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專欄 - 從華爾街到硅谷

拯救美標

Dan Primack 2013年07月03日

Dan Primack專注于報道交易和交易撮合者,從美國金融業到風險投資業均有涉及。此前,Dan是湯森路透(Thomson Reuters)的自由編輯,推出了peHUB.com和peHUB Wire郵件服務。作為一名新聞工作者,Dan還曾在美國馬薩諸塞州羅克斯伯里經營一份社區報紙。目前他居住在波士頓附近。
太陽資本最近剛剛把廚衛生產商美標出售給了一家日本公司,價格是當初買進美標時的一倍多。然而,6年前,如果不是太陽資本出手收購,美標或許早就已經破產。

????上周,私募股權基金公司太陽資本(Sun Capital Partners)同意將美國廚衛生產商美標公司(American Standard)以5.42億美元的價格出讓給日本驪住集團(Lixil Group),這個價格是當年太陽資本收購美標公司時的一倍多。誰都不會想到,六年前如果沒有太陽資本,美標可能就“停業”了。

????美標是一個有著140多年歷史的廚衛品牌,在美國享有盛譽,曾隸屬于美標集團。當年這家集團旗下還有大型暖通空調部門和車輛控制系統業務部門。然而在2007年初,美標集團聽取了華爾街分析師的建議,推出資產分拆計劃。根據這一計劃,美標集團將衛浴及廚具業務部門拍賣給報價最高的競購方【它的車輛控制系統業務部門以威伯科(WABCO)之名獨立上市公司,而暖通空調業務部門則被賣給了英格索蘭公司(Ingersoll-Rand)。】

????潛在競購者很快發現美標公司的衛浴及廚具業務部門在美國市場已經陷入嚴重虧損,大勢已去,只剩下一個虛名,但是在亞洲和歐洲兩大市場卻增長迅速。事實上,當時大家都預測,最終購得美標的公司將會關閉它在美國的業務。

????太陽資本一直都在謹慎的關注著競購美標衛浴及廚具業務部門的進程,主要是由于太陽資本當時已經擁有兩家美國衛生潔具制造商:克蘭公司(Crane Plumbing)和雅佳公司(Eljer Plumbingware)。這兩家公司都是太陽資本在2005年收購的。當太陽資本得知只剩下貝恩資本(Bain Capital)和塞克資本(SAC Capital)兩家還在角逐時,太陽資本向貝恩資本提出了一個交易提議。

????“由于最終的競標是在周一,于是我們在前一周的周五和貝恩資本進行了接觸,”太陽資本聯席首席執行官馬可?拉德爾回憶說。“他們認為美標的美國區業務一文不值,甚至可能是負資產,因為還要花錢來關閉這些業務。于是,那個周末我們提出由太陽資本出資1.3億美元來購買美標美國區業務的大多數股權。貝恩資本同意了,還把這個價碼加入到美標全球業務的競購中,最終擊敗了塞克資本。我們和貝恩資本坐在了一條船上,如果他們競標成功,我們也將囊獲美標的美國區業務。”

????貝恩資本最終以17.5億美元收購了美標衛浴及廚具業務部門,并將后者的亞洲和歐洲業務重新冠名為Ideal Standard。太陽資本購買美標美國區業務的1.3億美元中有5,000萬美元做為股本,使得太陽資本擁有了51%的股權,略高于貝恩資本。其余則用來償還債務。

????太陽資本認為,美標存在大量的產能過剩以及在錯誤的地方生產錯誤的產品等問題。例如,太陽資本認為,一些在墨西哥生產的低產量、高利潤率的產品在美國生產的話會更合適,而一些高產量、低利潤率的產品則更適合在墨西哥生產。同時,太陽資本還覺得,與行業內的市場領導者科勒公司(Kohler)相比較,美標在新品研發上做的還遠遠不夠。

????Private equity firm Sun Capital Partners last week agreed to sell kitchen and bath company American Standard Brands to Japan's LIXIL Corp., in a $542 million deal that more than doubles Sun's original investment. Not exactly what too many folks would have imagined six years ago, when Sun was the only thing standing between American Standard and an "Out of Business" sign.

????American Standard has been a ubiquitous name in America's kitchens and bathrooms for more than 140 years, but it used to be part of a much larger conglomerate that also included large HVAC and vehicle controls divisions. By early 2007, however, the company listened to the Wall Street sirens and launched a breakup plan that would include the sale of its kitchen and bath unit to the highest bidder (the vehicle controls unit became publicly-traded WABCO, while the HVAC unit was sold to Ingersoll-Rand).

????Prospective bidders quickly learned that the kitchen and bath unit was "American" in name only, losing a bundle stateside while growing rapidly in Asia and Europe. In fact, it was expected that the ultimate winner would effectively shut down the American operations.

????Sun Capital had been paying careful attention to the process, in large part because it already owned a pair of much smaller U.S. fixture-makers: Crane Plumbing and Eljer Plumbingware, both of which Sun acquired in 2005. When Sun learned that the American Standard process was down to just Bain Capital and SAC Capital, it went to Bain with an offer.

????"We contacted them on a Friday when final bids were due on a Monday," recalls Sun Capital co-CEO Marc Leder. "They were valuing the American business at zero, or maybe even a bit less because of what it would cost to shut it down. So over that weekend we agreed to pay $130 million for a majority stake in the Americas business, which Bain took and added it onto its bid for the global business and outbid SAC. We have them an ironclad agreement that if they closed on the larger deal, we'd close simultaneously on the Americas piece."

????Bain won the overall deal for $1.75 billion, and would rename the Asia and European business Ideal Standard. The $130 million carve-out of American Standard was structured with $50 million of equity -- of which Sun put in slightly more than Bain for a 51% ownership stake. The remainder was debt.

????Sun's investment thesis was that American Standard had a lot of excess capacity, making the right products in the wrong places. For example, it was making certain low-volume, high-margin products in Mexico that would be better made in the U.S., and some higher-volume, lower-margin products that it thought should be made in Mexico. Sun also felt that the company was not doing nearly enough with product innovation, particularly when compared to market leader Kohler.

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