過(guò)去十年中，比能源工業(yè)改變更大的重要經(jīng)濟(jì)部門(mén)，恐怕只有國(guó)防工業(yè)了。如今的軍事技術(shù)與十年前相比發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化，近來(lái)的軍事新聞滿是關(guān)于無(wú)人機(jī)、軌道炮、射線武器、隱形戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)、隱形驅(qū)逐艦和網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的報(bào)道，盡管這些技術(shù)上的進(jìn)步并不局限于國(guó)防領(lǐng)域。

以無(wú)人機(jī)為例。無(wú)人機(jī)代表的是軍事實(shí)力理論的根本變化——飛機(jī)，甚至一些地面車輛，都能通過(guò)遠(yuǎn)程人為控制和預(yù)設(shè)計(jì)算機(jī)程序相結(jié)合的方式，在數(shù)千英里之外工作。這種技術(shù)正在徹底地改變石油和天然氣行業(yè)的方方面面，而這對(duì)美國(guó)公司而言喜憂參半。

從積極的方面來(lái)看，無(wú)人機(jī)正在迅速成為石油工業(yè)削減成本的最佳手段之一。石油公司不必再掏錢(qián)讓人從一個(gè)油井跑到另一個(gè)油井，或是沿著油管檢查哪里有問(wèn)題，這些苦活現(xiàn)在都可以讓無(wú)人機(jī)完成。現(xiàn)場(chǎng)勘探，生產(chǎn)監(jiān)控和安全排查也可以讓無(wú)人機(jī)代勞，這些無(wú)人機(jī)可以自動(dòng)駕駛，許多美國(guó)供應(yīng)商都能以合理的價(jià)格提供這種服務(wù)。

然而，無(wú)人機(jī)對(duì)美國(guó)的石油公司也有負(fù)面作用，可能會(huì)威脅到他們未來(lái)面對(duì)國(guó)外公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。這種威脅來(lái)自中國(guó)。軍用無(wú)人機(jī)可能是最適合攜帶導(dǎo)彈襲擊地面目標(biāo)的方式之一，它的成本要比傳統(tǒng)野戰(zhàn)裝備低很多。在美國(guó)，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的軍用無(wú)人機(jī)售價(jià)約為500萬(wàn)美元，而在中國(guó)，同樣的無(wú)人機(jī)售價(jià)可能只有100萬(wàn)至200萬(wàn)美元。與售價(jià)動(dòng)輒高達(dá)幾千萬(wàn)美元的傳統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)相比，這只是一個(gè)零頭。在許多技術(shù)參數(shù)上，美國(guó)的無(wú)人機(jī)都要優(yōu)于中國(guó)無(wú)人機(jī)，但兩國(guó)的產(chǎn)品對(duì)尋求廉價(jià)空軍力量的第三世界軍隊(duì)而言，都十分有用。

美國(guó)和美國(guó)公司的問(wèn)題在于，該國(guó)是冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期防衛(wèi)條約的簽署國(guó)。這份名為《導(dǎo)彈及其技術(shù)控制制度》（MTCR）的條約旨在限制出售用于發(fā)射核彈頭的導(dǎo)彈，如今被政府廣泛用于阻止無(wú)人機(jī)技術(shù)的擴(kuò)散，即便銷售對(duì)象是美國(guó)的盟友。到目前為止，只有兩個(gè)大國(guó)獲準(zhǔn)購(gòu)買(mǎi)美國(guó)無(wú)人機(jī)技術(shù)——英國(guó)和意大利。

這和石油有什么關(guān)系？

中國(guó)不是《導(dǎo)彈及其技術(shù)控制制度》的簽署國(guó)，因此在出售無(wú)人機(jī)上沒(méi)有這樣的限制。現(xiàn)在，中國(guó)的無(wú)人機(jī)已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了伊拉克和尼日利亞等國(guó)的軍火庫(kù)。中國(guó)不僅把無(wú)人機(jī)賣給這些國(guó)家，還用其作為談判的籌碼，確保在與這些國(guó)家進(jìn)行石油貿(mào)易時(shí)獲得有利的條款。

