????和很多人一樣，一直以來，我眼看著團購網站Groupon公司疾如流星般的迅速崛起，也看到過去幾周來與之相伴的一些負面報道甚囂塵上。我并不了解該公司的任何內幕，但我曾公開表示，對該公司創始人以及他們能如此迅速壯大起來的業務，我感到欽佩。

????必須明確指出，我認為Groupon絕不僅僅是一個每日特價的郵寄清單。長期來看，這一業務具有估值超過200億美元的潛力并非不可思議——這是眾多小型商戶卓有成效的營銷解決方案。該公司應該能發展到這樣一個特定階段，屆時它能向小型商戶提供一些工具，使之能基于人口統計學資料、地理位置、過往購買行為和其他確定目標市場的選擇向客戶提供目標非常精準的團購產品或服務。這實質上是在向小型商戶提供產出管理（yield management）及某種動態定價系統（dynamic pricing）。對各商家和消費者來說，所有這些都是大買賣，是雙贏方案。

????分享這個商機的入場券就是消費者的參與程度。Groupon與其競爭者已開始爭奪地盤，在盡可能多的領域里拼湊盡可能龐大的特價清單。從理論上說，這個清單越大，鎖定目標消費者和進行產出管理的機會就越大。

????但是，這個市場已出現了一些問題。而我懷疑，目前的情況是，這一領域最優秀的公司淪為犧牲品才換來了整個團購行業商業模式的成功。其結果是，Groupon，LivingSocial公司（美國第二大團購網站——譯注）及其他公司能融到數額驚人的資本。而大眾媒體（在團購聚合網站如Yipit所提供服務的協助下）能相當精確地摸清各家競爭者的規模及其相對增長率。這使得要繼續擴大特價清單和提高營收變得壓力重重。而要想這么做，最好的辦法就是號召更多新商家加入，說服它們提供大幅折扣，盡可能多賣優惠券，維持運轉。

????我對這個行業有個純屬空想的看法，即出現一家規模龐大、真正持久經營的公司。但情況與目前稍有不同。與當前這個市場所享有的凈收入與收入總額之比在30%到40%的區間相比，這一比例將在15%的區間內徘徊。這是一個比較合理，與其他類型的聯屬網絡營銷（affiliate marketing）項目相一致的值。它也能讓小型商戶可以依靠規模營銷賺錢，或是提高優惠券的平均價值使之更具吸引力。我想，屆時會出現幅度更小的折扣和定位更精準的團購項目。

????參與團購的商家也能享有更大的控制權，并獲得更多的指導，以便從其與這類公司的關系中獲得最大的回報。

????最后，消費者也能有多種方式和所提供的服務互動，而不是僅僅每天收到一封團購優惠的電子郵件。屆時將會出現圍繞本地商家提供的優質內容，絕佳的移動體驗，消費者可以自主決定是否接受對其消費行為的追蹤以便獲得更好的產品和服務，等等。這樣一家公司可能沒有Groupon或LivingSocial那么強勁的增長勢頭，但卻能建立更穩固的基礎，成為一家持續發展的公司。

????不幸的是，當前有太多公司在做上述服務中的某一塊了。但如果沒有Groupon和LivingSocial那樣龐大的消費群規模，任何一家這類公司都難以將其落到實處。更糟糕的是，當前小型商戶和消費者都對特價服務厭倦至極，要贏得消費者注意變得更加困難了。

????我想，有朝一日，不再有這么多錢愚蠢地流入已經處于發展末期的互聯網公司，這一領域的領頭羊才會會更謹慎地拓展業務，并打造出能長期受到商戶和消費者喜愛的服務。可惜，這并非當今世界的現狀。也許當前市場某個巨頭會成為我上面描述的那種公司，持久經營下去。又或者它們只是一個雛形，是行業新星即將到來的一種預兆，正如當年的Lycos（最早提供信息搜索服務的網站之一——譯注）和Alta Vista（一度最為流行的搜索引擎）之于后來的谷歌公司（Google）。時間將會告訴我們一切——畢竟谷歌已經成為了現實。

????Rob Go是NextView風險投資公司的聯合創始人。這是一家種子期投資公司，專注于互聯網創新應用。他此前曾在Spark Capital投資公司工作，其博客地址是www.robgo.org。

????譯者：清遠

????Like many people, I've been watching the meteoric rise of Groupon as well as some of the negative press we've been seeing the last several weeks. I am not privy to any private information about the company, but I've said publicly that I admire the founders and the kind of business they have been able to build so quickly.

????For the record, I think that Groupon is much more than a deal-of-the-day mailing list. The long-term $20 billion+ potential for this business is not really a mystery -- it's as a performance marketing solution for small businesses. The company should get to the point where they can give small businesses the tools to make very targeted offers to consumers based on demographics, location, past purchase behavior, and other targeting options. You essentially offer the small business yield management and somewhat dynamic pricing. All of these are big deals and are win-win for businesses and consumers.

????The price of admission into this opportunity is consumers engagement. Groupon and its competitors embarked on a land grab, amassing as large a list as possible in as many regions as possible. In theory, the larger the list, the better the opportunity for targeting and yield management.

????But, something has gone wrong in this market. And I suspect this is a case where the best companies in this space are victims of the model's success. As a result, Groupon, LivingSocial and others have been able to raise monstrous amounts of capital. The general press (enabled by services like Yipit) is able to track with pretty good accuracy what the scale is of the various competitors and their relative growth rates. This puts massive pressure to continue to grow lists and grow revenue. And the best way to do that is to call on brand new businesses, convince them to offer massive discounts, sell as many coupons as possible, and move on.

????My armchair observer's view of this business is that there is a massive and truly enduring company here. But it would look a little different. Net revenue / Gross Revenue would be in the 15% range, as opposed to the 30-40% range that is currently enjoyed by the market. This is a rational amount that is consistent with other affiliate marketing programs. It also allows the small business to potentially make money on the sale, or to increase the average value of the coupon to make it more enticing. I think you'd also see smaller discounts and much more targeted offers.

????Merchants would also have much more controls and receive more guidance to getting the most out of their relationship with these companies.

????Finally, consumers would have multiple ways to engage with the service vs. just a daily email. You'd see great content around local businesses, there would be an excellent mobile experience, you'd have the option to have your purchases tracked to provide better offers, etc. This company probably would have had slower top-line growth than Groupon or LivingSocial, but would have built a stronger foundation for an enduring company.

????The sad thing is that there are so many companies doing pieces of this. But it's going to be hard for anyone to really nail it without the massive consumer scale that Groupon and LivingSocial have. And, to make matters worse, both SMBs and consumers is now extremely fatigued with deal services, making it ever harder to win anyone's attention.

????I think in another time, when there wasn't so much money foolishly piling into late stage internet companies, the leaders in this space would have grown more carefully, and built a service that merchants and consumers would love for a long time. Sadly, that is not the state of the world today. Maybe one of the market leaders will become the company I have described above and will be enduring. Or maybe they will be the Lycos and Alta Vista heralding a future Google. Time will tell – but a Google does exist here.

????Rob Go is co-founder of NextView Ventures, a seed-stage investment firm focused on Internet-enabled innovation. He previously was with Spark Capital, and blogs over at www.robgo.org