????2003年6月2日加州桑尼維爾消息

????惠普與Opsware公司聯(lián)手加強(qiáng)惠普公用數(shù)據(jù)中心自動(dòng)化系統(tǒng)

????2006年2月13日加州桑尼維爾消息

????Opsware公司宣布與思科公司達(dá)成全球分銷協(xié)議

????這兩個(gè)標(biāo)題聽起來非常相似——“小企業(yè)與大公司合作，開拓更大的市場(chǎng)”——但最終卻導(dǎo)致了兩種截然不同的結(jié)果。我們公司2003年與惠普公司（HP）簽訂的協(xié)議沒有創(chuàng)造任何收入，但2006年與思科公司（Cisco）的合作卻為我們帶來了數(shù)千萬美元的銷售額，并幫助Opsware公司成為數(shù)據(jù)中心軟件領(lǐng)域難以企及的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。為什么一份合約大獲成功，而另一份卻一敗涂地呢？

????一家擁有絕佳產(chǎn)品的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)時(shí)常面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是：把產(chǎn)品擺到足夠多的客戶面前，說服他們購買。在理論上，與惠普、EMC或沃達(dá)豐（Vodafone）這樣的公司達(dá)成合作協(xié)議，讓它們向其客戶銷售你的產(chǎn)品，是覆蓋市場(chǎng)、促使銷售速度成倍提升的好辦法。但在實(shí)踐中，大多數(shù)“大衛(wèi)-歌利亞”(David-Goliath)式的分銷協(xié)議都類似于我們?cè)?003年與惠普公司的合作：它們都是不錯(cuò)的公關(guān)手法，但也就僅此而已。以下是這類合作通常的演變路徑：

????? 分銷協(xié)議大張旗鼓地公布于眾，公司內(nèi)外都抱有極高的期望。

????? 歌利亞需要你調(diào)整產(chǎn)品，同時(shí)在培訓(xùn)和其他方面給予其大量幫助才會(huì)愿意試著推銷你的產(chǎn)品。

????? 歌利亞在產(chǎn)品功能和支持方面的要求讓你們公司業(yè)已超負(fù)荷運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的員工團(tuán)隊(duì)疲于應(yīng)對(duì)。

????? 你缺乏足夠的理由指派專人去支持歌利亞，因?yàn)槟愀揪筒淮_定這樣做能創(chuàng)造新的收入。

????? 歌利亞一套產(chǎn)品也沒有賣出去，甚至有可能出現(xiàn)更糟糕的一幕：歌利亞與你們公司自身的銷售團(tuán)隊(duì)相互競(jìng)相，爭(zhēng)奪你們?cè)居型愿叩睦麧櫬手苯于A得的客戶。

????? 雙方的“合作關(guān)系”無疾而終，不僅破壞了你與歌利亞的關(guān)系，還在公司內(nèi)部留下了苦澀的回憶。

????一些初創(chuàng)企業(yè)往往應(yīng)為沒有哪一個(gè)合作伙伴能夠完全依靠自己的力量完成產(chǎn)品的分銷，從而抵擋不住“以量取勝”的誘惑，與盡可能多的分銷伙伴簽約。盡管過度覆蓋市場(chǎng)的策略或許能帶來暫時(shí)的慰藉，但這樣做在實(shí)踐中只會(huì)成倍增加企業(yè)所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。比沒有分銷伙伴更糟糕的情形是試圖管理多個(gè)效率低下、在市場(chǎng)上相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的分銷伙伴，疲于應(yīng)付它們的種種要求。

????SUNNYVALE, Calif., June 2, 2003

????HP and Opsware Inc. Join Forces to Deliver Enhanced Automation for HP's Utility Data Center

????SUNNYVALE, Calif., Feb. 13, 2006

????Opsware Announces Worldwide Distribution Agreement with Cisco

????These two headlines sound pretty similar—"Small company partners with giant company to reach a bigger market"—but they led to two very different outcomes. Our 2003 deal with HP (HPQ) didn't generate a single dollar in revenue, whereas our 2006 agreement with Cisco (CSCO) drove tens of millions of dollars in sales and helped to make Opsware the uncatchable leader in data center software. Why did one succeed spectacularly while the other never took off?

????As a startup with the best product, your challenge is often getting it in front of enough customers and getting them to buy. In theory, striking a deal to have an HP or an EMC (EMC) or a Vodafone (VOD) sell your product to their customers is the way to cover the market and exponentially increase sales velocity. In practice, however, most "David-Goliath" distribution deals turn out like our 2003 HP deal: great PR, but not much else. Here's the way it typically plays out:

????? The deal is announced with great fanfare and high internal and external expectations.

????? Goliath needs product changes, training and lots of help to even attempt to sell your product.

????? Goliath deluges your already overloaded people with feature and support requests.

????? You can't justify assigning dedicated people to support Goliath because you can't bank on any new revenue.

????? Goliath sells nothing, or even worse, ends up competing against your sales team for customers you would have won directly at a higher margin.

????? The "partnership" quietly withers away, leaving a damaged relationship with Goliath and a bad taste inside the company.

????The temptation for some startups is try to "make it up in volume"—sign as many distribution partners as possible on the basis that none of them is likely to deliver much on their own. While that degree of over-coverage might feel temporarily reassuring, it only multiplies the challenges exponentially in practice. The only thing worse than having no partners is trying to manage multiple ineffective partners competing with each other in the market and drowning the company with their demands.