以尼日利亞為例。據(jù)說(shuō)中國(guó)對(duì)尼日利亞的石油很感興趣。中國(guó)在尼日利亞投資了數(shù)十億美元建設(shè)碳?xì)浠衔锏幕A(chǔ)設(shè)施，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)認(rèn)為尼日利亞在國(guó)際石油市場(chǎng)上的地位將會(huì)日益提升。一些預(yù)測(cè)認(rèn)為，到2050年，尼日利亞的人口將達(dá)到世界第三。假如真的如此，屆時(shí)將會(huì)有更多機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)開(kāi)采尼日利亞的石油，并利用該國(guó)對(duì)石油的更大需求。中國(guó)希望在這種增長(zhǎng)的兩個(gè)層面上都分一杯羹。

中國(guó)的石油需求位居全球第二，僅次于美國(guó)。因此，中國(guó)介入國(guó)外石油市場(chǎng)的情況在短期內(nèi)不會(huì)改變。從美國(guó)政府的角度來(lái)看，這可能不會(huì)是個(gè)問(wèn)題，不過(guò)，對(duì)于埃克森和雪佛龍這類依靠公平獲取海外石油開(kāi)采機(jī)會(huì)的公司而言，中國(guó)的無(wú)人機(jī)恐怕會(huì)是中國(guó)公司擊敗美國(guó)公司的殺手锏。當(dāng)前油價(jià)走低，頁(yè)巖油前途未卜，當(dāng)美國(guó)股民們考慮可能更便宜的外國(guó)油源時(shí)，這樣的優(yōu)勢(shì)是絕對(duì)需要關(guān)注的。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：嚴(yán)匡正

審校：任文科

Perhaps the only major sector of the economy that has changed more than energy in the last decade is the defense industry. Military technology today differs radically from what was available a decade ago, with military news stories these days filled with talk of drones, rail guns, directed energy weapons, stealth fighters, stealth destroyers, and cyber warfare. Not all of these technological advances are staying limited to the defense industry though.

Take drones for instance. Drones represent a paradigm shift for military power – now aircraft and even some ground vehicles can be operated from thousands of miles away through a combination of remote human operation and preprogrammed computer routines. This type of technology is now radically altering many aspects of the oil and gas industry in ways that are both good and bad for U.S. companies.

On the positive side, drones are quickly becoming one of the best cost cutting tools in the oil patch. Rather than paying people to travel from site to site or along pipelines looking for problems, oil companies can dispatch drones to do the dirty work. Site exploration, production monitoring, and security concerns can all be handled with drones, which in many cases are self-piloting and are available from a variety of U.S. suppliers at reasonable prices.

Yet there is also a darker side to drones for U.S. oil companies and one that could threaten their ability to compete in foreign markets in the future. That threat comes from China. Military drones are arguably most useful for carrying missiles to attack ground targets in a way that is very low cost compared to conventional field armaments. In the U.S., a typical military drone might retail for around $5M. In China, that same drone might cost $1-2M. Both sets of drones are a pittance compared to a traditional fighter aircraft, which almost universally cost tens of millions. U.S. drones are superior to Chinese drones on a variety of technical metrics, but both sets of drones are functionally very useful for third world militaries that are looking for cheap airpower.

The problem for the U.S. and American firms is that the country is a signatory to a defense treaty from the Cold War Era that was intended to curtail the sale of missiles to launch nuclear warheads. This treaty, called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), is now commonly applied by the government to stop the sale of drone technology even to U.S. allies. So far, only two major nations have been approved to buy U.S. drone tech – the UK and Italy.

How does all of this relate to oil?

The Chinese are not signatories to MTCR and thus face no such restriction on the sale of their drones. As a result, Chinese drones are turning up in the arsenals of countries like Iraq and Nigeria. But the Chinese are not just selling drones to these countries, they are also using these drone sales as a bargaining chip to secure advantageous terms related to oil in these countries.

Take Nigeria for instance. China is reportedly very interested in Nigeria’s oil. China has invested billions of dollars in hydrocarbon infrastructure in Nigeria because China sees Nigeria as having a rising degree of importance in the world and the oil markets. By 2050, some projections suggest Nigeria will have the third largest population in the world. As that development occurs, there will be more opportunities to exploit Nigerian oil and greater demand by the country for oil. The Chinese want a piece of both sides in that growth.

The Chinese demand for oil makes it second in the world behind the U.S. in consumption, and as a result Chinese involvement in foreign oil markets is not going to change anytime soon. From the American government’s perspective, this may not be a problem, but for companies like Exxon and Chevron that rely on fair access to overseas oil production opportunities, China’s drones may be the ace in the hole that gives the nod to Chinese firms over U.S. companies. And with the future of shale oil in question given current low oil prices, that advantage is definitely something that U.S. shareholders should care about when considering potentially cheaper foreign oil sources.