????我們不妨回顧一下。TALF鼓勵(lì)人們投資那些看上去依然健康、但沒人愿意觸碰的證券化資產(chǎn)，如優(yōu)質(zhì)的AAA級(jí)資產(chǎn)抵押證券。政府為第一部分虧損提供擔(dān)保，鼓勵(lì)私人投資者重返市場(chǎng)。而PPIP則是鼓勵(lì)投資者買下銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上的所有問題資產(chǎn)，并為此提供所需資金額約85%的貸款。兩項(xiàng)計(jì)劃都是通過政府激勵(lì)，吸引私營(yíng)部門參與到救助活動(dòng)中來，從而強(qiáng)化美國(guó)救助基金TARP的效力。

????歐洲人提出的方案與美國(guó)的這兩項(xiàng)計(jì)劃相仿。一是設(shè)立一個(gè)特殊目的投資工具（SPIV），幫助基金買入資產(chǎn)——就此而言，這些資產(chǎn)可能是優(yōu)質(zhì)主權(quán)債券（即意大利和西班牙）。另一項(xiàng)提議則類似于保單，EFSF為主權(quán)違約相關(guān)的首個(gè)20%損失提供擔(dān)保，創(chuàng)造出準(zhǔn)主權(quán)信用違約互換（CDS）。同樣也是通過鼓勵(lì)私人投資，加強(qiáng)救助基金的效力。

????歐洲人效法美國(guó)人的想法是對(duì)的，但他們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)的執(zhí)行結(jié)構(gòu)卻存在根本缺陷。TALF和PPIP確實(shí)推動(dòng)了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)重拾活力，因?yàn)橥顿Y者們知道他們投入金融體系的所有錢事實(shí)上都有美國(guó)財(cái)政部（the U.S. Treasury）和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（the Federal Reserve）的資金擔(dān)保。這讓他們有信心打開腰包，參與到政府的救助項(xiàng)目中來。

????但在歐洲的計(jì)劃中，唯一的后盾是EFSF的本金。美國(guó)財(cái)政部有收入流，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)有基本上無限的印鈔能力，而EFSF的現(xiàn)金池則設(shè)定為4,400億歐元，不能逾越。這樣的規(guī)模不太可能在投資者中激發(fā)起必要的信心，讓他們重新投身于歐洲主權(quán)債券市場(chǎng)，也無法鼓勵(lì)銀行增加放貸。

????歐洲人的計(jì)劃要想取得成功，EFSF需要有歐洲央行（the European Central Bank）的支持。歐洲央行是否準(zhǔn)備投入足夠的彈藥是完成整個(gè)拼圖的關(guān)鍵一環(huán)。如果投資者們知道歐洲央行愿意在危難時(shí)刻向金融體系注入充足的現(xiàn)金，那么他們?cè)敢鈪⑴c歐元區(qū)救助的可能性就會(huì)高很多。問題是歐洲央行已拒絕出手，而且一些成員國(guó)，比如德國(guó)，也不想押上自己的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表來支持EFSF。

????歐洲的債務(wù)危機(jī)肯定沒有速效藥。但這也不是眼下急需的。類似TALF和PPIP這樣的計(jì)劃當(dāng)時(shí)也沒有解決美國(guó)的次貸問題，但時(shí)至今日，它們?nèi)匀槐灰暈槿〉昧顺晒Α＿@是因?yàn)樗鼈儙椭饬水?dāng)時(shí)更為緊迫的、可能令美國(guó)整個(gè)銀行體系崩潰的信心危機(jī)。

????歐洲人需要先滅火，再談重建。目前提出的計(jì)劃就好像是水龍帶，但現(xiàn)在還沒有足夠的水能將火勢(shì)完全撲滅。而時(shí)間已經(jīng)不多。

????Here's a refresher. TALF set out to encourage investment in securitized assets that were seen as sound but that no one wanted to touch, like high quality triple-A asset-backed securities. The government would guarantee the first portion of losses to encourage private investors to jump back in the market. PPIP set out to encourage investors to buy up troubled assets off the banks' balance sheet by essentially loaning them around 85% of the money to do it. Both programs had the effect of augmenting the firepower of the U.S. bailout fund, known as TARP, by having the private sector help with rescue efforts with government incentives.

????The European proposals are similar to these programs. One would create a special purpose investment vehicle to help fund asset purchases -- in this case, presumably, high-quality sovereigns (i.e. Italy and Spain). The other would act like an insurance policy in which the EFSF would guarantee the first 20% of losses associated with a sovereign default, creating a quasi sovereign credit default swap. This expands the firepower of the bailout fund by again enlisting private investment.

????The Europeans have got the right idea in copying these programs, but the structure they have set up for its implementation is fundamentally flawed. TALF and PPIP worked to get the U.S. economy going again because investors knew whatever money they put in the system was essentially being backed by the firepower of both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. This gave them the confidence to open up their wallets to help augment the government's bailout program.

????But under the European plan, the only backstop is the principal in the EFSF. Unlike the Fed and the Treasury, which have revenue streams and basically unlimited money printing powers, the EFSF's pool of cash is set at 440 billion euros and cannot grow. That is unlikely to spur the confidence necessary to get investors to jump start the European sovereign bond markets and encourage banks to increase lending.

????For the European plan to work, the EFSF needs to be backed by the European Central Bank. The firepower of the ECB is the key to this entire puzzle. Investors will be far more likely to commit to helping the euro zone if they knew that the ECB was ready to flood the system with cash if there is a problem. Trouble is, the ECB has refused to help, and countries, like Germany, do not want them to lend their balance sheet out to back up the EFSF.

????To be sure, there are no quick fixes to Europe's debt woes. But that is not what needs to happen right now. Programs like TALF and PPIP, for example, didn't fix the U.S. mortgage problem, but they are still viewed as being successful. That's because they helped end the more pressing crisis of confidence, which was threatening to take down the entire U.S. banking system.

????The Europeans need to put out the fire before they rebuild their house. While the proposed plan gives them the hose to fight the fire, there still isn't enough water to put it out completely. Time is running out.