歐洲的狀況一直都不太好。今年歐元區整體人均GDP終于回升到危機前水平。西班牙宣稱本國經濟成功復蘇，但失業率仍居近20%的高位，年輕人失業率超過40%，但至少比五年前歐元危機開始時情況有所改善。希臘仍面臨嚴重衰退。去年歐元區增長率僅為1.6%，這還比2005年到2015年年均增長率高出一倍。歷史學家已經開始把過去十年稱作歐元區“失去的十年”，但他們有可能很快會改口，稱之為“最后十年”。

歐元區于2002年成立，不過單一貨幣區的裂痕早在1999年就已產生，2008年全球金融危機期間進一步顯現。經濟學家早就預測歐洲遭遇沖擊時歐元會面臨考驗，不幸的是歐元誕生沒多久考驗就來了，還是從大西洋彼岸來勢洶洶的一場大震蕩。到2010年，歐元危機已全面擴散，“邊緣國家”——希臘、西班牙、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙的主權債券利率飛升到前所未有的高位。但如果仔細觀察，歐元區的不平衡從一開始就在積聚，貨幣大量涌入邊緣國家，仿佛匯率風險消除后所有風險都不存在一般。

這也體現了歐元區成立時關鍵缺陷之一：歐元區穩固的基礎是相信各國政府不會犯錯，具體是指將赤字保持低于GDP的3%，債務水平不超過GDP的60%，年通脹率低于2%，市場就能保持增長和穩定。但規定的這些數字，包括背后的理念既無理論也無實踐基礎。情況最糟的兩個國家，愛爾蘭和西班牙在危機前尚有盈余，金融危機給它們帶來了赤字和債務問題。

成立歐元區的希望是通過財政和貨幣約束產生“聚合”效應，令單一貨幣系統更好地運轉。然而實際上產生了分化效應，富國越來越富，窮國越發貧困，各國國內也是富人越來越有錢，窮人越來越窮。一切正由歐元區的結構導致。舉例來說，單一市場中貨幣離開窮國銀行更容易，迫使銀行收縮銀根，經濟越發衰退。

大概20多年前，經濟學家暢想單一貨幣區時都在強調充足的勞動力自由遷移，充裕的共同預算以抵抗沖擊，以及各國之間保持足夠的“經濟”相似性多么重要。但歐元區成立后失去了兩項重要的調節工具，匯率和利率，而且沒有任何替代。沒有共同存款保險，銀行領域沒有統一的解決方案，也沒有失業保險體系。

還有一點很重要，早期討論忽略了“智識”聚合的重要性：其實各國對于政策優劣的認識差別巨大，尤其是在德國和歐洲其他各國之間。認識的差距長期存在。上世紀90年代中期，我擔任經濟合作與發展組織經濟政策委員會主席時就曾明顯感受到。嚴格來說，這也是分化的體現。所以德國認為采取緊縮政策可以迅速實現經濟增長時，每個具體實踐的國家都慘遭失敗。后果很容易預見，全世界最頂尖的經濟學家都預測到了。類似的例子是，很多實施結構改革的國家國力反而遭到削弱，增速放緩，貿易赤字增加。

歐元區開始出現巨大的民主缺陷：希臘、西班牙和葡萄牙的選民大量投票給反對緊縮的政黨。然而又覺得除了接受德國的要求別無他法。沒人想到加入歐元區后，居然意味著失去經濟主權。

歐元區的宏偉目標是歐洲更加繁榮。繁榮會進一步推動經濟和政治融合。歐元是政治產物，但其政治學基礎并不穩固，沒有設計出配套的制度安排確保實現目標。隨著歐元區陷入停滯，情勢日漸惡化，各國團結起來的機會不大，倒是很可能進一步分化。如今看起來，原本打算終結歐洲貨幣林立狀況的歐元可能要終結自己，正是對統一貨幣的執念造就了對歐洲一體化最嚴重的威脅。

