????大家聽說過EveryBlock或Village Soup嗎？Backfence呢？每個以社區為重點的初創公司開張沒多久就關門大吉了。此外，許多所謂的超本地化網站也進行過嘗試，但都以失敗告終。就連美國在線公司(AOL)旗下的Patch新聞網也碰到了難以逾越的障礙。它們的困境引出了一個問題：為什么超本地化生意這么難做？

????理論上不應該這樣，至少在新聞層面上。地方小報紙的持續衰落似乎為Patch新聞網這樣的企業提供了一個巨大的機會——據說，許多當地居民仍然希望隨時了解家門口正在發生的事情。然而，自美國在線公司CEO蒂姆?阿姆斯特朗于2009年以估計約700萬美元的價格收購Patch新聞網以來，后者一直難以實現盈利。2011年，Patch新聞網獲得2,000萬美元營收；一位前員工告訴《財富》雜志( Fortune)，在Patch新聞網旗下的863家網站中，那時僅有12家實現了盈利。向前快進兩年：阿姆斯特朗本月宣布，900家Patch新聞站點中將有400家關閉或合并，從而將導致500名員工失去工作。老天。

????某種程度上，Patch新聞網和此前其他超本地化嘗試的問題都與它們迅速擴張的方式有關。“它們沒來得及完善產品就開始全方位出擊了。現在回想起來，這不是一個理想的做法，”一位前美國在線公司高管去年對《財富》雜志說。說句公道話，如阿姆斯特朗所言，三分之一的Patch新聞站點已經成功了，還有三分之一很可能將扭虧為盈。如果Patch新聞網不負阿姆斯特朗的承諾，到年底基本上實現盈利的話，它肯定將要經歷一番激烈掙扎和重大戰略調整，比如邀請博客貢獻內容，全面削減預算等等。

????事實上，更好的方式聽起來基礎得可笑，但非常重要：先做好核心產品，然后再謀求成長。Patch新聞網先發展，再解決問題，爾后處理急躁擴張所造成的不良后果。此外，不同地域將以不同方式使用一款產品，在一個市場備受追捧的內容往往不受另一市場青睞。新的超本地化初創公司應該汲取Patch新聞網的前車之鑒。

????Nextdoor公司CEO尼拉夫?托利亞坦言：“一旦開始把編輯團隊分散在數百個，乃至數千個不同的站點，怎么說呢，我實在想不出一個行之有效的例子。”托利亞欽佩Patch新聞網的努力，但對于如何推動公司成長這個問題，他有不同看法。Nextdoor公司于2011年10月推出之前，托利亞和他的團隊先進行了長達一年的試點，檢驗其以社區為中心的社交網絡創意，學習這些網絡的應用之道，同時對功能作出相應地調整。Nextdoor公司的首批測試平臺之一是門洛帕克市一個擁有150家住戶的社區——這家公司認為，于所有社區而言，這個數字是一個最佳容量點。但更多的測試得出了相反的結論，每個社交網絡的家庭數量在500至3,000家之間。

????Ever heard of EveryBlock or Village Soup? What about Backfence? Each community-focused venture launched, then folded. Many more so-called hyperlocal sites have also tried and failed. Even AOL's Patch news sites have had trouble sticking. Their struggles beg the question: Why is hyperlocal so hard?

????It shouldn't be in theory, at least where news is concerned. The ongoing decline of small, local newspapers presents what seems like a significant opportunity for ventures like Patch. (Arguably, many local residents still want to stay informed on nearby goings-on.) And yet the company that AOL (AOL) CEO Tim Armstrong acquired for an estimated $7 million back in 2009 has since struggled to reach profitability. In 2011, Patch made $20 million in revenues; a former employee told Fortune that just 12 of the 863 Patch sites then were profitable. Fast-forward two years: Armstrong announced this month that 400 of Patch's 900 sites would either be shuttered or partnered off, resulting in 500 employees losing their jobs. Ouch.

????Part of Patch's problem, and other previous hyperlocal efforts, has to do with way it rapidly expanded. "They went all in before they perfected the product, and in retrospect, that wasn't ideal," a former AOL executive told Fortune last year. To be fair, Armstrong has said one-third of Patch sites are already successful, while the other third will likely turn a profit. If Patch becomes largely profitable by the end of year, which Armstrong has pledged, it will have done so amid serious struggles and major changes in strategy, from having bloggers contribute content to trimming budgets across the board.

????Indeed, the better approach sounds ridiculously basic but important: get the core product right first, then grow from there. Patch grew first, problem-solved later, then dealt with the fallout caused by its brash expansion. Also, different geographic areas will use a product differently, with popular content in one market being less read in another. New hyperlocal startups should be taking note of Patch's failures.

????"When you start to fragment editorial into hundreds if not thousands of different sites, well, I can't think of an example that's worked," admits Nirav Tolia, CEO of Nextdoor, who admires Patch's efforts but differs on how to grow a company. Prior to Nextdoor's launch in October 2011, Tolia and his team spent a year in a pilot phase, testing out their idea of neighborhood-focused social networks, learning how they were used, and tweaking features accordingly. One of Nextdoor's first testbeds was a Menlo Park neighborhood with 150 households, a number the company believed would be the average sweet spot for all neighborhoods. But more testing proved otherwise, with each network ranging between 500 and 3,000 homes.