區(qū)成員確信，法國是值得信賴的，法國承諾恢復財政體系秩序。這意味著法國新任總統在重啟法國經濟增長引擎的過程中需要有節(jié)制地使用他的“國家信用卡”。

????譯者：早稻米

????That would be a mistake. The new governments in France and Greece need to understand that economic growth and government austerity are not mutually exclusive. The type of growth that comes through government spending, especially employment growth, can only be sustained if the private sector grows at a fast enough pace to support it. If not, then any gains would be temporary and just add to the debt load. It is all about the efficient use of resources. Spending billions of euros hiring back thousands of unproductive government workers who produce little value to the country's overall economy isn't the same as spending billions building engines of economic growth that are self sustaining, like a research campus or a fund to seed startup companies.

????But all of this talk of growth versus austerity addresses only the short-term economic woes impacting Greece, France and the rest of the eurozone and skips over the structural problems that created the sovereign debt crisis in the first place. This crisis will never end until the 17 members of the euro fully integrate their fiscal and monetary policies. This, of course, would mean a massive transfer of sovereignty that most of the eurozone governments would find unpalatable.

????Yet Hollande says he is in favor of the European Central Bank issuing "eurobonds," to support eurozone members that are having trouble funding themselves in the open market. This would be an alternative to the ECB's LTRO program, which currently works by flooding the banks with cheap cash to buy sovereign bonds as a pass through funding mechanism for many eurozone governments. The LTRO program is the only thing keeping the interest rates on the sovereign bonds of countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy from hitting unsustainably high levels.

????But the LTRO program is only a temporary measure, one that cannot possibly continue without eventually triggering hyperinflation. The issuing of eurobonds, backed by all 17 members would be a more lasting solution, but it can never work unless all the members have a joint fiscal regime. That's because it would mean the co-mingling of debt and a transfer of risk across the eurozone. That kind of trust can only occur if all eurozone members were on the same page in terms of spending.

????So, Hollande is right to support eurobonds as it would be the first real step to solidifying the currency union, but it is unclear if he has any idea what it would take to make it a reality. He would not only need to convince his own government to give up fiscal control but also convince all the other eurozone members to do so as well, including Germany, which is vehemently opposed to the idea. But before all that he will need to reassure the markets and other eurozone members that France is creditworthy and committed to getting its fiscal house in order. That means France's new president will need to use the national credit card sparingly as he tries to rekindle the fire in country's economic growth engine.