????“美國(guó)政府必須接受一個(gè)痛苦的事實(shí)，昔日靠借債就能輕松擺脫爛攤子的好日子已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了……”——中國(guó)新華社（Xinhua News Agency）.

????最近，我們的中國(guó)朋友心跳加速已經(jīng)有好些日子了。北京的主流媒體同仁們一直加班加點(diǎn)，充滿義憤地撰寫各種評(píng)論，抨擊美國(guó)政府在財(cái)政上揮霍無(wú)度，經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展遲緩。畢竟，中國(guó)是新興超級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)體。它出于好心借給美國(guó)錢的日子就要到頭了。或者至少中國(guó)政府打算讓大家確信這一點(diǎn)。

????作為美國(guó)政府最大的債主，中國(guó)發(fā)出的聲音肯定聽(tīng)起來(lái)令人膽寒，不是嗎？中國(guó)人深恐自己龐大的三萬(wàn)億美元外匯儲(chǔ)備——其中70%購(gòu)買了美國(guó)國(guó)債——即將貶值，正打算拿回自己辛辛苦苦掙下的錢回老家。可惡的美國(guó)佬。

????不過(guò)，有件小事不得不提。這種情況沒(méi)有可能——絕不可能——變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí)。

????圍繞著中國(guó)購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債這一主題的種種亂象令人震驚：大量的不實(shí)信息，無(wú)數(shù)緊張過(guò)度的頭條新聞，還有對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)知識(shí)的徹底無(wú)知。無(wú)論何時(shí)，當(dāng)某些歇斯底里的廣播訪談節(jié)目主持人或西裝革履的政客開(kāi)始慷慨激昂地大談特談中國(guó)是如何“支配我們”時(shí)，都必須牢記一些關(guān)鍵要點(diǎn)。首先，正如北京大學(xué)光華管理學(xué)院（Peking University's Guanghua School of Management）的金融學(xué)教授邁克爾?佩蒂斯最近在他的“中國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)通訊”（China Financial Markets）中所闡述的：“請(qǐng)記住，中國(guó)人民銀行（the People's Bank of China）之所以購(gòu)買巨額的美國(guó)政府債券并不是因?yàn)樗掷锏腻X多得沒(méi)地方花了。它購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債純屬其行使交易政策的職能?！痹谌虮姸啻艄蠂@這個(gè)議題所發(fā)出的一片喧嘩中，邁克爾的見(jiàn)解可能是最為清醒的。

????其次，正如佩蒂斯再次提醒我們的：“除非是資本凈輸出國(guó)，否則不可能出現(xiàn)經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目盈余?！眲e忘了，中國(guó)仍然有巨額的經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目盈余?，F(xiàn)狀是，盡管中國(guó)的經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目盈余占其經(jīng)濟(jì)總量的比例已不像數(shù)年前那么高了，那時(shí)經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目盈余一度達(dá)到GDP的10%，但總量還是十分巨大。今年第一財(cái)季，經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目盈余是282億美元，且出口仍然是中國(guó)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的關(guān)鍵驅(qū)動(dòng)因素。（第一財(cái)季，商品與服務(wù)出口占中國(guó)GDP增長(zhǎng)額約40%。）

????當(dāng)然，中國(guó)可以將出口商們通過(guò)將商品掙來(lái)的美元都遣返回美國(guó)。但將所有這些錢送返美國(guó)意味著要將美元兌換成中國(guó)自己的貨幣——人民幣，這就意味著人民幣將對(duì)美元大幅升值。這種情形當(dāng)然是教科書式的貿(mào)易和貨幣市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作的方式。如果一國(guó)一直都處于貿(mào)易順差的狀態(tài)，最終其貨幣將會(huì)升值到某個(gè)臨界點(diǎn)，到了這一點(diǎn)，其商品競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力就會(huì)降低，貿(mào)易賬戶也會(huì)進(jìn)行相應(yīng)調(diào)整。然而，正因?yàn)槌隹谑侵袊?guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)極其重要的組成部分，中國(guó)政府有意識(shí)地放緩了調(diào)整步伐。在過(guò)去五年間，人民幣兌美元的匯率已從8.2：1變成現(xiàn)在的約6.5：1。換言之，人民幣已經(jīng)升值了，但是，如果政府沒(méi)有有意介入放緩這一進(jìn)程的話，這一升值進(jìn)程可能會(huì)更快。中國(guó)人民銀行按照市場(chǎng)價(jià)購(gòu)買了盡可能多的美元，并且用人民幣來(lái)支付。（正如佩蒂斯所說(shuō)，它是通過(guò)在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)借貸人民幣來(lái)購(gòu)買的，或是通過(guò)迫使中國(guó)各家銀行在央行儲(chǔ)蓄準(zhǔn)備金來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。）