面對不斷出現的危機，歐洲也在改革，但力度太小，也為時已晚。有些措施實際上只有反作用：設置統一監管系統后，卻不考慮當地宏觀經濟狀況，也沒有共同存款保險保障，實際上加劇分化。與此同時，歐洲又運氣不太好接連遇上各種危機，尤其是難民危機。很多國家失業率太高，部分原因也是歐元導致的，希望找到新工作的人們只能投奔有工作機會的地方，結果是少數幾個國家承受移民潮的巨大沖擊。也很容易理解，失業率高的國家當然會拒絕新勞動力涌入搶走本就稀缺的工作。

歐洲瀕臨崩潰邊緣，但最大的崩潰風險很可能是危機可能四處蔓延。市場已經感覺歐元系統很難長期維系，投機者總是嗜血而動。歐洲央行總裁馬里奧·德拉吉聲稱的“不惜代價”維護穩定確實創造了奇跡，至少比人們預期得久。但也只不過是場信任騙局：只有市場參與者相信有用才真會起作用。

市場的力量與政治是相互交織的。選民們不高興，因為這么長時間以來政府表現實在很差，所以不管是左翼還是右翼的溫和派，選民都投票反對。持不同政見者占據明顯優勢。

或許歐洲領袖感受到緊迫性后，最終會下定決心在歐元區實施結構性改革，讓單一貨幣系統順利運轉，實現共同繁榮。或許2017年歐元區真能穩定下來。

如果希望單一貨幣系統生效，就得進一步推進歐洲一體化——更加團結；強國更愿意幫助弱國；更快推進共同存款保險以及共同失業保障體系，而不是像現在一樣半途而廢難以維系。不過隨著歐元失敗，改革越發不易。改革很有可能意味著政治力量轉投別的方向，若果真如此，歐洲很有可能把歐元當成一場有趣的，好意的實驗，可惜以失敗告終，而且讓歐洲人民和國家承受了巨大傷害。（財富中文網）

作者：Joseph E. Stiglitz

譯者：Pessy

審校：夏林

約瑟夫?E?斯蒂格利茨是美國哥倫比亞大學教授，2001年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主。近來著有《歐元：為何單一貨幣威脅歐洲未來》。

Europe has not been doing well. Just this year, GDP per capita for the Eurozone as a whole finally returned to pre-crisis levels. It is claiming victory in Spain—even though unemployment remains near 20% and youth unemployment is more than twice that—simply because things are better today than they have been since the euro crisis began a half decade ago. Greece remains in a severe depression. Growth for the Eurozone over the past year has been an anemic 1.6%, and that number is twice the average growth rate from 2005 to 2015. Historians are already speaking of the Eurozone’s lost decade, and it’s possible they’ll soon be writing about its last decade, too.

The euro was introduced in 2002, but the cracks in the single currency arrangement, which began in 1999, became evident with the 2008 global financial crisis. Economists had predicted that the test of the euro would occur when the region faced a shock, and Europe was unlucky in facing such a big shock coming from across the Atlantic so soon after its creation. By 2010, the euro crisis had become full blown, with interest rates on the sovereign debt of the “periphery”—Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal—soaring to unheard-of levels. But a closer look at the Eurozone shows imbalances building up from the very beginning—with money rushing into the periphery countries in the misguided belief that eliminating exchange rate risk had somehow eliminated all risk.

This illustrates one of the key flaws in the construction of the Eurozone: It was based on the belief that if only government didn’t mess things up—if it kept deficits below 3% of GDP, debt below 60% of GDP, and inflation below 2% per annum—the market would ensure growth and stability. Those numbers, and the underlying ideas, had no basis in either theory or evidence. Ireland and Spain, two of the worst afflicted countries, actually had surpluses before the crisis. The crisis caused their deficits and debt, not the other way around.

