????親愛的Groupon潛在股東，

????我寫這封信的初衷，是為了向您提供有關(guān)Groupon首日公開募股（IPO）的一些看法。這家團購網(wǎng)站初創(chuàng)企業(yè)發(fā)布的發(fā)售說明書里作為前言的那封喜氣洋洋、矯揉造作的“安德魯 D. 梅森公開信”里刪掉了這些觀點。

????你會感覺到，在律師接手梅森的這封信并揚棄其精華之前，它最初的版本要大膽得多。梅森在信中寫道：“生命苦短，我們不能打造一家無趣的公司”。然而，梅森的信本身就很無趣，并未在245頁的招股說明以外提供其他任何信息。梅森天真地大談公司理想，而歸結(jié)起來，不外乎 “客戶永遠是對的”這類陳詞濫調(diào)，毫無新意可言。

????梅森是一位善于推動公司成長的首席執(zhí)行官。截至今年3月底，Groupon的營收在一年的時間內(nèi)增長了15倍。Groupon是在正確時間建立的一家正確的公司，它創(chuàng)意十足，執(zhí)行充分，必將成為未來創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)研究的典范，對整個行業(yè)產(chǎn)生影響。2010年3月，Groupon的國際銷售收入在營收中占比為零，通過海外擴張，一年后，這一占比增長到53%。

????但是，現(xiàn)在有一點開始逐漸變得清晰：Groupon的招股說明中還有其他一些模糊不清之處，有些甚至與梅森的公開信前后矛盾。

????梅森迫不及待地輕松宣稱：“我們通過投資推動增長，因此我們原本的季度盈利變?yōu)槊黠@的虧損。”他的這番豪言顯然是受到谷歌公司創(chuàng)始人的啟發(fā)。他們在谷歌2004年首度公開募股的發(fā)售說明書中包含了一份漂亮的、史詩般的“所有者手冊”。（自那以后，谷歌對華爾街的態(tài)度就明顯變得不是那么傲慢了。）

????然而Groupon不是谷歌公司。谷歌上市時的營業(yè)毛利達到24%。Groupon上市之際，營業(yè)損失相當于營業(yè)收入的18%。此外，Groupon的首度公開募股將使公司市值達到300億美元，遠比谷歌公司上市時高。

????Groupon出現(xiàn)損失是該公司自己的選擇。2010年早些時候，公司是盈利的，隨后它就開始大舉擴張，以保持在行業(yè)內(nèi)的領(lǐng)先。高速增長的代價是巨大的。由于巨額銷售和營銷成本，Groupon“燒錢”的速度比增長速度更快。這種做法在創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)中并不常見，并且充滿風險。只有支出的成本帶來了營收的增長，這樣做才是有效的。然而Groupon公布的數(shù)據(jù)表示，Groupon或許未能做到這一點。在波士頓等城市，Groupon的投資回報開始下降。

????這讓Groupon處于一種頗為危險的境地。目前，它的總負債為5.34億美元，僅比其總資產(chǎn)少700萬美元。有評論人士認為Groupon已經(jīng)資不抵債，或許現(xiàn)在下此斷言還為時過早。但在通常情況下，準備上市的公司會使財務(wù)狀況和資產(chǎn)負債表處于相對健康的一個狀態(tài)。Groupon目前似乎急于進行IPO。這種態(tài)度減小了Groupon IPO的吸引力。

????由于燒錢速度太快，因此如果沒有新的資本補充，到今年秋季Groupon將用完所有現(xiàn)金。但這也是Groupon自己的選擇。今年1月，Groupon融資9.5億美元，但其中的85%被用于從梅森和其他內(nèi)部人士手中回購股票。（2009年，Groupon曾撥給梅森一筆借款用以購買一些股票，這些錢他只還了一部分。）

????Groupon這樣做勢必引發(fā)投資者的擔心，從而影響投資者的信心。投資者沒有任何投票權(quán)，所有的投票權(quán)都屬于梅森和Groupon其他數(shù)名內(nèi)部人士。這使Groupon面臨不必要的風險。如果Groupon不從梅森等人手中回購股票，這一風險原本也可以很容易避免。

????Groupon的承銷商——摩根斯坦利（Morgan Stanley），高盛（Goldman Sachs）和瑞士信貸（Credit Suisse）——對此心知肚明。這些投行在發(fā)售說明書里披露了完整的情況，盡管是用小字印刷的。但他們或許應(yīng)該更進一步，建議Groupon等到財務(wù)狀況好轉(zhuǎn)后再進行IPO。不過，這些投行也知道，投資者正失去理性。對它們來說，這是檢驗投資者是否理性，是否愿意向泡沫中投資的一次試驗。如果投資者參與Groupon的IPO，那么未來將會有更多類似的IPO出現(xiàn)。

????梅森沒有在自己的公開信中談?wù)撨@些問題，相反，信里充斥著推銷股票和企業(yè)發(fā)展的奇談怪論。他在信中宣稱：“我們關(guān)心我們的客戶和商戶。”這當然不是真話。招股說明顯示，梅森等人關(guān)心的只是自己的錢袋。梅森這樣說要么是非常天真，要么就是欺詐。

????我猜他這么說是屬于天真。在他的信里有一種令人不安的、悲哀的語調(diào)，似乎他自己也沒弄明白，自己曾一心想要改變世界，如今卻淪為一家聲譽日隆的優(yōu)惠券網(wǎng)站的代言人。“我創(chuàng)辦了The Point（這是一家社會事業(yè)型的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司，梅森后來將其轉(zhuǎn)變成Groupon），賦予小人物以力量，以解決這個世界上尚未解決的一些問題，”他說道，似乎以為股東真會在意他的這番表白。

