市場估值約十億美元的中國咖啡初創企業瑞幸今年春天公開致函星巴克，要起訴這家西雅圖咖啡企業實施壟斷，那時美國咖啡巨頭星巴克把這當一種單純的市場營銷伎倆。“我們無意參與其它品牌的營銷炒作”，星巴克如是回應道。

然而，星巴克在中國市場的戰略最近突然出現改變，這說明星巴克覺得瑞幸的威脅遠遠不止被告上法庭。星巴克最新動作包括兩周前宣布和阿里巴巴合作開展咖啡外送業務，說明在這場戰爭里，哥利亞開始正視大衛了，而且不打算被大衛打倒。

瑞幸成立不到一年,創始人是神舟專車的前任COO。七個月的時間里瑞幸已經成為獨角獸企業，在最近一輪以新加坡主權財富基金GIC為首的2億美元融資中，估值達到10億美元。

五月，瑞幸兌現承諾，起訴星巴克勸誘房東簽訂排他性租約，防止競爭對手在星巴克所在地點開店。盡管如此，瑞幸仍然快速擴張。自1月試營業以來，瑞幸已在中國開了近600家店鋪，星巴克花了12年才達到這個數字。

但瑞幸的咖啡店不太一樣。星巴克的門店強調舒適，希望為顧客在家和辦公室之外提供“第三個地方”進行社交。相反，瑞幸門店中將近一半是“外賣廚房”，只做在線訂單的外賣業務。瑞幸受歡迎代表了中國消費文化的更迭，而星巴克卻沒有做出及時調整。

“第三個地方”

星巴克1999年進入中國市場時，希望為顧客提供第三個駐足之所的理念和中國新興的中產階級不謀而合，這些人在擁擠的辦公室里了圈了一天后不愿意那么快就回到狹窄的公寓里。

星巴克充分利用自己的國際身份，把自己定位為高端品牌。雖然中國那時不是（現在也仍然不是）主要咖啡消費市場，手里拿著一杯星巴克很快就成為身份的象征。

但它的高端路線差點在2013年翻了車，因為消費者發現星巴克在中國的定價比美國高。更何況，如果算上和平均收入的相對值，中國星巴克就顯得更貴了：美國人均月工資能買1000杯拿鐵，北京平均收入者只能買200杯。

瑞幸咖啡比星巴克最多能便宜三成，而且它還在進行價格補貼，推出“買二送一”、“買五送五”的優惠活動。有20億人民幣（2.9億美元）現金儲備在手，瑞幸CEO說公司“不著急盈利”——這更像是中國科技創業公司的態度而非咖啡公司。

科技是瑞幸的成功關鍵。它的所有訂單都需要通過app下單。哪怕在有休息區的門店里，顧客也得下載瑞幸app下單。支付要用微信或瑞幸自己的咖啡錢包。不能使用現金。

這在中國沒那么稀奇，中國的移動支付已經快速成為常態。連星巴克去年也和中國排名第一的在線零售公司阿里巴巴合作在2800家門店里推出了支付寶支付功能。

但瑞幸專注外賣業務利用的是中國消費文化的另外一個重要轉變。

中國的食品外賣行業在過去三年里迅速膨脹，市場價值高達410億美元。為了能統治市場，各家外賣公司紛紛燒錢提供打折優惠引誘消費者（很像瑞幸現在的做法）。不同公司間的沖突甚至衍生了暴力事件，敵對公司的外賣員在街上大打出手。

盡管混亂，生意卻一直不錯。外賣市場去年增長23%，尤其受到二三十歲消費者的歡迎；這個年齡群占瑞幸業務量的70%。隨著更多的千禧一代開始叫外賣了，尋找“第三個地方”的人變少了。

清醒

現在有個估值十億美元的競爭對手打到家門口了，星巴克終于覺醒，意識到中國的消費文化出現了改變，邀請阿里巴巴聯手進行咖啡外送業務。阿里巴巴旗下有中國第二大外賣服務公司餓了么，以后300萬餓了么外賣員也開始送星巴克咖啡外賣了。

星巴克沒說推出外賣業務是因為瑞幸，但其中一些業務和瑞幸相似，比如專做外賣訂單的全新“星巴克外賣廚房”。這一新項目將于今秋在北京和上海試點，之后再向星巴克其它門店快速擴張，最終確保勢力范圍能徹底超越瑞幸。

除了咖啡，阿里巴巴還將幫助星巴克打造綜合性的在線服務，讓顧客能夠進行一次性完成購物、買咖啡、積分、支付的全部流程。星巴克把這個數字工程稱為“第四個地方”，希望能把它和第三個地方有機結合， 打造線上線下一體化服務。

這在中國不是新想法。阿里巴巴稱之為“新零售”，2016年起就開始推廣這一模型。瑞幸一開始遵循的也是這個模型，事實證明在咖啡行業大受歡迎。

然而，瑞幸可能會因為這種模型的流行而遭遇滑鐵盧。瑞幸應該為星巴克開始擁抱新零售感到擔憂，因為后者是在現有實體店基礎上增加線上服務，這可比從零開始構建全新體系容易多了。星巴克已經有3400家門店，還計劃在未來4年里每15小時就在中國開一家新門店。

它還在適應，但適應是為了留下來。正如霍華德·舒爾茨在全球最大的星巴克——上海旗艦店星巴克烘焙工坊——召開的圓桌會議上所說：“所有不看好星巴克在中國發展的人都大錯特錯。”（財富中文網）

譯者：Agatha?

