????華爾街的印鈔機可能終于沒了墨水。本月，美國的大銀行們陸續公布了慘淡的季度業績，給出的理由從歐債危機到法庭和解不一而足。

????糟糕的市場情況確實影響到了華爾街的年度業績，但絕對不是主要原因。隨著新的監管規定強制銀行降低風險，傳統的投行和貸款業務已被掏空。這一季銀行業更安全的投資導致其權益回報率更接近乏味的管制型公用事業公司，而不是激進的投資公司。

????那么，銀行投資者應該習慣這樣差勁的資本回報率嗎？雖然不是每家銀行面臨的問題都一樣，但它們的業績報表有一個共同特點。所有大銀行的交易收入都比信貸危機前的鼎盛時期有顯著下降。因此，這些銀行反映盈利效率的指標——普通股東權益回報率都大幅下降。

????讓我們來看看這些數字。由于銀行的盈利數據有一定的波動性，最好是看全年數據，而不是季度數據。高盛（Goldman Sachs）2011年股東權益回報率低至3.7%，較上一年的11.9%顯著下降。在金融危機爆發前的2007年和2006年，高盛的股東權益回報率是行業領先的32%。但熄火的不只是高盛。摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）2011年股東權益回報率為6%，也低于2010年的7%。摩根士丹利2007年的股東權益回報率為9%，2000-2006年的平均年股東權益回報率為20%。摩根大通（JP Morgan）略有改善，2011年股東權益回報率10.2%，高于2010年的9.7%，但仍低于危機前2007年約13%的水平。

????所有這些數字都不能孤立來看。考慮到它們承擔的風險水平和所持資本額，個位數權益回報率太差了——它們也知道這一點。2011年初時高盛曾承諾，全年股東權益回報率要達到20%。但到了5月份，高管們默默地放棄了這一目標，因為交易業務顯然存在一些問題。

????當然，股東權益回報率絕非華爾街賴以生存的首要指標。銀行高管們還關注很多銀行業務模式特有的指標。不過，權益回報率雖然有不足之處，仍是投資者和分析師喜歡關注的一項指標，因為該指標能抹平行業差異，便于與其他資產類別進行比較。

????在信貸危機引發交易世界劇烈震蕩后，業內發生了兩大結構性變化。一是業內有幾家大公司消亡。二是一系列的監管改革強制銀行降低風險，增加資本緩沖。高盛和摩根士丹利變成了銀行控股公司，就像競爭對手摩根大通和美國銀行（Bank of America）一樣，由此必須縮減風險性業務。提高資本金要求，意味著可用于交易的資金減少。降低杠桿比率，意味著投資回報率下降。

????Wall Street's cash printing machine may be finally out of ink. One by one, the big U.S. banks reported dismal quarterly earnings this week, blaming the poor results on everything from the European debt crisis to court settlements.

????While tough market conditions did play a role in ruining Wall Street's annual money dance, it was hardly the main reason for its poor performance. The traditional investment banking and lending businesses have been gutted after new regulations forced the banks to decrease risk. Safer investing on behalf of the banks this quarter has translated into a return on shareholder's equity that's more akin to a sleepy regulated utility as opposed to an aggressive investment firm.

????So should bank investors get used to such lackluster and weak returns on their capital? While not every firm has the exact same problems, there is a common theme running throughout their earnings. Trading revenues at all major banks were down significantly from the heydays before the credit crisis. As a result, the firms' return on common shareholder equity, or ROE, which measures the efficiency of a company's earnings power, has collapsed.

????Let's look at some numbers. Given the lumpiness of bank earnings, it is best to look at full-year results as opposed to quarterly results. Goldman Sachs's (GS) annual ROE came in at a shockingly low 3.7% for 2011, down significantly from 11.9% the previous year. Before the financial crisis hit, Goldman's ROE was an industry-leading 32% in 2007 and 2006. But it wasn't just Goldman who sputtered. Morgan Stanley's (MS) ROE came in at 6% for the year, down from 7% in 2010. Morgan had a 9% ROE in 2007 and averaged an annual 20% ROE from 2000 to 2006. JP Morgan (JPM) fared a bit better with an ROE of 10.2% for the year, up slightly from the 9.7% it hit in 2010. But the firm is still below its pre-crisis ROE of around 13% in 2007.

????All this means nothing unless it is put in context. For the level of risk and amount of capital these firms hold, single digit returns on equity is pretty lousy -- and the banks know it. Goldman promised earlier in the year that it would hit a respectable 20% ROE in 2011. But its executives quietly dropped that goal in May after it became clear that its trading division was having some troubles.

????To be sure, ROE isn't the be-all-end-all metric that Wall Street lives by. There are dozens of other performance metrics that banking chieftains target, which are specific to the banking model. Nevertheless, ROE, while it has its flaws, is still a metric that investors and analysts like to see as it flattens out the sector, allowing them to compare it with other asset classes.

????There were two major structural changes that took place in the industry in the aftermath of the crisis that shook the trading world. The first was that several of the major players in the space ceased to exist. The second was the string of regulatory changes that forced the banks to cut risk and maintain larger capital buffers. Goldman and Morgan became bank holding companies like rivals JP Morgan and Bank of America (BAC) and were therefore forced to scale back on their risk taking. Higher capital requirements meant less money to use for trading. Lower leverage levels meant lower returns on investments.