The hope was that fiscal and monetary discipline would result in convergence, enabling the single-currency system to work even better. Instead, there has been divergence, with the rich countries getting richer and the poor getting poorer, and within countries, the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. But it was the very structure of the Eurozone that predictably led to this. The single market, for instance, made it easy for money to leave the banks of the weaker countries, forcing these banks to contract lending, weakening the weak further.

Economists assessing the prospects of a single currency arrangement some quarter century ago emphasized the importance of sufficient labor mobility and an adequately large common budget to buffer against shocks as well as sufficient economic similarity among the countries. But the euro took away two of the critical instruments for adjustment—the exchange and interest rates—and didn’t put anything in their place. There was no common deposit insurance, no common way of resolving problems in the banking sector, and no common unemployment insurance scheme.

Equally important, these early discussions ignored the importance of intellectual convergence: There is a huge gap in perceptions of what makes for good policies, especially between Germany and much of the rest of Europe. These differences are longstanding. They were evident to me when I chaired the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD in the mid-1990s. If anything, there has been divergence here, too. Thus, the austerity policy—which Germany thought should have brought a quick return to growth—has failed miserably in virtually every country in which it has been tried. The consequences were predictable, and predicted by most serious economists around the world. So too, many of the particular structural reforms have actually weakened the countries on which they have been imposed, lowering growth and increasing their trade deficits.

A huge democratic deficit has since opened up: citizens in Greece, Spain, and Portugal have all voted in large numbers for parties opposed to austerity. Yet, they have felt they have no choice but to accept the demands of Germany. Citizens were never told that when they joined the euro, they would be giving up their economic sovereignty.

The ambition of the euro was to bring greater prosperity to Europe. This, in turn, would promote economic and political integration. The euro was a political project, but the politics weren’t strong enough to create the institutional arrangements that would ensure success. With the euro leading to stagnation and worse, it is no surprise that it has led to increasing divisiveness rather than to more solidarity. Today, it seems that the euro, which was supposed to be a means to an end, has become an end in itself—the pursuit of which poses perhaps the single most important threat to the European project.

In response to the repeated crises, Europe has made reforms, but they have been too little, too late. Some may actually be counterproductive: Having a system of common supervision, without adequate sensitivity to local macro-conditions and without common deposit insurance may actually exacerbate divergence. Meanwhile, the region has the misfortune of being repeatedly bombarded with crises, especially the refugee crisis. With unemployment in so many countries so high—at least partly because of the euro—those seeking a new future wish to move to where there are jobs, resulting in a few countries bearing the brunt of the wave of migrants. And naturally, countries where unemployment is high resist having new workers competing for the scarce jobs.

Europe has been engaged in brinkmanship, but the danger of brinkmanship is that there is a high probability that eventually one goes over the brink. Markets sense that the system is not viable in the long run—speculators attack when they smell blood. European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s assertion that he will do “whatever it takes” has worked wonders—for longer than anyone expected. But it is a confidence trick: It works only because market participants believe it will work.

These market forces are intertwined with politics. Voters who should be unhappy—simply because they have done so poorly for such a long time—have expressed their anger by voting against the centrist parties of the left and right. The dissidents are in the ascendancy.

Perhaps European leaders, sensing the urgency of the moment, will finally make the reforms in the structure of the Eurozone that will enable a single currency arrangement to work—to achieve a shared prosperity. Perhaps 2017 will be the year in which the reform of the Eurozone really takes hold.

In order for a single currency system to work, there has to be more Europe—more solidarity; more willingness of the stronger countries to help the weaker; more willingness to create institutions like a common deposit insurance and a common unemployment scheme—than the current halfway house, which is simply not viable. But the failures of the Eurozone make such reforms increasingly hard. It is at least as likely that the political forces are going in the other direction, and if that is the case, it may be only a matter of time before Europe looks back on the euro as an interesting, well-intentioned experiment that failed—at great cost to the citizens of Europe and their democracies.