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????考夫曼基金會（The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation）發布的一份報告稱，風險投資模式已經破裂。報告沒有歸咎于一般合伙人，而是投資風險資本但未堅持要求結構性變革的有限合伙人。 ????恰巧，上個月在Splunk成功IPO推動Sevin Rosen第八支基金差不多實現了100%的賬面回報后，我又重提幾年前關于“風險投資模式已經破產”的整場討論。因此，很多讀者問我，考夫曼的報告是否讓我心有戚戚。或者，用一位讀者的話說，“承認你不知道自己在說些什么。” ????考夫曼的報告主要有兩個結論： ????1. 十多年來，風險投資總體而言沒有達到承諾的回報率（5億美元以上的基金尤其如此）。事實上，報告發現，如果當初有限合伙人投資小盤的上市股指基金，得到的回報會更高。 ????2. 有限合伙人不能忽視第一點，為降低自身風險，必須對風投基金協議進行重大的結構性調整。 ????第一點主要是基于考夫曼包含近100支風投基金的自有組合數據。而且，結論令人信服——特別是考慮到這些公司通常在“內部回報率”達到或接近峰值時（有時峰值的出現可能遠早于設想）募資，它認為采用好年份的四分位數是不夠的。 ????不幸的是考夫曼沒有披露一般合伙人情況——導致外界批評該組合只是選擇了一些糟糕的基金，以偏概全。 ????而幸運的是我進行了一些調研：考夫曼的“核心”風投組合包含Bessemer Venture Partners、Benchmark Capital、General Atlantic和Madrona Venture Partners的多支基金。它還有Clarus Ventures、Mayfield、MPM Capital、New Enterprise Associates和Oak Investment Partners等過往基金。從我理解來看，與Accel Partners、Kleiner Perkins、Sequoia、First Round、Foundry或Union Square等“名牌公司”沒什么關系。 ????初初一看，我的反應是“哇，考夫曼數據集里包含有這些基金，回報率這么差？”要么是其他基金糟透了，要么是其中的名牌基金盛名難副（要知道考夫曼從未有過一個超10億美元的基金剔除費率后回報率可達200%）。 |
????The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation has published a report arguing that the venture capital model is broken. And it lays blame not at the feet of general partners, but rather of limited partners who have continued to invest in venture capital without insisting on structural changes. ????This comes, of course, just days after I revisited the whole "VC model is broken" discussion from several years back, in the wake of Sevin Rosen basically returning its entire eighth fund (on paper) from the successful Splunk IPO. So a lot of you asked for me to chime in on the Kauffman study. Or, in the words of one reader, "admit that you don't know what you're talking about." ????The study basically breaks down into a pair of primary arguments: ????1. Venture capital has, in general, not produced its promised returns for more than a decade (with the situation being particularly acute in funds >$500m). In fact, it finds that LPs likely would have been better off investing in small-cap public equity index funds. ????2. Limited partners must internalize point #1, and make major structural changes to VC fund agreements in order to minimize their risk. ????The first point is mostly based on data from Kauffman's own portfolio of nearly 100 venture capital partnerships. And it is fairly compelling – particularly its argument that using vintage year quartiles is inadequate, considering that firms often fundraise at or near "peak IRR" (which sometimes comes much earlier than you might imagine). ????Unfortunately, Kauffman does not disclose its GP relationships – leading to some charges from the outside that the organization simply picked lousy funds and is looking for a macro scapegoat. ????Fortunately, I did some digging: Kauffman's "core" venture capital portfolio includes multiple commitments with Bessemer Venture Partners, Benchmark Capital, General Atlantic and Madrona Venture Partners. It also has legacy relationships with such firms as Clarus Ventures, Mayfield, MPM Capital, New Enterprise Associates and Oak Investment Partners. From what I understand, no relationships with "brand names" like Accel Partners, Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia, First Round, Foundry or Union Square. ????At first glance, my reaction was "Wow, Kauffman has such lousy returns with those funds included in the data set?" Either the other funds are god-awful, or the included brands aren't the superstars they get made out to be (particularly when you learn Kauffman has never had a $1 billion+ fund return 2x capital after fees). |
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