????的確，過(guò)去十幾年間，中國(guó)政府已經(jīng)努力放緩其外匯儲(chǔ)備快速增長(zhǎng)的步伐。但是，正如中國(guó)人民銀行的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和顧問(wèn)余永定上周所說(shuō)：“這些舉措都未見(jiàn)成效，因?yàn)樗鼈儾](méi)有解決外匯儲(chǔ)備快速增長(zhǎng)的真正原因：即以控制人民幣升值步伐為目標(biāo)的政府干預(yù)。”

????中國(guó)政府基于美元的外匯儲(chǔ)備正在貶值，因?yàn)橐恢币詠?lái)，人民幣兌美元緩慢但是確定無(wú)疑地在升值。這就是為什么余永定的觀點(diǎn)值得肯定。他在《金融時(shí)報(bào)》（FT）上撰文稱：“中國(guó)人民銀行必須停止購(gòu)買美元，并盡快允許人民幣匯率由市場(chǎng)決定。”

????這一觀點(diǎn)正確至極。然而，要實(shí)現(xiàn)這種轉(zhuǎn)變，其可能性就像由我來(lái)代替姚明成為休斯頓火箭隊(duì)核心主力一樣。要中國(guó)政府在匯率政策上突然改弦易轍毫無(wú)可能。因?yàn)槟壳耙讶簧硖巹趧?dòng)力工資上漲和貨幣升值重壓之下的中國(guó)出口企業(yè)將命懸一線。請(qǐng)記住，在中國(guó)，穩(wěn)定高于一切。中國(guó)將盡一切可能避免突然、劇烈的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策沖擊。

????當(dāng)然，中國(guó)也有其他選擇。它可以不再購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債，轉(zhuǎn)而購(gòu)買其他國(guó)家的政府債券。你知道世界第二大和第三大最具流動(dòng)性的國(guó)內(nèi)債券市場(chǎng)是哪兩國(guó)嗎？日本和意大利。我們可以請(qǐng)中國(guó)外匯管理局（(the State Administration of Foreign Exchange ，SAFE，掌管中國(guó)外匯儲(chǔ)備的官方機(jī)構(gòu)）的官員們做個(gè)舉手表決。有多少人想要大幅度提高介入日本和意大利市場(chǎng)的程度？特別是考慮到現(xiàn)在歐洲央行（ECB）已開(kāi)始把購(gòu)買意大利國(guó)債作為最后一招。

????為保證收益，中國(guó)政府可能會(huì)增加日元的外匯儲(chǔ)備，也會(huì)增加黃金儲(chǔ)備。并且，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)的是，它將在美國(guó)和其他地方對(duì)“硬資產(chǎn)”（hard assets）加大投資。實(shí)際上，這么做對(duì)所有人都有好處（奧巴馬政府應(yīng)該對(duì)所有愿意出資10萬(wàn)美元或更多錢在美購(gòu)買房產(chǎn)的中國(guó)公民發(fā)放簽證）。但是請(qǐng)記得，僅僅是本年度的第一財(cái)季，中國(guó)政府就又增加了1,380億美元的外匯儲(chǔ)備。這么多錢需要找到用武之地。它們可以回到國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)，或是需要進(jìn)行再投資。無(wú)論如何，世界上唯一一個(gè)具有足夠的規(guī)模和深度吸納這些資金的市場(chǎng)正是美國(guó)政府債券市場(chǎng)。

????正如佩蒂斯所說(shuō)：“過(guò)去幾年間每半年我們就能聽(tīng)到同樣的聲音：”中國(guó)要把錢投到其他地方了?，F(xiàn)在，特別是在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾（S&P）發(fā)布了下調(diào)美國(guó)信用等級(jí)評(píng)級(jí)這一飽受爭(zhēng)議的決定后，中國(guó)政府用前所未有的尖銳措辭重申了這一威脅。此舉在中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)外都贏得了一些政治認(rèn)同。但是事實(shí)依然如同佩蒂斯所說(shuō)：“這一切不會(huì)變成現(xiàn)實(shí)。”

????譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

????"The U.S. government has to come to terms with the painful fact that the good old days when it could just borrow its way out of messes of its own making are finally gone..." -- China's state-owned Xinhua News Agency.

????It's been quite a few days of chest thumping for our friends in the Chinese government. The ruling Party's propagandists in Beijing have been working overtime, huffily putting out statements bashing the United States for its fiscal profligacy and economic sloth. China, you see, is the new economic super power. Its days of lending to the United States out of the goodness of its beneficent heart are just about over. Or so Beijing would have you believe.