When Luckin, a billion-dollar Chinese coffee start-up, penned an open letter this spring to Starbucks threatening to sue the Seattle-based brewer on antitrust grounds, the U.S. coffee giant dismissed it as a mere marketing gimmick. “We have no intention of participating in the promotion hype of other brands,” it responded.

But sudden changes to its China strategy suggests that Starbucks saw a threat in Luckin much bigger than being taken to court. Recent moves by Starbucks, including the delivery partnership it announced two weeks ago with Alibaba, indicate that in this particular battle, Goliath is taking David seriously, and doesn’t intend to get knocked out.

Luckin was founded less than a year ago by Jenny Qian, the former COO of Uber-like car provider, UCAR. Within seven months, it had already achieved unicorn status, clinching its billion-dollar valuation in a $200 million funding round led by Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, GIC.

In May, it made good on its promise and sued Starbucks, alleging the coffee house was coaxing landlords into signing exclusive rental agreements, preventing rival coffee shops from opening stores in Starbucks locations. Despite this claim, Luckin has expanded quickly. Since its soft launch in January, the coffee house has opened close to 600 stores in China – a feat it took Starbucks twelve years to achieve.

But Luckin’s coffee shops are different. Starbucks stores have always emphasized comfort, providing a “third place” for consumers to socialize outside of their homes or offices. Conversely, nearly half of Luckin’s shops are “takeaway kitchens”, dedicated exclusively to fulfilling orders made online and delivering them out of store. Luckin’s popularity represents a shift in China’s consumer culture that Starbucks has been slow to react to.

The ‘third place’

When Starbucks entered China in 1999, its third place strategy resonated with China’s emerging middle class, who were reluctant to return to cramped apartments after spending long hours confined to crowded offices.

Starbucks was also able to capitalize on its international standing and present itself as a premium brand. Even though the Chinese weren’t (and still aren’t) major coffee drinkers, clutching a Starbucks cup soon became a status symbol.

But its premium branding almost backfired in 2013 when consumers discoveredthat Starbucks was charging more in China than it was in the U.S. Worse, Starbucks is also more expensive in China relative to the average income: in America, the average salary buys 1,000 lattes a month, but in Beijing the average earner can only afford 200.

Luckin’s coffee is up to 30% cheaper than the java at Starbucks, and it issubsidizing its prices, offering “buy two, get one free” and “buy five, get five free” offers. With Rmb2 billion ($290 million) in cash reserves, CEO Qian has said Luckin is “in no rush to make a profit” – an attitude more typical of a Chinese tech start-up than a coffee shop.

Tech is pivotal to Luckin’s success. All of its orders are made in-app. Even at the stores where patrons can actually sit and relax, customers have to download the Luckin app to place an order. Payment is then made through WeChat or Luckin’s own Coffee Wallet. There is no cash option.

This doesn’t seem so unnatural in China, where mobile payments are fast becoming the norm. Even Starbucks teamed up with the nation’s number one online retailer, Alibaba, last year to roll out AliPay features across 2,800 stores.

But Luckin’s emphasis on delivery harnesses another major shift in consumer culture.

China’s food delivery industry has ballooned over the last three years into a market valued at $41 billion. Seeking dominance, competing couriers have burned through cash offering discounts to entice users (much like Luckin is doing now). Clashes between the companies have even turned violent, with drivers from the rival firms brawling on the streets.

Despite the chaos, business has been good. The market grew 23% last year, proving particularly popular among 20-30 year olds: a demographic that also makes up 70% of Luckin’s business. As more millenials turn to deliveries, fewer will be seeking that third place.

Smell the coffee

Now that it has a billion dollar rival on its doorstep, Starbucks has woken up to China’s changing consumer culture and has enlisted Alibaba to help it run deliveries. Alibaba owns Ele.me, China’s second-largest food delivery provider, and will dedicate some of its three million drivers to running Starbucks orders.

Starbucks doesn’t say its new delivery deal is a response to Luckin, but some of its features are familiar, such as the new “Starbucks Delivery Kitchens” dedicated exclusively to fulfilling delivery orders. The new program will be trialed in Beijing and Shanghai this fall before spreading rapidly across Starbucks’ other locations, completely dwarfing Luckin’s reach.

Besides running coffee, Alibaba will also help Starbucks create a comprehensive presence online, allowing customers to buy merchandise, order coffee, collect points and make payments all through one service. Starbucks refers to this digital footprint as a “fourth place,” and it wants to integrate it with its third places, creating a confluence of online and offline services.

This is not a new idea in China. Alibaba calls it “New Retail” and has been championing the model since 2016. It is also the model that Luckin has adhered to from the get-go and proved to be popular for coffee.

The model’s popularity, however, could potentially lead to Luckin’s own downfall. Luckin should be worried now that Starbucks has embraced New Retail, because it is easier to add internet on top of existing offline services than build a whole system from scratch. Starbucks already has 3,400 locations and plans to add a new China store every 15 hours for the next four years.

It may be adapting, but it is doing so to stay. As Howard Schultz warned at a roundtable in Shanghai’s flagship Starbucks Roastery – the biggest Starbucks in the world – “Anyone who is betting against Starbucks in China is dead wrong.”