希臘救助方案埋下更大禍根
????希臘第二輪救助方案并沒有讓華爾街相信歐洲已控制住了債務(wù)危機(jī)。如果說這一方案起到了什么作用,那就是它強(qiáng)化了一種觀點(diǎn):在主權(quán)債券交易中,私營投資者是二等公民,信用違約掉期(CDS)提供不了什么保障。它將使私營投資者很難再相信歐洲主權(quán)債券,也給陷入困境的其他歐洲國家未來的救助方案埋下了伏筆,屆時(shí)救助行動將變得更加棘手。 ????周二,歐元區(qū)宣布將再拿出1,300億歐元救助希臘,完全在市場的意料之中。如果能獲得希臘國會批準(zhǔn),這一方案將是歐洲試圖平息近三年來主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)的最大努力。 ????暫且不談希臘屆時(shí)可能無法履行其雄心勃勃的債務(wù)償付計(jì)劃,眼下這個(gè)救助方案將歐洲央行(European Central Bank)、歐元區(qū)各國政府與投資者對立起來,動搖了人們對于一度被視為零風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的主權(quán)債券市場所抱有的信心。 ????具體來說,這一方案使得歐洲央行和其他目前持有希臘債券的各國央行不必像私營投資者那樣按約定被迫削減本金53.5%。事實(shí)上,歐洲央行和各國央行根本就無需削減本金。他們持有的債券將保持平價(jià),所有痛苦都由私營投資者承擔(dān)。 ????這等于出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)雙層體系,歐元區(qū)各國政府和歐洲央行事實(shí)上持有了優(yōu)先債券。雖然歐洲央行和歐元區(qū)各國政府已同意放棄希臘債券可能產(chǎn)生的收益,但它仍然傳遞出一個(gè)信號,即他們持有的是優(yōu)先債券,而私營投資者持有的是后償債券。 ????由于這樣的設(shè)計(jì),選擇持有CDS對沖主權(quán)債券風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資者們將拿不到任何現(xiàn)錢。本金減53.5%,從技術(shù)上而言是投資者的自愿行為,使他們放棄了收回貸款本金的權(quán)利。 ????最后,該方案可能也無法重塑投資者對歐洲債券市場的信心。相反,它反而會讓投資者停止繼續(xù)買入主權(quán)債券,導(dǎo)致危機(jī)進(jìn)一步升級,陷入困境的政府將比以往更加依賴歐洲央行的資金。 葡萄牙的問題 ????但是,歐洲央行愿意充當(dāng)?shù)钟鶜W債危機(jī)的后盾嗎?根據(jù)巴克萊(Barclays)的估算,歐洲央行和各國央行已持有約15%的歐洲主權(quán)債券。去年,為了穩(wěn)定市場,歐洲央行根據(jù)干預(yù)應(yīng)急計(jì)劃Securities Markets Program,首次購入了歐元區(qū)邊緣成員國的主權(quán)債券。 |
????The latest Greek bailout has done little to convince Wall Street that Europe has gotten a grip on its debt woes. If anything, the deal has cemented the view that private investors are second-class when it comes to sovereign debt deals and that credit default swaps offer little protection. This will make it very hard for private investors to trust European sovereign debt, setting the stage for further messy bailouts in other troubled European countries. ????It came as no surprise to the markets yesterday that the eurozone would be shelling out an additional 130 billion euros to bailout Greece. The deal, if approved by Greek lawmakers in the coming days, is supposed to be Europe's best attempt to calm the nearly three-year-old sovereign debt crisis. ????Putting aside for the moment that Greece will probably not live up to its new and ambitious debt repayment schedule, the deal has managed to pit investors against the European Central Bank and various eurozone governments, shattering the confidence in the once riskless sovereign debt market. ????Specifically, the deal was structured where the European Central Bank and other national central banks in the eurozone, which currently hold Greek debt, won't be forced to take the agreed upon 53.5% haircut on its principal, as is the case with private investors holding Greek debt. In fact, the ECB and the various national central banks (NCB) won't be taking a haircut at all. The value of their debt will stay at par, while private investors take all the pain. ????This has managed to create a two-tiered system in which the various eurozone governments and the ECB essentially hold senior debt. While the ECB and the NCBs have agreed to forgo any profits they may generate off their Greek debt holdings, it still sends a signal that they are to be considered the senior debt, while private investors hold the subordinated debt. ????Investors who chose to hedge their sovereign debt risk with credit default swaps won't be collecting any cash given the way the deal was structured. The 53.5% haircut is technically a voluntary move on behalf of investors, making them ineligible to collect the principal on their loans. ????At the end of the day, the deal will probably fail to bring back confidence in the battered European debt markets. In fact, it could cause investors to hold back from making additional sovereign debt purchases, further exacerbating the crisis. This will make the governments even more dependent on the ECB for funding. The Portugal problem ????But will the ECB be there to backstop Europe's debt woes? The ECB and the various national central banks already control around 15% of the European sovereign debt market, according to estimates made by Barclays. The ECB first made those purchases of European peripheral debt last year as part of its Securities Markets Program, an emergency measure in which the ECB basically stepped in and bought up sovereign debt in an effort to stabilize the market. |