????Coming from Washington's largest creditor, the noises out of Beijing now sure sound threatening don't they? The Chinese, afraid that their massive three trillion dollars portfolio of foreign reserves -- 70% of which is in Treasury debt -- is going to be devalued, are just going to take their hard-earned money and go home. Screw you, Uncle Sam.

????There's this one little thing, though. There is no chance -- none -- that this will happen.

????The amount of misinformation, the number of overwrought headlines and the fundamental economic illiteracy that surrounds the subject of China's purchase of U.S. Treasury debt continues to be astounding. There are a couple of key points to remember whenever some hysterical radio talk show host or uniformed politician starts ranting about how China "owns us." First, as Michael Pettis, a professor of finance at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management and perhaps the most lucid voice on this subject amidst a global cacophony of dunces, wrote recently in his China Financial Markets newsletter: "Remember that the People's Bank of China does not purchase huge amounts of U.S. government bonds because it has a lot of money lying around and doesn't know what to do with it. Its purchase of U.S. government bonds is simply a function of its trade policy."

????Second, as Pettis again reminds us, "you cannot run a current account surplus unless you are also a net exporter of capital." And China, lest anyone forget, is still running huge current account surpluses. Not, it is true, as massive a surplus as a share of its overall economy as it had a couple of years ago, when the current account surplus reached 10% of GDP, but huge nonetheless. It was $28.2 billion in the first quarter of this year, and exports continue to be a key driver of China's overall economic growth. (Exports of goods and services constituted about 40% of China's GDP growth in the first quarter.)

????China could, of course, repatriate all the dollars its exporters earn by selling stuff to the U.S. But bringing that money home means converting the dollars into its own currency, the Renminbi (RMB), which means the value would rise—sharply against the dollar. This, of course, is how text-book trade and currency markets are supposed to function. If you run persistent trade surpluses, eventually your currency appreciates to the point that your goods become less competitive and the trade accounts adjust accordingly. Precisely because exports are such a significant part of China's growth story, however, Beijing has purposefully slowed the adjustment process. The RMB over the last half-decade has gone from 8.2 to the dollar to about 6.5 now. It has appreciated somewhat, in other words, but as fast as it might have if the government hadn't purposefully intervened to slow the process. The PBOC buys as many dollars as the market offers at the price it sets, and it pays for those dollars in RMB. (As Pettis writes, it does so by borrowing RMB in the domestic market, or by forcing Chinese banks to place reserves on deposit at the central bank.)

????Beijing, it's true, has tried to slow down its rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves over the last couple of years. But as Yu Yongding, an economist and advisor to the PBOC said in a piece last week, "these policies failed because they did not address the real cause of the rapid increase in foreign exchange: namely, state intervention aimed at controlling the pace of Renminbi appreciation."

????The value of Beijing's dollar based foreign exchange reserves are eroding for China, as the RMB, slowly but surely, has crept against the dollar. Which is why Yu, to his credit, wrote in the FT that "the People's Bank of China must stop buying US dollars and allow the Renminbi exchange rate to be decided by market forces as soon as possible."

????That's exactly correct. The thing of it is, there's about as much chance of that happening as there is of me replacing Yao Ming as the Houston Rocket's center. There is no way Beijing is going to go cold turkey on exchange rates. Its exporters, already under pressure thanks to rising wages and some currency appreciation, would scream bloody murder. And remember, China is all about stability. Sudden, dramatic economic policy shocks are to be avoided if at all possible.

????China does have a few options, of course. It could, instead of U.S. Treasuries, buy other foreign government bonds. You know what the second and third largest, most liquid domestic bond markets are in the world? Japan and Italy. Let's have a show of hands of you folks at SAFE (the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which manages Beijing's foreign exchange reserves). How many of you want to significantly increase your exposure to Japan and Italy, particularly today with the ECB stepping in as a buyer of last resort for Italian debt?

????On the margins, Beijing may well increase its reserves held in Yen, as well as in gold. And it will no doubt continue to increase its investment in hard assets, in the U.S. and elsewhere. Indeed, that would be good for everyone else. (The Obama administration should be issuing free visas to any Chinese citizen willing to pay $100,000 or more to buy a house in the United States.) But remember that China, in the first quarter of this year alone, acquired an additional $138 billion in new foreign exchange reserves. That money needs to go somewhere. It can either come home, or it needs to be reinvested. And the only market in the world that has the size and depth to handle that kind of money is, for better or worse, the U.S. government debt market.

????As Pettis says, "every six months for the past several years we've heard the same thing:" China's going to take its money elsewhere. Now, Beijing is making that threat in ever more strident terms, particularly following the controversial S&P downgrade. It earns cheap political points, both at home and abroad, for doing so. But the truth is, as Pettis says, "it isn't going to happen."