????我們不斷在這個星球上架設一些明知可能引發(fā)災難性后果的系統(tǒng)。典型的例子就是核電站：這些裝有危險濃縮物質的電站往往位于人口密集地區(qū)，而且由于核電行業(yè)的合并，核電站所有者具有很大的政治影響力。不幸的是，現(xiàn)在我們看到了高度集中帶來的苦果。

????日本作為一個其他能源匱乏的島國，沿著海岸線分布著不少核電站；其中兩個核電站——福島和女川核電站更是建于地震活躍帶上。文件顯示，日本的監(jiān)管部門和經理人們將“最糟情景”視為“離群值”——即“非真實風險”。2006年，一個名為日本原子力安全委員會（Nuclear Safety Commission）的團體認識到了海嘯襲擊日本沿海核電站的危險，但最終給出了令人安慰的結論：“即便是非常接近海平面的核電站，反應堆周圍堅實密閉的安全殼結構也能阻止海嘯對核部分造成損傷，雖然核電站其他部分可能遭到損毀。不太可能出現(xiàn)放射性危害。”我們現(xiàn)在知道了那些安全殼結構事實上是多么地難當重任。

????核電行業(yè)目前由少數(shù)幾家公司主導。西屋電氣（Westinghouse）被東芝（Toshiba）收購了；法國公司阿海琺（Areva）主導著歐洲市場，目前在美國開展聯(lián)合項目。Exelon和Entergy經營著美國大部分核電站。行業(yè)整合使得企業(yè)的規(guī)模和影響力足以游說政府減少監(jiān)管，幫助它們提高運營效率——實現(xiàn)一個又一個季度的利潤最大化。（雖然核電行業(yè)應從長計議——由于審批和規(guī)劃，建設一座核電站可能需時10年，而核電站的使用年限為40-60年——但核電公司同其他企業(yè)一樣難逃華爾街短期心態(tài)的影響。）

????但在這個危險的行業(yè)中，更具威脅性的集中或許在于核電機組的集中化。東京電力（Tokyo Electric）旗下有一個核電站的機組數(shù)量達到了7個；福島第一核電站（Fukushima Daiichi）現(xiàn)有核電機組6個，計劃新增2個。這使得它們很容易受到外接電源斷電、應急電源遭水淹等“共模”故障的沖擊，危險提高了6倍。假如有關部門曾以較低的經濟處罰要求這些核電站分散機組，地震和海嘯的威脅就能大為降低。

????不幸中的萬幸？監(jiān)管部門已表示將從福島危機中汲取教訓，提高核電站的安全性。3月12日，美國核學會（American Nuclear Society）點評了這些嚴重事件，但持續(xù)的行業(yè)風險分析讓我們感到安慰：在這樣的一場災難中，“封閉放射性材料實際上可以被視為一項‘成功’，畢竟這樣級別的自然災害并未納入最初的設計范疇。核電行業(yè)將從此次事件汲取教訓，重新設計核設施，令它們未來能夠更安全。”在災難中，我們警醒自救。

????--本文作者Charles Perrow是耶魯大學社會學名譽教授，《下一場災難》（The Next Catastrophe）一書的作者。

????We continue to populate our planet with systems that have catastrophic potential despite the known risks. Case in point: Nuclear power plants, which house fearful concentrations of hazardous materials, are often located in densely populated areas, and whose owners wield great political clout thanks to consolidation in the nuclear power industry. Unfortunately we are now seeing the consequences of this centralization.

????Japan, an island without other energy sources, has sprinkled its coastline with nuclear power plants; two, the Fukushima and the Onagawa facilities, were built in an area known for its seismic activity. Documents show regulators and managers in Japan treated "worst case" events as outliers—not real risks. In 2006 a group called the Nuclear Safety Commission recognized the danger of tsunamis hitting Japan's coastal plants but reassuringly concluded: "Even for a nuclear plant situated very close to sea level, the robust sealed containment structure around the reactor itself would prevent any damage to the nuclear part from a tsunami, though other parts of the plant might be damaged. No radiological hazard would be likely." We now know how inadequate those containment structures proved to be.

????The nuclear industry is dominated by a handful of companies. Westinghouse was bought by Toshiba; the French company Areva dominates in Europe and is now in joint projects in the U.S., one company supplies it with a third of its electric power. Exelon (EXC) and Entergy (ETR) run most of them in the U.S. Consolidation has given companies size and influence to lobby governments for less oversight, which helps them operate more efficiently--and maximize profits quarter after quarter. (Though the industry by necessity has to think long term—due to permissions and planning it may take 10 years to build a facility that will have a 40- to 60-year life span—nuclear power companies are as beholden to Wall Street's short-term mentality as any corporation.)

????But perhaps a more threatening form of concentration in this dangerous industry is at the facility level. One of Tokyo Electric's facilities has 7 plants on one site; Fukushima Daiichi has 6 and plans to build two more there. This makes them obvious targets for a "common mode" failure such as loss of off-site power and flooding of sources of emergency power, increasing the danger six-fold. Had the facilities been required to disperse their plants, at some small economic penalty, earthquake and tsunami risks would be greatly reduced.

????The silver lining? Regulators now say they will use lessons from the disaster at Fukushima to improve nuclear plant safety. On March 12 the American Nuclear Society noted the dire events, but continuing the tradition of risk analysis in the industry reassured us: In an event like this, "containing the radioactive materials could actually be considered a 'success' given the scale of this natural disaster that had not been considered in the original design. The nuclear power industry will learn from this event, and redesign our facilities as needed to make them safer in the future." In our disasters is our salvation.

????--Charles Perrow, emeritus professor of sociology, Yale University, is the author of The Next Catastrophe.