????但過去10年來，由債務驅動的繁榮創造了一種人為的經濟，讓西班牙的失業率在2006年一度降至7%。即便失業率高企，西班牙也正常運轉了好多年，但這樣的體系現在已經行不通了。過去，西班牙的民眾和企業并沒有背負多少債務，因此，如果某個人無法找到工作或某個企業倒閉的話，由此造成的危機也相對獨立。

????比如，在1989年，西班牙的家庭債務約為GDP的31%，公司債務約為GDP的49%。如今，家庭債務占GDP的比率幾乎增加了兩倍，高達85%；而非金融企業的債務則猛增至GDP的140%。大約80%的家庭債務是抵押貸款，因而跟房地產泡沫密切相關。公司債務與西班牙公司從事的減損盈利的大規模收購項目，以及眾多可疑的基礎設施交易存在關聯。合計下來，西班牙的私人債務總額現在僅次于愛爾蘭和葡萄牙，位列歐元區第三。

????在助推投機性繁榮的資金當中，有許多來自肆意揮霍的西班牙銀行。政府通過好幾輪救援行動，支撐起搖搖欲墜的銀行體系。迄今為止，政府的救助行動已耗費了1,050億歐元，相當于西班牙GDP的10%。但即使接受了這么多的救援資金，西班牙的銀行依然處境危險，瀕臨倒閉。比如，政府聲稱，銀行業持有的約50%的房地產貸款敞口是“問題資產”；它們手頭的儲備只夠彌補30%的損失。隨著房地產市場危機開始顯露，銀行將開始承受巨額損失。這個過程慢得令人痛苦，因為這些房屋大多數是人們的主要居所。這會迫使政府投入更多的銀行救助資金，從而將私人債務轉變為政府債務。

????西班牙的一個優勢在于，政府債務占GDP的比例（70%）相對溫和。這一比率低于歐元區的平均水平（91%），是希臘（140%）的一半，遠好于意大利（120%）。但投資者擔心的是私人債務占GDP的比例——240%。一旦銀行倒閉，這份債務就會轉嫁給政府。如果經濟萎縮，債務攀升，整個國家的債務占GDP的比重就將以驚人的速度開始增長。瑞士信貸集團（Credit Suisse）估計，倘若西班牙經濟陷入嚴重衰退，政府債務占GDP的比重將在2020年之前升至100%，這么高的水平勢必難以為繼。

????周四，西班牙政府以6.975%的利率出售了價值36億歐元的主權債券，這樣的利率水平非常危險，已經逼近迫使希臘、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙等國向歐洲中央銀行（ECB)求助的利率門檻——7%。雖然西班牙還沒有正式尋求歐洲央行的幫助（即緊急援助），但它實際上已經受惠于歐洲央行從二級市場購買數十億美元西班牙債券的行動——此舉是為了壓低該國的借貸利率。倘若歐洲央行終止這項債券購買計劃，西班牙國債收益率將很快沖破7%的關口。

????西班牙的主權病弱，但跟鄰國希臘不同的是，它還沒有馬上破產的危險。但如果西班牙的銀行開始破產，經濟開始萎縮，它就會變得跟南面這位揮霍無度的歐洲鄰居沒什么兩樣。拉霍伊現在要重建一個從未真正存在過的經濟基礎，這份任務可不怎么令人艷羨。

????譯者：任文科

????But the debt-fueled boom of the last decade created an artificial economy, sending Spain's unemployment rate down to as low as 7% in 2006. Spain functioned for years with high unemployment, but such a system won't fly now. Back then its citizenry and businesses had little debt, so if a person couldn't find work or if a business failed, it would be a relatively self-contained crisis.

????For example, in 1989, household debt was around 31% of GDP while corporate debt was 49% of GDP. Today, household debt has nearly tripled at 85% of GDP while non-financial corporate debt has soared to 140% of GDP. Around 80% of household debt is linked to mortgages and is thus intimately tied to the housing bubble. The corporate debt is linked to huge dilutive acquisitions taken on behalf of Spanish companies and a multitude of questionable infrastructure deals. Together, Spain has a total private debt ratio that is the third highest in eurozone behind Ireland and Portugal.

????Much of the money that fueled the speculative boom came from profligate Spanish banks. The government has propped up its creaky system through several rounds of bailouts, which have totaled 105 billion euros so far, equivalent to 10% of the nation's GDP. But even with all that bailing, Spanish banks have still come perilously close to failing. For instance the government said that around 50% of the total exposure that banks have to property are considered "problem assets" and that they only hold enough reserves on hand to cover 30%. As the housing crisis unfolds, painfully slow as most of these houses are primary residences, the banks will start to take tons of losses. That forces the government to pledge more cash to bail out the banks, turning that private debt into government debt.

????The one thing Spain has going for it is that its government debt to GDP ratio is a relatively tame 70% of GDP. That compares to the eurozone average of 91% and is half that of Greece at 140% and much stronger than Italy at 120%. But it's the private debt ratio of 240% of GDP that has investors worried. As banks fail, that debt gets passed on to the government. As the economy contracts, and as debt rises, the debt to GDP ratio for the nation starts to increase at breakneck speed. If the Spanish economy stays in deep recession, Credit Suisse (CS) estimates that the government's debt to GDP ratio would reach an unsustainably high 100% by 2020.

????On Thursday, the government sold 3.6 billion euros in sovereign debt at 6.975%, dangerously close to the 7% threshold that forced Greece, Ireland and Portugal to seek assistance from the European Central Bank. While Spain has not sought formal help, i.e. a bailout, from the ECB, it has benefitted from ECB buying up billions of dollars worth of Spanish debt in the secondary market in a move to keep borrowing rates low. If the ECB were to end that bond buying program, Spanish debt would shoot well past that 7% threshold.

????The Spanish sovereign is sick but unlike neighboring Greece, it is in no immediate danger of going bust. But as those banks start blowing up and its economy shrinks, Spain will look more like its spendthrift southern European neighbor. Mr. Rajoy now has been handed the unenviable task of recreating an economy that never really existed.