蘋果，以及與之類似的其他大型上市公司可能正在成為瀕危物種。或者說，岌岌可危的至少是其所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。實際上，在一些經(jīng)濟學(xué)家已經(jīng)開始設(shè)想的未來中，就連蘋果這樣最有價值的美國公司也會和公開市場說再見。

本周，美國國家經(jīng)濟研究局以此為主題，發(fā)布了一份研究報告。其作者是知名經(jīng)濟學(xué)家亞利桑那大學(xué)教授凱思林·卡爾和俄亥俄州立大學(xué)教授雷內(nèi)·M·史圖斯。

美國上市公司不斷改變的性質(zhì)，和40年來一直影響美國工人的變化頗有些相似之處。其中之一就是，上市公司的數(shù)量不斷減少，其經(jīng)濟狀況也變得越發(fā)不平衡。

Apple, and other large public companies like it, may be an endangered species. Or at least their ownership structure might be. Indeed, some economists are starting to imagine a future where even the most valuable companies in America, like Apple, say so long to public markets.

That’s the subject of a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper published by this week by well-known economists Kathleen Kahle of the University of Arizona and Rene M. Stulz of the Ohio State University.

The changing nature of the American public corporation shares some similarities with changes that have affected the American worker over the past 40 years. For one, not only is the the number of public corporations on the decline, there is a growing inequality in the economic fortunes of those that remain:

如上圖所示，雖然幾十年來上市公司的總市值仍然接近歷史最高水平，但它們的絕對數(shù)量不斷下降。

不過，兩位經(jīng)濟學(xué)家的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，不光是現(xiàn)有上市公司聚集了更多的財富，更重要的是，上市公司內(nèi)部的財富也變得更加集中。他們寫道：“2015年，35家企業(yè)擁有上市公司一半的資產(chǎn)，一半的上市公司凈利潤集中在30家企業(yè)手中。而在1975年，這兩個數(shù)字則分別是94和109。”

另一個令人吃驚的變化是，1980年，機構(gòu)投資者在上市公司的持股比例平均為17.7%，現(xiàn)在則超過50%。最后，上市公司正在迅速老齡化，其平均年齡已經(jīng)從1995年的12.2歲增至目前的18.5歲。這表明新公司越來越不愿意上市，而這種趨勢對上市公司的整體性質(zhì)有非常重要的影響。比如，老一些的公司不如新公司那樣有創(chuàng)新性。

為什么這些情況很重要呢？

今年5月，針對為什么較年輕的公司都在躲避上市這一問題，《財富》雜志發(fā)表過一篇調(diào)查報告。結(jié)論是，由于現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟的資本密集程度下降，再加上如今很容易獲得資本支持，很多企業(yè)認為沒必要忍受因上市而招致額外的監(jiān)督。報告還認為，這或許不完全是一件壞事，因為“公共所有制一直存在的掣肘因素之一就是所謂的代理人問題，即所有者和經(jīng)營者不統(tǒng)一。”這種理論認為，“大型上市公司的最高管理層一般只持有很少的股份，他們會想法設(shè)法增加自己的財富。這些方法也許有損于其他股東，而后者的所有權(quán)往往非常分散，無法約束經(jīng)營者。非上市企業(yè)則不存在這個問題，因為主要所有人經(jīng)常是經(jīng)營者自身，或者是強有力的董事會成員。”

不過，近些年來跟蹤過上市公司行為的人都應(yīng)該知道，這項理論有個很大的問題：股票回購。上市公司正在把越來越多的盈利返還給股東，其形式包括分紅和股票回購。上市公司的加權(quán)平均分紅率已從1975年的27.1%升至目前的47%。倘若上市公司高管沒有遵循股東的最大利益，他們很可能早把這些錢中飽私囊，或者投入自己看中的項目，而不是把它交還到老板。

所有這些都顯示，現(xiàn)代上市公司正在喪失使命感。卡爾和史圖斯寫道：“整體而言，上市公司顯得缺乏抱負，也未獲得正確的激勵以及機會。他們把資金返還給投資者，或者囤積現(xiàn)金，卻沒有籌措資金進行更多的投資。”

美國的上市公司群體正在萎縮，這不僅是企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的問題，也是我們所有人的問題。我們認為，活躍的公開市場帶來的透明度及其提供的機遇讓經(jīng)濟受益。這種情況不僅限于投資者，也包括工薪族和選民。一個更偏向私營的經(jīng)濟體將導(dǎo)致更大的貧富差距和不公平，不僅是在公開市場和金融市場，在這些市場以外也會如此。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

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作者：Chris Matthews

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

As you can see from the above chart, the absolute number of public corporations has been on the decline for decades, while the total market capitalization of those left remain near all-time highs.

But what the economists in the study found is that it’s not just that there is more wealth concentrated in the remaining public companies. More importantly, the wealth among public companies is concentrated as well. “In 2015, 35 corporations account for half the assets of public corporations and 30 account for half the net income,” the authors write. “In contrast, in 1975, these numbers were 94 and 109.”

Another striking change: In 1980, institutional ownership of public firms averaged 17.7%. Today it’s over 50%. Lastly, public firms are aging rapidly, with the average age rising from 12.2 years in 1995 to 18.5 years today. This reflects the increasing unwillingness of new firms to go public, and this trend has very important effects on the overall nature of public firms. For one, older firms are less innovative than newer firms.

Why does this all matter?

Back in May, Fortune published an investigation of just why newer companies are eschewing going public concluding that because the modern economy is less capital intensive, and because capital is so easily available today, companies feel no need to put up with the extra regulation and scrutiny that come with being publicly listed. The argument was also floated that this might not be an entirely bad thing, as “One of the enduring drawbacks of public ownership is the so-called agency problem, the misalignment of owners and managers.” According to this theory, “Top executives at big public companies typically own only tiny stakes and are tempted to enrich themselves in all manner of ways that may harm the other shareholders, whose ownership is often so diffuse that they can’t discipline the managers. That problem doesn’t arise in private firms, where the majority owners are usually either the managers themselves or members of a powerful board of directors.”

But this theory has a big problem. And it is one that anyone following the behavior of public companies in the past few years should know: Buybacks. Public firms have been increasingly giving earnings back to shareholders. Since 1975, the weighted average of total payouts—in the form of both dividends and share buybacks—has risen from 27.1% of income to 47% today. If public corporate executives weren’t following the best interest of shareholders, they’d likely be using this money to invest in perks or pet projects, not returning it to their bosses.

All of this points to a loss of the sense of purpose of being a public company in the modern economy. “As a whole, public firms appear to lack ambition, proper incentives, or opportunities. They are returning capital to investors and hoarding cash rather than raising funds to invest more,” Kahle and Stulz write.

Public corporate America is shrinking, and that’s not just a problem for business leaders, but one for all of us who think that the economy benefits from the transparency and access to opportunity that robust public markets create. And that goes not just for investors but for investors but for workers and for voters, as well. A more private economy creates more inequality and inequity, not just in public markets, and financial markets, but outside of them as well.