????事與愿違，迫于聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人的壓力，他接受了Groupon更現(xiàn)實的目標：“讓今天跟昨天足夠不同，讓起床干活物有所值。”生活本來就充滿了妥協(xié)，缺少樂趣，這樣的目標無疑是令人沮喪的。似乎梅森在Groupon的重重壓力之下已經(jīng)銳氣全無，如今他已迫不及待地想要退步抽身、去從事更有意義的事業(yè)。

????如果一名首席執(zhí)行官在股票發(fā)售說明書里暗示他想要抽身，股東們就該認真想想他們是否該趟這趟渾水了。

????譯者：清遠

????Dear Potential Groupon Shareholder,

????I'm writing this letter to provide some insight into the Groupon IPO that was omitted from the cheery, twee "Letter from Andrew D. Mason" that prefaced the prospectus filed by the group-buying startup.

????You get the feeling that the original draft of Mason's letter was a lot bolder before the lawyers got to it sucked out most of its spirit. Mason wrote, "Life is too short to be a boring company." But this is boring letter, adding virtually nothing to the prospectus' 245 pages of legalese. Mason prattles on about company ideals that boil down to platitudes like "The customer's always right." This is hardly an innovative vision.

????Mason is a CEO skilled at managing growth. He built a company that saw revenue increase by a factor of 15 in the year through March. Groupon wasn't just a good idea at the right time, it was an idea exploited to full effect, in ways that will be studied by founders of other startups for years to come. Groupon's overseas expansion brought international sales from 0% of revenue in March 2010 to 53% of revenue in a year later.

????But it's starting to become clear that there are some more unsettling things inside the prospectus, things obscured by and even contradicted by the carefree tone of Mason's note.

????Mason wastes no time in blithely declaring, "we've made investments in growth that turned a healthy forecasted quarterly profit into a sizable loss." He's clearly channeling Google's (GOOG) founders, who included a saucy and epic "owner's manual" in the prospectus for its 2004 IPO. (Since then, Google's attitude toward Wall Street has grown decidedly less cocky.)

????But Groupon is no Google. Google went public with a 24% operating margin. Groupon is approaching the markets with an operating loss equal to 18% of revenue. And yet, Groupon's IPO could give the company a $30 billion value, higher than Google's when it went public.

????Groupon is losing money by choice. In early 2010, the company was profitable, then it embarked on its aggressive expansion to stay ahead of competitors. Hypergrowth is expensive. Thanks to sales and marketing costs, Groupon is spending money even faster than the insane pace that it has been bringing it in. This approach, not uncommon in startups, is risky: It works if all that spending keeps revenue growing over time. But there are already worrying signs that might not be the case; according to Groupon's own data, it's already seeing diminishing returns on its investments in established cities like Boston.

????This leaves Groupon in a fairly precarious financial position. Total liabilities are $534 million, only $7 million less than total assets. It may be premature to declare that Groupon is "effectively insolvent," as some commentators have, but companies hoping to go public normally wait until income statements and balance sheets are in a healthier state. There is something rushed about this IPO, as if the company is acting in desperation. Desperation is never the mark of an attractive IPO.

????Groupon is burning through cash so quickly that, without new financing, it will run dry come autumn. But again, the company chose to put itself in this position. The company raised $950 million in January, but 85 cents of every dollar went toward stock repurchases for Mason and other insiders. (In 2009, Groupon gave Mason a loan to buy some shares, which he repaid only in part.)

????And here is the biggest thing that should worry every potential investor. Groupon is dealing with you in bad faith. You'll have no voting rights, all voting power belongs to Mason and a few other insiders. And yet, you are expected to take on unnecessary risks -- risks that could easily have been avoided had insiders not decided to pay themselves hundreds of millions of dollars from venture financing.

????Groupon's underwriters -- Morgan Stanley (MS), Goldman Sachs (GS) and Credit Suisse (CS) -- understand this. They disclosed it all in the prospectus, albeit in fine print. They might have gone a step further and told Groupon to wait until it's finances were in better order. But they know investors are acting irrationally. For them, this IPO is an acid test to see how irrational investors are willing to be to cash in on the bubble. If you buy this stock, you are effectively voting for more IPOs as shoddy as this one.

????None of this is in Mason's letter. Instead there's all kind of odd language about selling out, bumpy rides and fire dancing. At one point, he declares, "Our customers and merchants are all we care about." Which of course is simply not true. As the rest of the prospectus shows, lining the founders' pockets is all Groupon cares about. That statement is either a testimony to Mason's colossal naivete or it is simply dishonest.

????My guess is that it's naiveté. There is an unsettling, plaintive tone to Mason's letter, as if he were trying to figure out how he went from trying to change the world to being the public face of a glorified coupon site. "I started The Point [the social cause startup that Mason later morphed into Groupon] to empower the little guy and solve the world's unsolvable problems," he says, as if shareholders would care.

????Instead, he was bulled by a cofounder into Groupon's much more modest aspiration: "To make today different enough from yesterday to justify getting out of bed." In the cheerless realm of life compromises, it doesn't get much bleaker than that. It almost sounds like Mason is chafing under the demands of Groupon, and he can't wait to get out and do something more meaningful.

????But when the CEO suggests in the stock prospectus that he wants out, it should make shareholders think hard about whether they want to get in.